Brahmin Left versus Merchant Right: Changing Political Cleavages in 21 Western Democracies, 1948-2020[∗]

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July 2021

APPENDIX

This appendix supplements our paper "Brahmin Left versus Merchant Right: Changing Political Cleavages in 21 Western Democracies, 1948-2020". It contains additional methodological details, as well as supplementary figures and tables.

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This appendix supplements our paper "Brahmin Left versus Merchant Right: Changing Political Cleavages in Western Democracies, 1948-2020". Appendix A presents the methodology used to derive quantile groups from discrete categories. Appendix B contains supplementary figures and tables.

Appendix A. Estimation of quantile groups from discrete categories

One of the contributions of this paper is to provide data on the vote share received by specific parties and coalitions by income and education groups, decomposing for instance the population into its poorest or least educated half (the bottom 50%), the next 40% (the middle 40%), and the highest decile (the top 10%). Such groups are key to track political cleavages over time and compare them across countries. The problem is that existing surveys do not provide continuous values for income or education: these variables are most often coded in discrete categories (educational levels in the case of education, income brackets in the case of income).

To partially overcome this issue, we introduce a simple reweighing method, which exploits the distribution of individuals in each bracket or category to approximate quantiles. Consider for example the 2015 Canadian Election Study, which contains an income variable coded in eighteen brackets (see table 1). One is interested in computing the proportion of individuals belonging to the lowest income decile voting for the New Democratic Party $\bar{y}_{\{d=1\}}$, where y is a binary variable taking 1 is the respondent voted for the NDP and 0 otherwise, and where d refers to the income decile to which the respondents belong. Unfortunately, this is not directly possible with this income variable since only 5% of individuals belong to the first income bracket ($b = 1$), and 15.5% of them belong to the lowest two brackets ($b \in [1,2]$). If support for the NDP decreases linearly with income, then $\bar{y}_{\{b=1\}}$ will strongly overestimate $\bar{y}_{\{d=1\}}$, while $\bar{y}_{\{b=2\}}$ will strongly underestimate it since we are looking at individuals who are on average too poor in the first case and too rich in the second. However, it is easy to see that since individuals within the second bracket range from quantiles 0.05 to 0.155, this means that $\frac{0.05}{0.155-0.05} \approx 48\%$ of them belong to the bottom 10%, while 52% of them belong to the rest of the population, assuming for simplicity that individuals within brackets are uniformly distributed.

Table 1 - Reweighing categories to approximate quantiles: example for income brackets in Canada, 2015

Bracket number	Frequency range	Decile-specific reweighting factor

Bracket number	Frequency range	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1	0.000 - 0.050	1									
2	0.050 - 0.155	.48	.52								
3	0.155 - 0.201		.97	.03							
4	0.201 - 0.253			1							
5	0.253 - 0.309			.84	.16						
6	0.309 - 0.355				1						
7	0.355 - 0.478				.36	.64					
8	0.478 - 0.529					.43	.57				
9	0.529 - 0.554						1				
10	0.554 - 0.599						1				
11	0.599 - 0.652						.02	.98			
12	0.652 - 0.734							.59	.41		
13	0.734 - 0.767								1		
14	0.767 - 0.807								.82	.18	
15	0.807 - 0.876									1	
16	0.876 - 0.902									.92	.08
17	0.902 - 0.973										1
18	0.973 - 1.000										1

Note: author's computations based on the 2015 Canadian Election Study. *Interpretation*: individuals belonging to the second income bracket represent 10% of the population and are located above the 5% poorest individuals, but within the 15.5% poorest. Assuming that individuals' incomes are uniformly distributed within this income bracket, this implies that 48% of them belong to bottom 10% earners and 52% of them are in the second income decile. To approximate the mean of a variable y for individuals within the first decile of income, one can therefore give a weight of 1 to those in the first bracket, a weight of 0.48 to those in the second bracket, and compute the weighed mean of y over these individuals.

Therefore, a reasonable approximation of the vote share received by the NDP among bottom 10% earners is a weighed average of vote shares in the two brackets:

$$\bar{y}_{\{d=1\}} = \frac{1 \times \bar{y}_{\{b=1\}} + 0.48 \times \bar{y}_{\{b=2\}}}{1 + 0.48}$$

This estimator is consistent, assuming that the average value taken by the dependent variable is constant within brackets. In practice, however, it does make sense to believe that the vote shares vary also within brackets in the same direction as observed between them. Therefore, this approximation should be considered as a lower bound of the true effect. Still, this method

clearly does much better than computing deciles or quintiles directly from brackets – which could in fact not be quantile groups given that frequencies would necessarily be imbalanced.

Figure 1 - From brackets to deciles: vote for the New Democratic Party by income group in Canada, 2015


Figure 1 shows the results obtained when computing vote shares for the New Democratic Party in the 2015 Canadian national election. Unsurprisingly, the two pictures look very similar, since computing vote shares by decile amounts to computing weighed averages across income brackets.

Another interesting aspect of this method is that it enables us to control for structural changes not only in income, but also in other ordered variables such as education, wealth or even rural-urban scales. If university graduates were originally 5% in the 1960s and increased up to 30% in the 2010s, for instance, then one can exploit detailed educational categories to approximate "top 10% educated voters". In the 1960s, this category is composed of both university graduates and some secondary educated voters; in the 2010s, it gives more weight to individuals with masters or PhDs. This is what we do throughout the paper.

Finally, one issue is that 'splitting' brackets into deciles implies that a single individual may belong to different quantile groups: in the example above, individuals in bracket 2 belong both to the first and the second deciles. While this is not problematic when computing averages, it makes regression models impossible to solve: without changing the dataset, one cannot compare the vote shares of the first and second decile with control variables.

To solve this problem, we expand the entire dataset as many times as the number of quantile groups required. In the case of deciles, for instance, the procedure consists in duplicating all observations ten times. Then, one simply needs to attribute the corresponding weights to duplicated individuals: individuals belonging to bracket 2 see their sample weight multiplied by 0.48 in their first observation, 0.52 in the second time they appear in the dataset, and 0 in all other instances. Since this process only reweighs individuals, it leaves the effect of other explanatory variables perfectly unchanged. Finally, to account for correlation of the outcome variable of interest across duplicated observations, we cluster standard errors by individual.

Appendix B. Supplementary figures and tables

Table A1 - Data sources

Country	Election	Source
Australia	1966	International Social Mobility and Politics File (Franklin et al. 1992)
Australia	1972	International Social Mobility and Politics File (Franklin et al. 1992)
Australia	1977	International Social Mobility and Politics File (Franklin et al. 1992)
Australia	1983	International Social Mobility and Politics File (Franklin et al. 1992)
Australia	1984	International Social Mobility and Politics File (Franklin et al. 1992)
Australia	1987	Australian Election Study
Australia	1990	Australian Election Study
Australia	1993	Australian Election Study
Australia	1996	Australian Election Study
Australia	1998	Australian Election Study
Australia	2001	Australian Election Study
Australia	2004	Australian Election Study
Australia	2007	Australian Election Study
Australia	2010	Australian Election Study
Australia	2013	Australian Election Study
Australia	2016	Australian Election Study
Australia	2019	Australian Election Study
Austria	1971	International Social Mobility and Politics File (Franklin et al. 1992)
Austria	1983	International Social Mobility and Politics File (Franklin et al. 1992)
Austria	1986	International Social Mobility and Politics File (Franklin et al. 1992)
Austria	1994	Eurobarometers
Austria	1995	Eurobarometers
Austria	1999	Eurobarometers
Austria	2002	European Social Survey
Austria	2006	European Social Survey
Austria	2013	Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES)
Austria	2017	Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES)
Belgium	1971	Eurobarometers
Belgium	1974	Eurobarometers
Belgium	1977	Eurobarometers
Belgium	1978	Eurobarometers
Belgium	1981	Eurobarometers
Belgium	1985	Eurobarometers
Belgium	1987	Eurobarometers
Belgium	1991	Belgium General Election Study
Belgium	1995	Belgium General Election Study
Belgium	1999	Belgium General Election Study
Belgium	2003	European Social Survey
Belgium	2007	European Social Survey
Belgium	2010	European Social Survey
Belgium	2014	European Social Survey
Canada	1963	Canadian Election Studies
Canada	1965	Canadian Election Studies
Canada	1968	Canadian Election Studies
Canada	1974	Canadian Election Studies

