chapter on Darwinian militarism. In two of these sentences I criticize Bryan’s position on the Darwinian roots of World War I. Thus it escapes me what the “good political reasons” are for seeing my book as a contest between Hitler and Bryan. Also, how could I have distorted the Scopes trial when I don’t even mention it anywhere in my book? Even more bizarre is Weikart’s absurd claim that my book supports a “theocratic agenda,” when he knows nothing about my political views. He would undoubtedly be astonished if he only knew.

Again, I thank Zimmerman, whom I respect as a fine scholar, for admitting that “Weikart admirably demonstrates the influence of Darwinism on Nazi racism and genocide,” and for acknowledging the value of my research. However, the credibility of his criticisms of my book is undermined by his wildly wrong claim that I support a “theocratic agenda.”

RICHARD WEIKART
California State University, Stanislaus

ANDREW ZIMMERMAN RESPONDS:

In my review I argued that Richard Weikart’s book, for all its fine research, distorts the history of Darwinism and anti-Darwinism in Germany in ways that reflect theocratic agendas in present-day American politics. By theocratic agendas I mean attempts to trump considerations of individual liberty with religious dogma in areas including reproduction, sexuality, and end-of-life decisions. These areas are among those mentioned by Weikart in his own text, even though they were at most peripheral to debates about Darwinism in Imperial Germany. *From Darwin to Hitler* is structured around a contest between Darwinism and Christian ethics, which Weikart characterizes as a contest between proponents of death and life, respectively. This representation is anachronistic, projecting present-day theocratic agendas onto the history of science in Imperial Germany. It also tendentiously simplifies both Darwinism and Christianity. I pointed to Professor Weikart’s failure to mention the Scopes monkey trial in his prominent and approving citations of William Jennings Bryan not as a “climax” to my review, but rather as a dog that did not bark in the night: it signaled, but did not in itself constitute, significant and systematic weaknesses in the book, weaknesses that I discussed and documented in my review.

ANDREW ZIMMERMAN
George Washington University

TO THE EDITORS:

In his review of my book *Closer to the Masses: Stalinist Culture, Social Revolution, and Soviet Newspapers* (AHR, April 2005, 588–589), Jeffrey Brooks suggests that I appropriated his work (the book *Thank You, Comrade Stalin* and earlier articles) without attribution. This suggestion is baseless, as anyone who reads through his and my published work on the Soviet press can discover for themselves.

In specific references I cite Professor Brooks’s influence on my definition of the “voices” of the Soviet press (23, 25), his production of culture approach to the study of prerevolutionary Russian literature (3), his demonstration that activists used the press to learn official Soviet language (72), his work on the disappearance of Soviet studies of the reader around 1930 (2, 34), his exploration of the negative attitudes of prerevolutionary Russian intellectuals to commercial culture (35, 213), his article on the decline in the circulation of books and newspapers in the USSR in the Civil War and NEP years (16, 46), and his discussion of the creation of a Stalinist “hyperreality” in the Soviet press and literature post-1929 (166). In addition, I cite most of Brooks’s published work on the Soviet press in an early footnote, as he notes in his review.

In his review, Brooks focuses on the fact that both of our books discuss a narrowing of the target audience(s) of Soviet newspapers to party activists/“insiders” during the First Five Year Plan. Brooks appears to indicate that I took this idea from him. First, I formulated this thesis in a seminar paper written for Professor Sheila Fitzpatrick in the winter of 1992–1993, before Professor Brooks had published it anywhere, as far as I know. I expanded on the thesis in my dissertation, which was complete and available to the public as of December 1997. I presented the thesis on the retargeting of the Soviet press (as well as the other core arguments of *Closer to the Masses*) in my short 1998 monograph *Agitation, Propaganda, and the “Stalinization” of the Soviet Press, 1922–1930*, published in the University of Pittsburgh’s Carl Beck Papers series two years before Brooks’s book appeared. Yet Brooks’s book does not cite either my monograph or my dissertation.

Second, Brooks mentions the narrowing of the newspaper audience in passing, and in general terms. In contrast, this phenomenon is at the center of my book. The book demonstrates that by 1930 the formerly “highbrow” *Pravda* and *Izvestiia* had come to resemble closely the “mass newspapers” *Peasant Gazette* and *Worker Gazette*, not just in language and layout, but in distribution methods and journalistic work procedures. I link this change to specific decisions of party leaders, to chronic production problems faced by early Soviet journalists, and to difficulties in distributing the newspapers. Professor Brooks does not do any of this, which is fine. His is a different book, focused more on newspaper content than on newspaper production.

