|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Appendices** | | | | | | | | |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Table A1: Two-Stage Model using Predictors from Rauh (2015) as endogenous to Freedom from Influence | | | | | | | | |
|  | Predict Leg 1 | | Predict Leg 2 | | Predict Gov 1 | | Predict Gov 2 | |
| (Intercept) | -0.253 |  | -0.136 |  | -0.092 |  | -0.153 |  |
|  | (0.138) |  | (0.136) |  | (0.161) |  | (0.160) |  |
| Autonomy ~ Budget per Monitored + Legislative Appoint Authority | 0.221 | \* |  |  |  |  | -0.209 | \* |
|  | (0.101) |  |  |  |  |  | (0.111) |  |
| Autonomy ~ Budget per Monitored + Executive Appoint Authority |  |  | -0.219 | \* | 0.402 | \*\* |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.108) |  | (0.120) |  |  |  |
| Budget per Monitored Individual | 0.000 | \*\*\* | 0.000 | \*\*\* | 0.000 |  | 0.000 | \*\* |
|  | 0.000 |  | 0.000 |  | 0.000 |  | 0.000 |  |
| Lack of Budget Independence | -0.184 | \*\*\* | -0.178 | \*\*\* | -0.179 | \*\*\* | -0.187 | \*\*\* |
|  | (0.025) |  | (0.025) |  | (0.028) |  | (0.029) |  |
| Staff per Monitored Individual | -0.016 | \* | -0.014 | \* | -0.015 |  | -0.018 | \* |
|  | (0.007) |  | (0.007) |  | (0.008) |  | (0.008) |  |
| Regulation for Legislature | 0.002 | \*\* | 0.002 | \*\*\* |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.001) |  | (0.001) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Regulations for Executive |  |  |  |  | 0.003 | \*\* | 0.002 | \* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.001) |  | (0.001) |  |
| Fulltime Commission | 0.08 | \*\* | 0.045 |  | 0.048 |  | 0.083 | \*\* |
|  | (0.028) |  | (0.027) |  | (0.030) |  | (0.030) |  |
| p Dem/Strong Dem | 0.524 | \*\* | 0.34 |  | 0.373 |  | 0.476 | \* |
|  | (0.188) |  | (0.189) |  | (0.217) |  | (0.214) |  |
| Spatial Index | -0.048 |  | -0.085 |  | -0.101 |  | -0.07 |  |
|  | (0.142) |  | (0.141) |  | (0.164) |  | (0.163) |  |
| Unified State Government | -0.051 | \*\* | -0.053 | \*\*\* | -0.066 | \*\*\* | -0.063 | \*\*\* |
|  | (0.016) |  | (0.016) |  | (0.018) |  | (0.018) |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Significance:\*0.05, \*\*0.01, \*\*\*0.001 | | | | | | | | |
| logLik | 18.988 |  | 19.751 |  | 24.969 |  | 26.097 |  |
| Note that the signs are consistent with the model in table 2. Comparing LRs shows that the more parsimonious model is preferred. Bootstrap se estimated using method proposed by Keljian (1971). | | | | | | | | |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Table A2: Predicting Effectiveness of Regulation - Southern Variable Included | | | | | | | | |
|  | Predict Leg 1 | | Predict Leg 2 | | Predict Gov 1 | | Predict Gov 2 | |
| (Intercept) | -0.005 |  | -0.06 |  | -0.532 | \*\* | -0.403 | \* |
|  | (0.168) |  | (0.168) |  | (0.200) |  | (0.197) |  |
| Free from Legislative Influence | -0.038 | \*\* |  |  |  |  | -0.088 | \*\*\* |
|  | (0.018) |  |  |  |  |  | (0.019) |  |
| Freedom from Executive Influence |  |  | 0.017 |  | 0.037 | \*\* |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.012) |  | (0.013) |  |  |  |
| Budget per Monitored Individual | 0.000 | \*\*\* | 0.000 | \*\*\* | 0.000 | \*\*\* | 0.000 | \*\*\* |
|  | 0.000 |  | 0.000 |  | 0.000 |  | 0.000 |  |
| Lack of Budget Independence | -0.148 | \*\*\* | -0.118 | \*\*\* | -0.135 | \*\*\* | -0.208 | \*\*\* |
|  | (0.031) |  | (0.031) |  | (0.034) |  | (0.034) |  |
| Staff per Monitored Individual | -0.02 | \*\* | -0.021 | \* | -0.015 |  | -0.015 |  |
|  | (0.009) |  | (0.009) |  | (0.010) |  | (0.010) |  |
| Regulations for Legislature | 0 |  | 0 |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.001) |  | (0.001) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Regulations for Executive |  |  |  |  | 0.006 | \*\*\* | 0.007 | \*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.001) |  | (0.001) |  |
| Fulltime Commission | -0.07 | \*\*\* | -0.078 | \* | 0.012 |  | 0.028 |  |
|  | (0.032) |  | (0.032) |  | (0.035) |  | (0.035) |  |
| p Dem/Strong Dem | 1.469 | \*\*\* | 1.476 | \*\*\* | 1.648 | \*\*\* | 1.646 | \*\*\* |
|  | (0.224) |  | (0.224) |  | (0.251) |  | (0.248) |  |
| Spatial Index | 0.408 | \* | 0.507 | \*\* | 0.357 |  | 0.113 |  |
|  | (0.177) |  | (0.174) |  | (0.193) |  | (0.196) |  |
| South | -0.171 | \* | -0.189 | \* | -0.282 | \*\* | -0.228 | \*\* |
|  | (0.076) |  | (0.076) |  | (0.083) |  | (0.082) |  |
| Non South: Unified Party | -0.054 | \* | -0.063 | \*\* | -0.057 | \* | -0.035 |  |
|  | (0.021) |  | (0.022) |  | (0.025) |  | (0.024) |  |
| South : Unified Party | -0.061 |  | -0.038 |  | -0.043 |  | -0.104 |  |
|  | (0.050) |  | (0.051) |  | (0.056) |  | (0.056) |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Significance: \*0.05, \*\*0.01, \*\*\*0.001 | | | | | | | |  |
| logLIK | -25.829 |  | -25.922 |  | -29.311 |  | -28.828 |  |

The signs are consistent with the model in table 2 indicating that the model is robust to introduction of additional variables. Comparing LRs shows that the more parsimonious model is preferred.