Canada	1979	Canadian Election Studies
Canada	1980	Canadian Election Studies
Canada	1984	Canadian Election Studies
Canada	1988	Canadian Election Studies
Canada	1993	Canadian Election Studies
Canada	1997	Canadian Election Studies
Canada	2000	Canadian Election Studies
Canada	2004	Canadian Election Studies
Canada	2006	Canadian Election Studies
Canada	2008	Canadian Election Studies
Canada	2011	Canadian Election Studies
Canada	2015	Canadian Election Studies
Canada	2019	Canadian Election Studies
Denmark	1960	Danish Election Study
Denmark	1964	Danish Election Study
Denmark	1966	Danish Election Study
Denmark	1968	Danish Election Study
Denmark	1971	Danish Election Study
Denmark	1973	Danish Election Study
Denmark	1975	Danish Election Study
Denmark	1977	Danish Election Study
Denmark	1979	Danish Election Study
Denmark	1981	Danish Election Study
Denmark	1984	Danish Election Study
Denmark	1987	Danish Election Study
Denmark	1988	Danish Election Study
Denmark	1990	Danish Election Study
Denmark	1994	Danish Election Study
Denmark	1998	Danish Election Study
Denmark	2001	Danish Election Study
Denmark	2005	Danish Election Study
Denmark	2007	Danish Election Study
Denmark	2011	Danish Election Study
Denmark	2015	Danish Election Study
Finland	1972	Finnish Voter Barometers
Finland	1975	Finnish Voter Barometers
Finland	1979	Finnish Voter Barometers
Finland	1983	Finnish Voter Barometers
Finland	1987	Finnish Voter Barometers
Finland	1995	Finnish Voter Barometers
Finland	1999	Finnish Voter Barometers
Finland	2003	Finnish Voter Barometers
Finland	2007	Finnish National Election Studies
Finland	2011	Finnish National Election Studies
Finland	2015	Finnish National Election Studies
France	1956	French Election Studies
France	1958	French Election Studies
France	1962	French Election Studies
France	1965	French Election Studies
France	1967	French Election Studies

France	1973	French Election Studies
France	1974	French Election Studies
France	1978	French Election Studies
France	1986	French Election Studies
France	1988	French Election Studies
France	1993	French Election Studies
France	1995	French Election Studies
France	1997	French Election Studies
France	2002	French Election Studies
France	2007	French Election Studies
France	2012	French Election Studies
France	2017	French election studies
Germany	1949	German Federal Election Studies
Germany	1953	German Federal Election Studies
Germany	1957	German Federal Election Studies
Germany	1961	German Federal Election Studies
Germany	1965	German Federal Election Studies
Germany	1969	German Federal Election Studies
Germany	1972	German Federal Election Studies
Germany	1976	German Federal Election Studies
Germany	1980	German Federal Election Studies
Germany	1983	German Federal Election Studies
Germany	1987	German Federal Election Studies
Germany	1990	German Federal Election Studies
Germany	1994	German Federal Election Studies
Germany	1998	German Federal Election Studies
Germany	2002	German Federal Election Studies
Germany	2005	German Federal Election Studies
Germany	2009	German Federal Election Studies
Germany	2013	German Federal Election Studies
Germany	2017	German Federal Election Studies
Iceland	1978	Icelandic National Election Studies
Iceland	1983	Icelandic National Election Studies
Iceland	1987	Icelandic National Election Studies
Iceland	1991	Icelandic National Election Studies
Iceland	1995	Icelandic National Election Studies
Iceland	1999	Icelandic National Election Studies
Iceland	2003	Icelandic National Election Studies
Iceland	2007	Icelandic National Election Studies
Iceland	2009	Icelandic National Election Studies
Iceland	2013	Icelandic National Election Studies
Iceland	2016	Icelandic National Election Studies
Iceland	2017	Icelandic National Election Studies
Ireland	1973	Eurobarometers
Ireland	1977	Eurobarometers
Ireland	1981	Eurobarometers
Ireland	1982	Eurobarometers
Ireland	1987	Eurobarometers
Ireland	1989	Eurobarometers
Ireland	1992	Eurobarometers

Ireland	1997	Eurobarometers
Ireland	2002	European Social Survey
Ireland	2007	European Social Survey
Ireland	2011	European Social Survey
Ireland	2016	European Social Survey
Ireland	2020	UCD Online Election Poll
Italy	1953	Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR)
Italy	1958	Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR)
Italy	1968	Italian National Election Studies
Italy	1972	Italian National Election Studies
Italy	1983	Italian National Election Studies
Italy	1987	Italian National Election Studies
Italy	1992	Italian National Election Studies
Italy	1994	Italian National Election Studies
Italy	1996	Italian National Election Studies
Italy	2001	Italian National Election Studies
Italy	2006	Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES)
Italy	2008	Italian National Election Studies
Italy	2013	Italian National Election Studies
Italy	2018	Italian National Election Studies
Luxembourg	1974	Eurobarometers
Luxembourg	1979	Eurobarometers
Luxembourg	1984	Eurobarometers
Luxembourg	1989	Eurobarometers
Luxembourg	1994	Eurobarometers
Luxembourg	1999	Eurobarometers
Luxembourg	2004	European Social Survey
Luxembourg	2013	European Election Studies (EES)
Luxembourg	2018	European Election Studies (EES)
Netherlands	1967	Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies
Netherlands	1971	Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies
Netherlands	1972	Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies
Netherlands	1977	Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies
Netherlands	1981	Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies
Netherlands	1982	Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies
Netherlands	1986	Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies
Netherlands	1989	Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies
Netherlands	1994	Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies
Netherlands	1998	Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies
Netherlands	2002	Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies
Netherlands	2006	Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies
Netherlands	2010	Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies
Netherlands	2012	Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies
Netherlands	2017	Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies
New Zealand	1972	New Zealand Election Studies
New Zealand	1975	New Zealand Election Studies
New Zealand	1978	New Zealand Election Studies
New Zealand	1981	New Zealand Election Studies
New Zealand	1984	New Zealand Election Studies
New Zealand	1987	New Zealand Election Studies

New Zealand	1990	New Zealand Election Studies
New Zealand	1993	New Zealand Election Studies
New Zealand	1996	New Zealand Election Studies
New Zealand	1999	New Zealand Election Studies
New Zealand	2002	New Zealand Election Studies
New Zealand	2005	New Zealand Election Studies
New Zealand	2008	New Zealand Election Studies
New Zealand	2011	New Zealand Election Studies
New Zealand	2014	New Zealand Election Studies
New Zealand	2017	New Zealand Election Studies
Norway	1957	Norwegian National Election Studies
Norway	1965	Norwegian National Election Studies
Norway	1969	Norwegian National Election Studies
Norway	1973	Norwegian National Election Studies
Norway	1977	Norwegian National Election Studies
Norway	1981	Norwegian National Election Studies
Norway	1985	Norwegian National Election Studies
Norway	1989	Norwegian National Election Studies
Norway	1993	Norwegian National Election Studies
Norway	1997	Norwegian National Election Studies
Norway	2001	Norwegian National Election Studies
Norway	2005	Norwegian National Election Studies
Norway	2009	Norwegian National Election Studies
Norway	2013	Norwegian National Election Studies
Norway	2017	Norwegian National Election Studies
Portugal	1983	ESEO
Portugal	1985	ESEO
Portugal	1987	ESEO
Portugal	1991	ESEO
Portugal	1995	European Election Studies (EES)
Portugal	2002	Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES)
Portugal	2005	Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES)
Portugal	2009	Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES)
Portugal	2015	Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES)
Portugal	2019	Portuguese Election Study
Spain	1982	Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas
Spain	1986	Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas
Spain	1989	Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas
Spain	1993	Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas
Spain	1996	Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas
Spain	2000	Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas
Spain	2004	Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas
Spain	2008	Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas
Spain	2011	Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas
Spain	2015	Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas
Spain	2016	Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas
Spain	2019	Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas
Spain	2020	Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas
Sweden	1956	Swedish National Election Studies
Sweden	1958	Swedish National Election Studies