I also note that our books differ greatly in source bases and use of theoretical literature. At the core of Brooks’s book is his comprehensive reading of several Soviet newspapers from the 1920s through the end of the Stalin era. My *Closer to the Masses* is based in part, of course, on the newspapers themselves, but also on Soviet archives, literary journals, and the trade publi-
cations produced by Soviet journalists, such as Journalist. Brooks makes a wide variety of theoretical references, but arguably Erving Goffman’s work on public performance is at the center of his book. In contrast, I make use of the work of the functional linguistics of Roger Fowler and M. A. K. Halliday as well as the work of neo-Weberian political scientists such as Ken Jowitt. My use of functional linguistics, my analysis of Soviet use of the terms “agitation” and “propaganda,” and my statistical analysis of the newspaper space devoted specifically to ongoing Central Committee propaganda campaigns in 1925 and 1933 all differentiate my investigation of newspaper language from Brooks’s content analysis, presented in his book and in earlier articles.

During the 1990s, a number of North American scholars were working in parallel on the early history of the Soviet press, including Julie Kay Mueller, Steven Coe, and Michael Gorham, as well as Brooks and myself. In addition, Russian scholars such as Evgenii Dobrenko were working on closely related topics. There was both cross-fertilization and coincidence of conclusions. My sense is that all of us were making a good-faith effort to acknowledge intellectual debts. I am sorry that Professor Brooks does not share that sense.

MATTHEW LENOE
Hokkaido University
Sapporo, Japan

Jeffrey Brooks does not wish to respond.

THE EDITORS

TO THE EDITORS:


Let me at the outset clarify that neither is my book about the conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir nor was it occasioned by the “near war of 2001–2002.” It grew out of my doctoral dissertation, defended at Columbia University in May 1999. It deals with state-making processes in colonial India, their problems of establishing legitimate authority, and the place of rights and religion in popular resistance. Examining the strategies of the British imperial government and the Dogra rulers of Kashmir, evolved reciprocally, my work explains why and how legitimacy for the latter was derived from arenas such as the patronage of Hindu rituals and “tradition,” how the concept of subjects’ rights came to be circulated in Kashmir, why demands for rights were made in the religious mode, and what imprint this left on Hindu-Muslim relations and on expressions of regional solidarity.

I neither suggest a static set of relations between the imperial government, Dogra rulers, and their subjects, Hindu and Muslim, nor do I treat these latter groups or their experiences of the state as homogeneous. Identifying shifts in the paramount power’s terms for legitimacy, I explain their implications for the Dogras’ Hindu sovereignty. Chapters four and five highlight not only the debates and political rivalries within Hindu and Muslim communities, but also how erstwhile allies of the Dogras, Muslim and Hindu, later opposed the state in defense of endangered privileges and rights.

In paragraph seven, the reviewer draws on a final chapter kept deliberately free of footnotes (barring three) to criticize assertions in it for being unsubstantiated by footnotes. Both of his quotations come from my brief conclusion, where the aim was to summarize my arguments and to indicate some lines of continuity from the colonial past, which I spend five long chapters examining, into the post-1947 period, which is not the book’s focus.

The first passage, truncated in quotation, is: “Without conceding an inch in their own adherence to Islam, at the moment of the partition of India most Kashmiri Muslims voted clearly (and the vast majority continue to do so today) against the Pakistan option.” I use “vote” here in the general sense of an expression of opinion rather than the mechanical act of casting a ballot. My point is that the political articulation of religious identity notwithstanding, most Kashmiri Muslims did not embrace a vision of separate statehood founded on religious commonality alone—the “Pakistan option.” This assessment derives from the rhetoric of Sheikh Abdullah, widely considered the most popular politician in Kashmir at the time of partition, in which being Kashmiri was emphasized as much as being Muslim.

As for how I determine that “today the vast majority of Kashmir’s Muslims largely believe that they are scarcely better off than they were through 101 years of Dogra rule,” I would have thought a popularly based and long-lasting insurgency ample indication of widespread discontentment against the state. The problem of political legitimacy in Kashmir clearly remains.

In pointing to the “tenuous nature” of India’s secularism, specifically secularism as state ideology, I refer precisely to its “intertwining” with “communalism” in the nationalist project that the reviewer mentions. This interlocking has allowed even the Hindu right-wing BJP to call itself secular. It is the politics of religious bigotry that the reviewer seems to mean when describing “communalism” as a “brutal, experienced reality.” Without denying this, I contend that, as the history of Kashmir shows, not all politics in the religious idiom is necessarily “communal” in this pejorative sense. I do argue that religion is an important “language of both power and resistance” in Kashmir. Nowhere do I suggest that it is “primordial.” I delineate the particular historical contexts in which religious identities were politically articulated by rulers and subjects.

Finally, since no specific instances of “invective” have been cited, I am unable to explain myself. As for “secession from scholarship” in the book, I leave it to

MATTHEW LENOE
Hokkaido University
Sapporo, Japan

Jeffrey Brooks does not wish to respond.

THE EDITORS