Sweden	1960	Swedish National Election Studies
Sweden	1964	Swedish National Election Studies
Sweden	1968	Swedish National Election Studies
Sweden	1970	Swedish National Election Studies
Sweden	1973	Swedish National Election Studies
Sweden	1976	Swedish National Election Studies
Sweden	1979	Swedish National Election Studies
Sweden	1982	Swedish National Election Studies
Sweden	1985	Swedish National Election Studies
Sweden	1988	Swedish National Election Studies
Sweden	1991	Swedish National Election Studies
Sweden	1994	Swedish National Election Studies
Sweden	1998	Swedish National Election Studies
Sweden	2002	Swedish National Election Studies
Sweden	2006	Swedish National Election Studies
Sweden	2010	Swedish National Election Studies
Sweden	2014	Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES)
Switzerland	1967	Swiss National Election Studies
Switzerland	1971	Swiss National Election Studies
Switzerland	1975	Swiss National Election Studies
Switzerland	1979	Swiss National Election Studies
Switzerland	1983	Swiss National Election Studies
Switzerland	1987	Swiss National Election Studies
Switzerland	1991	Swiss National Election Studies
Switzerland	1995	Swiss National Election Studies
Switzerland	1999	Swiss National Election Studies
Switzerland	2003	Swiss National Election Studies
Switzerland	2007	Swiss National Election Studies
Switzerland	2011	Swiss National Election Studies
Switzerland	2015	Swiss National Election Studies
Switzerland	2019	Swiss National Election Studies
UK	1955	British Election Studies
UK	1959	British Election Studies
UK	1964	British Election Studies
UK	1966	British Election Studies
UK	1970	British Election Studies
UK	1974	British Election Studies
UK	1979	British Election Studies
UK	1983	British Election Studies
UK	1987	British Election Studies
UK	1992	British Election Studies
UK	1997	British Election Studies
UK	2001	British Election Studies
UK	2005	British Election Studies
UK	2010	British Election Studies
UK	2015	British Election Studies
UK	2017	British Election Studies
US	1948	American National Election Studies
US	1952	American National Election Studies
US	1956	American National Election Studies

US	1960	American National Election Studies
US	1964	American National Election Studies
US	1968	American National Election Studies
US	1972	American National Election Studies
US	1976	American National Election Studies
US	1980	American National Election Studies
US	1984	American National Election Studies
US	1988	American National Election Studies
US	1992	American National Election Studies
US	1996	American National Election Studies
US	2000	American National Election Studies
US	2004	American National Election Studies
US	2008	American National Election Studies
US	2012	American National Election Studies
US	2016	American National Election Studies
US	2020	American National Election Studies

Source: authors' elaboration.

Table A2 - Main classification of political parties	
	Social Democratic / Socialist / Communist / Green / Other left-wing parties
Australia	Labor Party, Greens
Austria	Social Democratic Party, KPÖ, Greens, NEOS, Other left
Belgium	Socialist Party, Socialist Party Differently, Ecolo, Groen, PTB
Canada	Liberal Party, Green Party, New Democratic Party
Denmark	Social Democrats, Socialist People's Party, Social Liberal Party, Red-Green Alliance
Finland	Social Democratic Party, Green League, Left Alliance, Other left
France	Socialist Party, Communist Party, Other left
Germany	Social Democratic Party, Alliance 90/The Greens, Die Linke
Iceland	Left-Green Movement, Social Democratic Alliance, People's Party
Ireland	Fianna Fáil, Sinn Féin, Labour Party, Green Party, Other left
Italy	Democratic Party, Free and Equal, Other left
Luxembourg	Socialist Workers' Party, Greens, Other left
Netherlands	Labour Party, Socialist Party, D66, Greens, Other left
New Zealand	Labour Party, Greens, Other left
Norway	Labour Party, Green Party, Socialist Left Party
Portugal	Socialist Party, Left Bloc, Unitary Democratic Coalition
Spain	Socialist Workers' Party, Podemos, United Left, Other left
Sweden	Social Democratic Party, Left Party, Green Party
Switzerland	Social Democrats, Party of Labour, Green Party, Green Liberal Party
United Kingdom	Labour Party
United States	Democratic Party
Source: authors' elaboration.	

Country	Party	Family	Left-right score (voters)	Left-right score (manifestos)
		Table A3 - Detailed classification of political parties		
Australia	Labor Party	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-0,7	-17,0
Australia	Liberal Party	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	0,8	18,2
Australia	Australian Greens	Greens	-1,5	-30,5
Australia	National Party	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	0,8	16,6
Australia	Australian Democrats	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	-0,6	-17,1
Australia	Palmer United Party	Anti-immigration		7,4
Australia	One Nation Party	Anti-immigration	0,5	
Austria	Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ)	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-0,6	-15,8
Austria	Austrian People's Party (ÖVP)	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	0,4	12,2
Austria	Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ)	Anti-immigration	1,0	4,2
Austria	Greens	Greens	-1,1	-11,2
Austria	NEOS / Liberal Forum	Liberals / Social-liberals	-0,1	9,0
Belgium	Christian People's Party (CVP)	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	0,7	5,5
Belgium	Belgian Socialist Party (PSB)	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-1,8	-15,2
Belgium	Socialist Party (PS)	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-1,3	-16,0
Belgium	New Flemish Alliance (N-VA)	Other	0,9	9,6
Belgium	Party for Freedom and Progress (PLP/PVV)	Liberals / Social-liberals	0,4	21,1
Belgium	Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats (VLD)	Liberals / Social-liberals	0,5	7,8
Belgium	Socialist Party (SP / sp.a)	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-1,3	-12,8
Belgium	Reformist movement (MR)	Liberals / Social-liberals	1,1	-12,9
Belgium	Christian Democratic and Flemish (CD&V)	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	0,5	9,8
Belgium	PL	Liberals / Social-liberals		21,9
Belgium	Christian Social Party (PSC)	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	0,5	-2,9
Belgium	Liberal Reformist Party (PRL)	Liberals / Social-liberals	0,3	7,1
Belgium	Volksunie (VU)	Other	0,3	3,3
Belgium	Vlaams Blok	Anti-immigration	1,1	8,7
Belgium	Workers' Party of Belgium (PTB)	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-2,1	-29,3

Country	Party	Category		
Belgium	Communist Party (PCB)	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-2,7	
Canada	Liberal Party	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-0,1	-1,1
Canada	Conservative Party	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	0,7	10,5
Canada	Canadian Alliance	Conservatives / Christian Democrats		18,8
Canada	Reform Party	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	0,6	29,2
Canada	New Democratic Party	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-0,9	-26,9
Canada	Bloc Québécois	Other	-0,7	-5,9
Canada	Social Credit Party	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	-0,5	7,5
Denmark	Social Democratic Party	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-1,0	-15,5
Denmark	Liberal Party of Denmark (Venstre)	Liberals / Social-liberals	1,5	17,0
Denmark	Conservative People's Party	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	1,8	23,9
Denmark	Danish People's Party	Anti-immigration	1,3	27,9
Denmark	Progress Party	Anti-immigration	1,5	25,5
Denmark	Socialist People's Party	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-2,2	-34,9
Denmark	Danish Social-Liberal Party (Radikale Venstre)	Liberals / Social-liberals	-0,6	-7,8
Finland	Social Democratic Party	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-1,1	-4,2
Finland	Agrarian Union	Other		8,9
Finland	Centre Party	Other	0,6	2,2
Finland	Finnish People's Democratic League	Communists	-2,1	-22,4
Finland	National Coalition Party	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	1,5	10,4
Finland	True Finns	Anti-immigration	-0,2	7,4
Finland	Left Alliance	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-2,2	-27,1
Finland	Greens	Greens	-0,8	-17,2
Finland	Finnish People's Party	Liberals / Social-liberals		27,0
Finland	Finnish Rural Party	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	-0,1	26,3
Finland	Swedish People's Party	Other	0,9	0,7
France	UDR/UNR	Conservatives / Christian Democrats		25,6
France	La République En Marche! (LRM)	Liberals / Social-liberals	-0,4	4,8
France	UDF/MoDem	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	0,1	14,8
France	LR/UMP/RPR	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	1,5	9,7
France	PS/SFIO	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-1,7	-23,0
France	Communist Party (PCF)	Communists		-24,4
France	MRP/CD	Conservatives / Christian Democrats		10,3
France	Reforming Movement (MR, 1973)	Conservatives / Christian Democrats		3,8

Country	Party	Category	Col4	Col5
France	Republican Party of Liberty - Conservatives	Conservatives / Christian Democrats		1,5
France	National Front (FN)	Anti-immigration	1,5	32,2
France	Progress and Modern Democracy	Other		1,2
France	Rally for the French People - Gaullists	Conservatives / Christian Democrats		12,0
France	La France Insoumise (FI) / Front de gauche (FDG)	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-2,2	-27,6
France	National Centre of Independents and Peasants (CNIP)	Conservatives / Christian Democrats		23,1
France	Radical Party	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left		-6,3
Germany	CDU/CSU	Conservatives / Christian Democrats		12,6
Germany	Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD)	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left		-13,0
Germany	Die Linke	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left		-29,1
Germany	Free Democratic Party (FDP)	Liberals / Social-liberals		4,5
Germany	Alternative for Germany (AfD)	Anti-immigration		15,9
Germany	Greens	Greens		-17,2
Germany	All-German Bloc (GB/BHE)	Conservatives / Christian Democrats		-1,3
Iceland	Independence Party	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	1,6	15,4
Iceland	Social Democratic Alliance	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-1,3	-12,2
Iceland	Progressive Party	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	0,0	6,5
Iceland	United Socialist Party	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left		-13,4
Iceland	People's Alliance	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-1,9	-26,3
Iceland	Social Democratic Party	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-0,2	-24,3
Iceland	Left-Green Movement	Greens	-2,2	-15,6
Iceland	Centre Party	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	0,9	
Iceland	Pirate Party	Other	-1,0	-15,3
Iceland	Reform Party	Liberals / Social-liberals	0,7	5,7
Iceland	Women's Alliance	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-1,1	-33,5
Iceland	People's Party	Other		-18,0
Iceland	Liberal Party	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	-0,1	13,9
Iceland	National Preservation Party	Other		-38,5
Iceland	Bright Future	Liberals / Social-liberals	-0,7	2,2
Ireland	Fianna Fáil	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	0,4	2,8
Ireland	Fine Gael	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	0,3	6,7
Ireland	Labour Party	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-1,1	-21,9
Ireland	Sinn Féin	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-1,3	-9,4
Ireland	Progressive Democrats	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	0,3	11,1

Italy	Christian Democracy (DC)	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	1,3	6,6
Italy	Olive Tree	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-2,1	-32,9
Italy	People of Freedom (PDL)	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	2,5	14,7
Italy	Five Star Movement (M5S)	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-0,6	-20,5
Italy	Italian Communist Party (PCI)	Communists	-2,2	-10,2
Italy	Democratic Party (PD)	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-2,1	-3,2
Italy	Forza Italia (FI)	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	2,2	25,4
Italy	Democratic Party of the Left (PDS)	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-2,9	-2,8
Italy	Democrats of the Left (DS) / Margherita / Ulivo	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-1,8	-12,8
Italy	Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity (PSIUP)	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-1,3	-1,5
Italy	National Alliance (AN)	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	3,1	6,5
Italy	Populars for Italy (PPI)	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	0,1	-2,2
Italy	Italian Socialist Party (PSI)	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-0,4	-9,9
Italy	Civic Choice	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	0,3	15,3
Italy	Lega	Anti-immigration	1,8	7,0
Italy	Socialist Party of Italian Workers	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left		-34,7
Italy	Communist Refoundation Party (PRC)	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-3,1	-32,9
Italy	Italian Social Movement (MSI, MSI-DN)	Anti-immigration	3,6	16,0
Luxembourg	Christian Social People's Party	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	1,1	8,4
Luxembourg	Luxembourg Socialist Workers' Party	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-1,3	-13,9
Luxembourg	Democratic Party	Liberals / Social-liberals	0,2	11,8
Luxembourg	Democratic Group	Liberals / Social-liberals		1,5
Luxembourg	Patriotic and Democratic Group	Liberals / Social-liberals		9,5
Luxembourg	Action Committee	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	0,2	7,7
Luxembourg	The Greens	Greens	-1,4	-11,1
Luxembourg	Communist Party of Luxembourg	Communists	-2,0	-25,3
Luxembourg	Green List Ecological Initiative	Greens	-1,2	-10,1
Luxembourg	Alternative Democratic Reform Party	Anti-immigration		14,9
Netherlands	Catholic People's Party (KVP)	Conservatives / Christian Democrats		5,0
Netherlands	Labour Party (PvdA)	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-1,8	-15,1
Netherlands	Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA)	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	1,2	1,2
Netherlands	People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD)	Liberals / Social-liberals	1,4	19,6
Netherlands	Pim Fortuyn List (LPF)	Anti-immigration	1,0	4,2
Netherlands	Party for Freedom (PVV)	Anti-immigration	1,3	17,2

Netherlands	Anti-Revolutionary Party (ARP)	Conservatives / Christian Democrats		11,9
Netherlands	Christian Historical Union (CHU)	Conservatives / Christian Democrats		15,8
Netherlands	Socialist Party (SP)	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-1,4	-20,3
Netherlands	Democrats 66 (D66)	Liberals / Social-liberals	-0,7	-6,5
Netherlands	Communist Party of the Netherlands	Communists		-29,3
Netherlands	PvdV	Conservatives / Christian Democrats		20,7
Netherlands	GroenLinks (GL)	Greens	-2,3	-9,6
New Zealand	National Party	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	1,2	15,1
New Zealand	Labour Party	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-1,1	-15,0
New Zealand	Alliance	Greens	-1,5	-14,1
New Zealand	Social Credit Party	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-0,9	-8,7
New Zealand	New Zealand First	Anti-immigration	0,0	0,9
New Zealand	Green Party of Aotearoa	Greens	-2,0	-2,9
Norway	Labour Party	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-1,2	-15,4
Norway	Conservative Party	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	1,8	17,1
Norway	Progress Party	Anti-immigration	1,8	35,2
Norway	Christian Democratic Party	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	0,6	10,3
Norway	Centre Party	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	-0,3	6,1
Norway	Socialist Left Party / Socialist Electoral League	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-2,4	-20,4
Norway	Liberal Party	Liberals / Social-liberals	-0,3	-3,3
Portugal	Socialist Party (PS)	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-0,9	-6,4
Portugal	PPD/PSD	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	1,6	5,2
Portugal	United People Alliance (APU)	Greens	-2,7	9,8
Portugal	PCTP/MRPP	Communists		-7,0
Portugal	CDS / People's Party (PP)	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	1,8	9,7
Portugal	Unitary Democratic Coalition (CDU, PCP-PEV)	Greens	-3,1	-8,1
Portugal	Left Bloc (BE)	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-2,4	-23,1
Spain	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE)	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-1,1	-8,2
Spain	People's Party (PP)	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	1,9	13,2
Spain	Union of the Democratic Centre (UCD)	Other	-1,3	2,6
Spain	AP-PDP	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	2,2	16,9
Spain	VOX	Anti-immigration	2,5	45,9
Spain	Ciudadanos	Liberals / Social-liberals	0,8	-1,2
Spain	Podemos	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-1,9	-20,8

Spain	Communist Party of Spain (PCE)	Communists	-2,0	-17,1
Spain	United Left (IU)	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-2,1	-20,0
Spain	Democratic and Social Centre (CDS)	Other	0,5	-3,9
Sweden	Swedish Social Democratic Party	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-1,4	-15,6
Sweden	Moderate/Right Party	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	2,1	39,1
Sweden	Liberal People's Party	Liberals / Social-liberals	1,1	6,0
Sweden	Centre Party	Liberals / Social-liberals	0,9	7,4
Sweden	Sweden Democrats	Anti-immigration	0,5	15,0
Sweden	Left Party	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-2,4	-29,6
Sweden	Christian Democrats	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	1,1	5,9
Sweden	New Democracy	Anti-immigration	1,0	34,4
Sweden	Green Party	Greens	-0,9	-14,2
Sweden	Left Party/Communists	Communists	-2,7	-28,6
Switzerland	Social Democratic Party of Switzerland (SPS/PSS)	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-2,0	-30,0
Switzerland	Free Democratic Party of Switzerland (FDP/PLR)	Liberals / Social-liberals	0,8	16,1
Switzerland	CVP/PDC	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	0,6	5,0
Switzerland	Swiss People's Party (SVP/UDC)	Anti-immigration	1,3	13,9
Switzerland	Green Party of Switzerland (GPS/PES)	Greens	-2,0	-26,3
Switzerland	Green Liberal Party of Switzerland (GLP/PVL)	Greens	-1,0	-5,2
USA	Democratic Party	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-0,9	-13,3
USA	Republican Party	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	1,0	14,6
UK	Conservative Party	Conservatives / Christian Democrats	1,2	15,5
UK	Labour Party	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left	-0,9	-14,7
UK	Liberal Democrats	Liberals / Social-liberals	-0,4	-0,8
UK	Social Democratic Party	Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left		-10,4
UK	UK Independence Party (UKIP)	Anti-immigration	0,3	16,5

Source: authors' elaboration.

Note: the table provides information on the categorization of political parties by family in the survey dataset (see Figure 4 on election results). Parties are sorted by decreasing order of their average vote share in all elections to which they participated. Excludes small parties (average vote share lower than 5% across elections in which the party participated). The left-right score (voters) corresponds to the difference between the average self-placement on a left-right scale (0 to 10) of voters of the corresponding party and the overall average of this variable across all voters. Negative values mean that voters supporting the party are on average more left-wing than the rest of the electorate. The left-right score (manifestos) corresponds to the difference between the average left-right ideological index of the corresponding party in the Comparative Manifesto Project database (-100 to 100) and the overall average of this variable across all parties. Averages over the entire dataset.

Figure A1 - The disconnection of income and education cleavages in Western democracies (before and after controls)

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.

Note: in the 1960s, both higher-educated and high-income voters were less likely to vote for left-wing (social democratic / socialist / communist / green / other left-wing) parties than lower-educated and low-income voters by more than 10 percentage points. The left vote has gradually become associated with higher education voters, giving rising to a remarkable divergence of the effects of income and education on the vote. Figures correspond to five-year averages for Australia, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the US. The estimates are presented before and after controlling for income/education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure A2 - The disconnection of income and education in Western democracies, unbalanced panel

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.

Note: in the 1960s, both higher-educated and high-income voters were less likely to vote for left-wing (social democratic / socialist / communist / green / other left-wing) parties than lower-educated and low-income voters by more than 10 percentage points. The left vote has gradually become associated with higher education voters, giving rising to a remarkable divergence of the effects of income and education on the vote. Figures correspond to five-year averages over all countries available for a given time period (unbalanced panel of all 21 Western democracies). The estimates are presented before and after controlling for income/education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure A3 - The disconnection of income and education cleavages in Western democracies (top 50% vs. bottom 50%)

Legend:
- – ○ – Difference between (% of top 50% educated voting left) and (% of bottom 50% educated voting left)
- ── ● ── After controls
- – □ – Difference between (% of top 50% earners voting left) and (% of bottom 50% earners voting left)
- ── ■ ── After controls

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.

Note: in the 1960s, both higher-educated and high-income voters were less likely to vote for left-wing (social democratic / socialist / communist / green / other left-wing) parties than lower-educated and low-income voters. The left vote has gradually become associated with higher education voters, giving rising to a remarkable divergence of the effects of income and education on the vote. Figures correspond to five-year averages for Australia, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the US. The estimates are presented before and after controlling for income/education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure A4 - The disconnection of income and education in Western democracies, unbalanced panel (top 50% vs. bottom 50%)

Legend:
- Difference between (% of top 50% educated voting left) and (% of bottom 50% educated voting left)
- After controls
- Difference between (% of top 50% earners voting left) and (% of bottom 50% earners voting left)
- After controls

X-axis: 1948-60, 1961-65, 1966-70, 1971-75, 1976-80, 1981-85, 1986-90, 1991-95, 1996-00, 2001-05, 2006-10, 2011-15, 2016-20

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: in the 1960s, both higher-educated and high-income voters were less likely to vote for left-wing (social democratic / socialist / communist / green / other left-wing) parties than lower-educated and low-income voters. The left vote has gradually become associated with higher education voters, giving rising to a remarkable divergence of the effects of income and education on the vote. Figures correspond to five-year averages over all countries available for a given time period (unbalanced panel of all 21 Western democracies). The estimates are presented before and after controlling for income/education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure A5 - The reversal of educational divides in Western democracies (top 10%)

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.

Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of higher-educated (top 10%) and lower-educated (bottom 90%) voters voting for left-wing (socialist, social democratic, communist, and green) parties in Western countries. In nearly all countries, higher-educated voters used to be significantly more likely to vote for right-wing parties and have gradually become more likely to vote for left-wing parties.

Figure A6 - The reversal of educational divides in Western democracies (top 10%), after controls

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.

Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of higher-educated (top 10%) and lower-educated (bottom 90%) voters voting for left-wing (socialist, social democratic, communist, and green) parties in Western countries, after controlling for income, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available). In nearly all countries, higher-educated voters used to be significantly more likely to vote for right-wing parties and have gradually become more likely to vote for left-wing parties.

Figure A7 - The reversal of educational divides in Western democracies (university graduates)

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of university graduates and the share of non-university graduates voting for left-wing (socialist, social democratic, communist, and green) parties in Western countries. In nearly all countries, higher-educated voters used to be significantly more likely to vote for right-wing parties and have gradually become more likely to vote for left-wing parties.

Figure A8 - The reversal of educational divides in Western democracies (university graduates), after controls

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.

Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of university graduates and the share of non-university graduates voting for left-wing (socialist, social democratic, communist, and green) parties in Western countries, after controlling for income, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available). In nearly all countries, higher-educated voters used to be significantly more likely to vote for right-wing parties and have gradually become more likely to vote for left-wing parties.

Figure A9 - The reversal of educational divides in Western democracies (bottom 50%)

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of lower-educated (bottom 50%) and higher-educated (top 50%) voters voting for left-wing (socialist, social democratic, communist, and green) parties in Western countries. In nearly all countries, higher-educated voters used to be significantly more likely to vote for right-wing parties and have gradually become more likely to vote for left-wing parties.

Figure A10 - The reversal of educational divides in Western democracies (bottom 50%), after controls

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of lower-educated (bottom 50%) and higher-educated (top 50%) voters voting for left-wing (socialist, social democratic, communist, and green) parties in Western countries, after controlling for income, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available). In nearly all countries, higher-educated voters used to be significantly more likely to vote for right-wing parties and have gradually become more likely to vote for left-wing parties.

Figure A11 - The reversal of educational divides in Western democracies (primary-educated voters)

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of primary-educated voters and the share of other voters voting for left-wing (socialist, social democratic, communist, and green) parties in Western countries. In nearly all countries, higher-educated voters used to be significantly more likely to vote for right-wing parties and have gradually become more likely to vote for left-wing parties.

Figure A12 - The reversal of educational divides in Western democracies (primary-educated voters), after controls

Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of primary-educated voters and the share of other voters voting for left-wing (socialist, social democratic, communist, and green) parties in Western countries, after controlling for income, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available). In nearly all countries, higher-educated voters used to be significantly more likely to vote for right-wing parties and have gradually become more likely to vote for left-wing parties.

Figure A13 - The reversal of educational divides in Western democracies (continuous variable)

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure represents the marginal effect of the education rank (quantile) of voters on support for left-wing (socialist, social democratic, communist, and green) parties in Western countries. In nearly all countries, higher-educated voters used to be significantly more likely to vote for right-wing parties and have gradually become more likely to vote for left-wing parties.

Figure A14 - The reversal of educational divides in Western democracies (continuous variable), after controls

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure represents the marginal effect of the education rank (quantile) of voters on support for left-wing (socialist, social democratic, communist, and green) parties in Western countries, after controlling for income, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available). In nearly all countries, higher-educated voters used to be significantly more likely to vote for right-wing parties and have gradually become more likely to vote for left-wing parties.

Figure A15 - The decline/stability of income divides in Western democracies (top 10%)

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of high-income (top 10%) and low-income (bottom 90%) voters voting for left-wing (socialist, social democratic, communist, and green) parties in Western countries. In nearly all countries, top-income voters have remained significantly less likely to vote for left-wing parties than low-income voters.

Figure A16 - The decline/stability of income divides in Western democracies (top 10%), after controls

Legend: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Britain, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United States, Average

X-axis: 1948-59, 1960-69, 1970-79, 1980-89, 1990-99, 2000-09, 2010-20

Y-axis: -35 to 35

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of high-income (top 10%) and low-income (bottom 90%) voters voting for left-wing (socialist, social democratic, communist, and green) parties in Western countries. In nearly all countries, top-income voters have remained significantly less likely to vote for left-wing parties than low-income voters. Estimates control for education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure A17 - The decline/stability of income divides in Western democracies (bottom 50%)

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of low-income (bottom 50%) and top-income (top 50%) voters voting for left-wing (socialist, social democratic, communist, and green) parties in Western countries. In nearly all countries, top-income voters have remained significantly less likely to vote for left-wing parties than low-income voters.

Figure A18 - The decline/stability of income divides in Western democracies (bottom 50%), after controls

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.

Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of low-income (bottom 50%) and top-income (top 50%) voters voting for left-wing (socialist, social democratic, communist, and green) parties in Western countries. In nearly all countries, top-income voters have remained significantly less likely to vote for left-wing parties than low-income voters. Estimates control for education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure A19 - The decline/stability of income divides in Western democracies (continuous variable)

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure represents the marginal effect of the income rank (quantile) of voters on support for left-wing (socialist, social democratic, communist, and green) parties in Western countries. In nearly all countries, top-income voters have remained significantly less likely to vote for left-wing parties than low-income voters.

Figure A20 - The decline/stability of income divides in Western democracies (continuous variable), after controls

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure represents the marginal effect of the income rank (quantile) of voters on support for left-wing (socialist, social democratic, communist, and green) parties in Western countries. In nearly all countries, top-income voters have remained significantly less likely to vote for left-wing parties than low-income voters. Estimates control for education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure A21 - The disconnection of income and education in Western democracies (including/excluding green parties)

Legend:
- **Difference between (% of top 10% educated voting left) and (% of bottom 90% educated voting left)** (solid red, filled circles)
- **Excluding green parties** (dashed red, open circles)
- **Difference between (% of top 10% earners voting left) and (% of bottom 90% earners voting left)** (solid blue, filled squares)
- **Excluding green parties** (dashed blue, open squares)

X-axis: 1961-65, 1966-70, 1971-75, 1976-80, 1981-85, 1986-90, 1991-95, 1996-00, 2001-05, 2006-10, 2011-15, 2016-20

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.

Note: in the 1960s, both higher-educated and high-income voters were less likely to vote for left-wing (social democratic / socialist / communist / green / other left-wing) parties than lower-educated and low-income voters by more than 10 percentage points. The left vote has gradually become associated with higher education voters, giving rising to a remarkable divergence of the effects of income and education on the vote. Figures correspond to five-year averages for Australia, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the US. The estimates are presented after controlling for income/education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure A22 - The disconnection of income and education cleavages in Western democracies (incl./excl. green parties), unbalanced panel


- Difference between (% of top 10% educated voting left) and (% of bottom 90% educated voting left)
- Excluding green parties
- Difference between (% of top 10% earners voting left) and (% of bottom 90% earners voting left)
- Excluding green parties

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.

Note: in the 1960s, both higher-educated and high-income voters were less likely to vote for left-wing (social democratic / socialist / communist / green / other left-wing) parties than lower-educated and low-income voters by more than 10 percentage points. The left vote has gradually become associated with higher education voters, giving rising to a remarkable divergence of the effects of income and education on the vote. Figures correspond to five-year averages over all countries available for a given time period (unbalanced panel of all 21 Western democracies). The estimates are presented before and after controlling for income/education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure A23 - Support for left-wing parties (excluding Greens) among top 10% educated voters, after controls

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of higher-educated (top 10%) and lower-educated (bottom 90%) voters voting for left-wing parties (excluding Greens) in Western countries, after controlling for income, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available). In nearly all countries, higher-educated voters used to be significantly more likely to vote for right-wing parties and have gradually become more likely to vote for left-wing parties.

Figure A24 - Support for left-wing parties (excluding Greens) among top 10% income voters, after controls

Legend:
- Australia
- Austria
- Belgium
- Britain
- Canada
- Denmark
- Finland
- France
- Germany
- Iceland
- Ireland
- Italy
- Luxembourg
- Netherlands
- New Zealand
- Norway
- Portugal
- Spain
- Sweden
- Switzerland
- United States
- Average

X-axis: 1940, 1950-59, 1960-69, 1970-79, 1980-89, 1990-99, 2000-09, 2010-20

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of high-income (top 10%) and low-income (bottom 90%) voters voting for left-wing parties (excluding Greens) in Western countries. In nearly all countries, top-income voters have remained significantly less likely to vote for left-wing parties than low-income voters. Estimates control for education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure A25 - The reversal of educational divides in Western democracies: decomposition by party family (left-wing parties)

Legend:
- Social Democratic / Socialist / Communist / Green / Other left-wing parties
- Social Democratic / Socialist / Communist / Other left-wing parties
- Green parties

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of top 10% educated voters and the share of bottom 90% educated voters voting for specific families of parties. Figures correspond to five-year averages over all countries available for a given time period (unbalanced panel of all 21 Western democracies). The estimates are presented after controlling for income, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure A26 - The reversal of educational divides in Western democracies: decomposition by party family (right-wing parties)

Legend:
- Conservative / Christian Democratic / Liberal / Anti-immigration parties
- Conservative / Christian Democratic / Liberal parties
- Liberal parties
- Anti-immigration parties

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.

Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of top 10% educated voters and the share of bottom 90% educated voters voting for specific families of parties. Figures correspond to five-year averages over all countries available for a given time period (unbalanced panel of all 21 Western democracies). The estimates are presented after controlling for income, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure A27 - The decline/stability of income divides in Western democracies: decomposition by party family (left-wing parties)

Legend:
- Social Democratic / Socialist / Communist / Green / Other left-wing parties
- Social Democratic / Socialist / Communist / Other left-wing parties
- Green parties

x-axis: 1948-60 1961-65 1966-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-00 2001-05 2006-10 2011-15 2016-20

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of top 10% income voters and the share of bottom 90% income voters voting for specific families of parties. Figures correspond to five-year averages over all countries available for a given time period (unbalanced panel of all 21 Western democracies). The estimates are presented after controlling for education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure A28 - The decline/stability of income divides in Western democracies: decomposition by party family (left-wing parties)

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.

Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of top 10% income voters and the share of bottom 90% income voters voting for specific families of parties. Figures correspond to five-year averages over all countries available for a given time period (unbalanced panel of all 21 Western democracies). The estimates are presented after controlling for education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure A29 - Vote for left-wing parties by education group: decomposition by party family

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by each family of parties by education group between 1955 and 2020. Average over all Western democracies.

Figure A30 - Vote for right-wing parties by education group: decomposition by party family

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by each family of parties by education group between 1955 and 2020. Average over all Western democracies.

Figure A31 - Vote for left-wing parties by income group: decomposition by party family

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by each family of parties by income group between 1955 and 2020. Average over all Western democracies.

Figure A32 - Vote for right-wing parties by income group: decomposition by party family

Legend:
- Conservative / Christian Democratic parties
- Liberal parties
- Anti-immigration parties

X-axis labels (grouped by period, each with Bottom 50%, Middle 40%, Top 10%):
1948-60, 1961-65, 1966-70, 1971-75, 1976-80, 1981-85, 1986-90, 1991-95, 1996-00, 2001-05, 2006-10, 2011-15, 2016-20

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by each family of parties by income group between 1955 and 2020. Average over all Western democracies.

Figure A33 - Vote for Green parties by education group

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Green parties in Western democracies in the last election available by education group.

Figure A34 - Vote for Green parties by income group

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Green parties in Western democracies in the last election available by income group.

Figure A35 - Vote for anti-immigration parties by education group

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by anti-immigration parties in Western democracies in the last election available by education group.

Figure A36 - Vote for anti-immigration parties by income group


Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by anti-immigration parties in Western democracies in the last election available by income group.

Figure A37 - Composition of parties voted for by top 10% educated voters

Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left

Communists

Liberals / Social-liberals

Greens

Anti-immigration

Conservatives / Christian Democrats

Other

1948-59   1960-69   1970-79   1980-89   1990-99   2000-09   2010-20

100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

Source: authors' computations using electoral surveys.
Note: the figure represents the average share of votes received by selected families of political parties in Western democracies between the 1940s and the 2010s within the top 10% group of highest educated voters. Decennial averages over all Western democracies. The dashed lines delimit the categorization of parties considered in the main specification (social democrats and affiliated, conservatives and affiliated, and other parties).

Figure A38 - Composition of parties voted for by top 10% income voters

Social Democrats / Socialists / Other left

Communists

Liberals / Social-liberals

Greens

Anti-immigration

Conservatives / Christian Democrats

Other

100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

1948-59   1960-69   1970-79   1980-89   1990-99   2000-09   2010-20

Source: authors' computations using electoral surveys.
Note: the figure represents the average share of votes received by selected families of political parties in Western democracies between the 1940s and the 2010s within the top 10% group of highest income voters. Decennial averages over all Western democracies. The dashed lines delimit the categorization of parties considered in the main specification (social democrats and affiliated, conservatives and affiliated, and other parties).

Figure A39 - The fragmentation of political cleavage structures.
Panel A. 1960s-1980s

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of high-income (top 10%) and low-income (bottom 90%) voters voting for selected groups of parties on the y-axis, and the same difference between higher-educated (top 10%) and lower-educated (bottom 90%) voters on the x-axis. In the 1960s, social democratic, socialist, and communist parties were supported by both low-income and lower-educated voters, while conservative, Christian, and liberal parties were supported by both high-income and higher-educated voters. Averages over all Western democracies. Estimates control for income/education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure A40 - The fragmentation of political cleavage structures.
Panel B. 2000-2020

Relative support among top-income voters (y-axis)

Relative support among higher-educated voters (x-axis)

High income / Low education

High income / High education

Low income / Low education

Low income / High education

Conservatives
Christian Democrats
Liberals / Social-liberals
Anti-immigration

Conservatives
Christian Democrats
Liberals / Social-lib.

Anti-immigration

Greens

Social Dem.
Socialists
Communists
Other left

Social Democrats
Socialists
Communists
Greens
Other left

Figure A41 - Educational and income divides: Detailed party families

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of high-income (top 10%) and low-income (bottom 90%) voters voting for selected groups of parties on the y-axis, and the same difference between higher-educated (top 10%) and lower-educated (bottom 90%) voters on the x-axis. Education most clearly distinguishes anti-immigration from green parties, while income distinguishes most clearly conservative and Christian parties from socialist, social democratic and communist parties. Averages over all Western democracies over the 2000-2020 period. Estimates control for income/education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure A42 - The disconnection of income and education cleavages in Western democracies (quadrant representation), all countries

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.

Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of high-income (top 10%) and low-income (bottom 90%) voters voting for selected groups of parties on the y-axis, and the same difference between higher-educated (top 10%) and lower-educated (bottom 90%) voters on the x-axis. Estimates control for income/education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available). Figures correspond to ten-year averages for Australia, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the US.

Figure A43 - Income and educational divides in Western democracies, 1950s

Relative support among high-income voters (y-axis, ranging from -30 to 40)

Relative support among higher-educated voters (x-axis, ranging from -40 to 40)

Norway (right-wing, ~25, ~29)
UK (right-wing, ~13, ~25)
Sweden (right-wing, ~34, ~16)
Germany (right-wing, ~14, ~11)
US (right-wing, ~17, ~10)
France (right-wing, ~19, ~1)
Italy (right-wing, ~10, ~-2)

Italy (left-wing, ~-10, ~2)
France (left-wing, ~-19, ~-1)
US (left-wing, ~-17, ~-10)
Germany (left-wing, ~-15, ~-11)
Sweden (left-wing, ~-33, ~-16)
Norway (left-wing, ~-31, ~-24)
UK (left-wing, ~-17, ~-24)

● Left-wing parties   ● Right-wing parties

Figure A44 - Income and educational divides in Western democracies, 1960s

Relative support among high-income voters (y-axis)

Relative support among higher-educated voters (x-axis)

● Left-wing parties   ● Right-wing parties

Figure A45 - Income and educational divides in Western democracies, 1970s

Relative support among high-income voters (y-axis): 30, 20, 10, 0, -10, -20, -30

Relative support among higher-educated voters (x-axis): -25, -20, -15, -10, -5, 0, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25

Right-wing parties (blue):
Australia, New Zealand, Netherlands, UK, France, Denmark, Austria, Sweden, Norway, US, Switzerland, Germany, Finland, Canada, Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg, Italy

Left-wing parties (red):
Italy, Luxembourg, Ireland, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Finland, Norway, France, US, Switzerland, Sweden, UK, Austria, Denmark, Netherlands, New Zealand, Australia

● Left-wing parties   ● Right-wing parties

Figure A46 - Income and educational divides in Western democracies, 1980s

Relative support among high-income voters (y-axis, from -30 to 30)

Relative support among higher-educated voters (x-axis, from -20 to 20)

● Left-wing parties   ● Right-wing parties

Figure A47 - Income and educational divides in Western democracies, 1990s

Relative support among high-income voters (y-axis, from -25 to 25)

Relative support among higher-educated voters (x-axis, from -15 to 15)

Right-wing parties (blue):
- Denmark
- Netherlands
- UK
- Norway
- Sweden
- Germany
- Australia
- France
- New Zealand
- Belgium
- Finland
- Ireland
- Portugal
- Canada
- Switzerland
- US
- Luxembourg
- Austria
- Iceland

Left-wing parties (red):
- Austria
- Iceland
- Canada
- Luxembourg
- Switzerland
- Finland
- Belgium
- Portugal
- US
- Germany
- Ireland
- UK
- France
- Netherlands
- Sweden
- Norway
- Australia
- New Zealand
- Denmark

● Left-wing parties   ● Right-wing parties

Figure A48 - Income and educational divides in Western democracies, 2000s

Left-wing parties
Right-wing parties

Figure A49 - Income and educational divides in Western democracies, 2010s

Relative support among high-income voters (y-axis, -20 to 20)

Relative support among higher-educated voters (x-axis, -20 to 20)

- Sweden
- Germany
- New Zealand
- Norway
- Denmark
- Australia
- UK
- Iceland
- Netherlands
- Finland
- France
- Austria
- Belgium
- Canada
- Spain
- Ireland
- Switzerland
- Portugal
- US
- Italy

Left-wing parties ● Right-wing parties ●

Figure A50 - Correlation between income and education

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure represents the correlation between income and education in post-electoral surveys in all Western democracies. Income is defined as the rank (quantile group) to which individuals belong, computed directly from raw income brackets. Education is defined as education deciles, computed from available educational categories (see methodology).

Figure A51 - Kitagawa-Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the education cleavage

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.

Note: the figure represents a two-way Kitagawa-Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the educational cleavage by five-year interval, separating it into a component explained by group differences in predictors (that is, differences in the composition of educational groups in terms of income, gender, age, religion, religious practice, rural/urban location, region, employment and marital status, private/public sector of employment, union membership, and home ownership) and an unexplained component. The unexplained component is very close to the actual indicator, revealing that the reversal of educational divides cannot be accounted for by changes in the composition of education groups. The decomposition is computed after pooling surveys covering the following countries: Australia, Denmark, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. All estimates include election (country-year) fixed effects.

Table B1 - Bakker-Hobolt modified Comparative Manifesto Project measures

A. Economic-distributive dimension

Pro-free-market emphases	Pro-redistribution emphases
Free entreprise	Regulate capitalism
Economic incentives	Economic planning
Anti-protectionism	Pro-protectionism
Social services limitation	Social services expansion
Education limitation	Education expansion
Productivity: positive	Nationalization
Economic orthodoxy: positive	Controlled economy
Labour groups: negative	Labour groups: positive
	Corporatism: positive
	Keynesian demand management: positive
	Marxist analysis: positive
	Social justice

B. Sociocultural dimension

Conservative emphases	Progressive emphases
Political authority	Environmental protection
National way of life: positive	National way of life: negative
Traditional morality: positive	Traditional morality: negative
Law and order	Culture
Multiculturalism: negative	Multiculturalism: positive
Social harmony	Anti-growth
	Underprivileged minority groups
	Non-economic demographic groups: positive
	Freedom-human rights
	Democracy

Source: adapted from R. Bakker and S. B. Hobolt, "Measuring Party Positions," in G. Evans and N. D. de Graaf (ed.), *Political Choice Matters: Explaining the Strength of Class and Religious Cleavages in Cross-National Perspective*, Oxford University Press, 2013, 38. For more detail on the content of each category and the Manifesto Project methodology, see https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/.

	Economic-distributive index				Sociocultural index			
	Social Democrats	Conservatives	Anti-immigration	Greens	Social Democrats	Conservatives	Anti-immigration	Greens
1945-59	-12,3	11,2			-2,2	2,2		
1960-69	-9,1	9,2			-1,1	0,9		
1970-79	-9,3	8,8	17,6		-0,6	0,6	3,9	
1980-89	-10,9	10,9	15,8	-8,5	-1,9	2,5	3,4	-24,1
1990-99	-9,9	8,2	11,6	-11,5	-3,6	5,2	7,1	-25,4
2000-09	-9,4	8,1	10,4	-6,8	-4,9	6,3	11,2	-24,8
2010-20	-13,5	11,2	8,7	-11,2	-5,4	4,4	20,4	-25,1

Table B2 - Ideological polarization in Western democracies, 1945-2020

Source: authors' computations using the Comparative Manifesto Project database.

Note: the table displays the average economic-distributive and sociocultural scores by decade for four families of parties across all Western democracies: social democratic, socialist and other left-wing parties; conservative, Christian democratic, and liberal parties; anti-immigration parties; and green parties. Negative values on the economic-distributive index correspond to greater proportions of pro-redistribution emphases relatively to pro-free-market emphases in party manifestos. Negative values on the sociocultural index correspond to greater proportions of progressive emphases relatively to conservative emphases. Indices are normalized by the average score by decade so as to better highlight the dynamics of polarization.

	Greens	Social Democrats	Conservatives	Anti-immigration
Sociocultural dimension				
Conservative emphases				
Law and order +	1,4	3,0	5,2	8,5
Political authority	1,4	2,9	2,9	3,1
Civic mindedness +	1,2	1,3	1,7	0,8
National way of life +	0,8	1,1	2,4	9,0
Traditional morality +	0,3	0,5	1,4	2,4
Multiculturalism -	0,2	0,3	1,0	5,0
Progressive emphases				
Environmentalism +	13,4	5,8	4,3	3,0
Democracy	3,2	3,2	2,0	4,4
Anti-growth economy +	6,9	2,8	1,9	0,8
Culture +	2,5	2,4	2,1	1,6
Freedom & human rights	3,7	1,8	2,4	2,2
Non-economic demographic groups	1,1	1,4	1,3	1,1
Multiculturalism +	1,5	1,1	0,8	0,3
Minority groups	0,7	0,7	0,5	0,4
Traditional morality -	0,9	0,6	0,3	0,1
National way of life -	1,1	0,4	0,5	0,1
Economic-distributive dimension				
Pro-free-market emphases				
Incentives	1,2	2,1	3,7	2,0
Economic growth +	0,6	1,8	3,0	0,6
Economic orthodoxy	0,6	1,2	2,9	1,1
Protectionism -	0,1	0,3	0,6	0,2
Free market economy	0,5	0,3	2,7	2,5
Welfare -	0,2	0,2	1,5	1,7
Labour groups -	0,0	0,0	0,4	0,2
Education -	0,0	0,0	0,2	0,3
Pro-redistribution emphases				
Welfare +	11,1	12,8	9,0	8,4
Equality +	9,6	8,8	4,4	3,1
Education +	6,1	6,5	5,4	3,9
Labour groups +	4,5	5,8	3,0	2,3
Market regulation	3,4	4,9	3,0	2,8
Controlled economy	0,9	1,0	0,3	0,5
Nationalisation	0,7	0,8	0,2	0,3
Keynesian demand management	0,2	0,6	0,2	0,2
Economic planning	0,3	0,4	0,5	0,2
Corporatism/mixed economy	0,3	0,3	0,3	0,1
Protectionism +	0,3	0,3	0,3	0,7
Other categories				
Technology & infrastructure	6,0	6,9	7,6	4,2
Gov-admin efficiency	1,5	2,8	4,7	3,3
Internationalism +	2,5	2,6	2,3	1,4
Decentralisation	1,3	1,5	1,8	1,3
Europe +	1,1	1,3	1,6	0,2

Table B3 - Sources of ideological polarization in Western democracies in the 2010s

Agriculture +	1,2	1,2	2,0	2,2
Military +	0,2	1,1	2,1	2,5
Economic goals	0,5	1,1	1,2	0,6
Political corruption	0,8	0,8	0,5	0,5
Military -	0,9	0,5	0,1	0,2
Peace	0,4	0,4	0,2	0,0
Europe -	0,4	0,3	0,6	6,3
Foreign special +	0,1	0,3	0,3	0,0
Constitution -	0,2	0,3	0,2	0,2
Middle class and prof. groups	0,1	0,2	0,4	0,2
Constitution +	0,2	0,2	0,4	0,1
Internationalism -	0,1	0,1	0,2	1,5
Anti-imperalism	0,1	0,1	0,0	0,1
Marxist analysis +	0,0	0,1	0,0	0,0
Centralisation	0,3	0,1	0,3	0,4
Foreign special -	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0

Note: The table reports the scores of green parties, social democratic / socialist / communist / other left-wing parties, conservative / Christian democratic / liberal parties, and anti-immigration parties on all the items available in the Comparative Manifesto Project database over the 2010-2020 period. Values correspond to the share of "quasi-sentences" dedicated to emphasizing each category of issues in parties' manifestos. Vote-share-weighted average over all parties with available data in the corresponding decade.

Table B4 - Manifesto scores of anti-immigration parties

	1970s	1980s	1990s	2000s	2010s
Sociocultural dimension					
Conservative emphases					
National way of life +	0,6	2,0	4,2	4,7	9,0
Law and order +	1,2	3,3	5,4	7,5	8,5
Multiculturalism -	0,0	0,9	0,9	4,0	5,0
Political authority	2,7	2,8	4,7	3,9	3,1
Traditional morality +	1,7	2,6	3,5	2,3	2,4
Civic mindedness +	1,0	0,7	1,2	1,3	0,8
Progressive emphases					
Democracy	2,6	2,6	3,2	2,2	4,4
Environmentalism +	3,8	4,6	4,3	4,2	3,0
Freedom & human rights	2,5	2,8	4,8	2,7	2,2
Culture +	0,9	2,3	2,1	2,1	1,6
Non-economic demographic groups	3,5	5,0	2,3	1,9	1,1
Anti-growth economy +	0,0	0,0	0,1	0,3	0,8
Minority groups	0,7	1,4	0,7	0,8	0,4
Multiculturalism +	0,1	0,2	0,8	0,2	0,3
Traditional morality -	0,4	0,1	0,0	0,2	0,1
National way of life -	0,0	0,2	0,0	0,0	0,1
Economic-distributive dimension					
Pro-free-market emphases					
Free market economy	5,7	6,3	5,2	3,9	2,5
Incentives	1,4	2,5	3,1	2,9	2,0
Welfare -	1,2	2,8	2,1	1,6	1,7
Economic orthodoxy	5,2	4,9	2,8	2,4	1,1
Economic growth +	1,6	1,0	1,1	1,1	0,6
Education -	0,8	0,2	0,1	0,1	0,3
Protectionism -	0,1	0,6	0,1	0,5	0,2
Labour groups -	0,1	0,5	0,2	0,2	0,2
Pro-redistribution emphases					
Welfare +	4,0	3,1	4,5	6,9	8,4
Education +	2,1	3,0	3,3	4,3	3,9
Equality +	3,6	1,2	2,3	3,3	3,1
Market regulation	0,8	1,8	1,8	1,1	2,8
Labour groups +	1,0	1,0	1,3	1,9	2,3
Protectionism +	0,1	0,4	0,5	0,9	0,7
Controlled economy	0,4	0,7	0,2	0,5	0,5
Nationalisation	0,1	0,0	0,1	0,2	0,3
Keynesian demand management	0,1	0,0	0,0	0,2	0,2
Economic planning	0,4	0,2	0,2	0,1	0,2
Corporatism/mixed economy	0,7	0,5	0,0	0,0	0,1
Other categories					
Europe -	0,1	0,3	1,1	2,7	6,3
Technology & infrastructure	2,5	3,0	3,5	5,7	4,2
Gov-admin efficiency	5,7	4,9	6,7	4,5	3,3
Military +	1,1	2,7	2,4	2,7	2,5
Agriculture +	2,3	2,0	2,7	2,1	2,2

Internationalism -	1,3	1,4	0,7	1,6	1,5
Internationalism +	2,5	1,8	1,8	1,1	1,4
Decentralisation	0,8	1,7	2,5	2,5	1,3
Economic goals	2,7	2,6	1,6	1,0	0,6
Political corruption	0,2	2,0	3,2	0,8	0,5
Centralisation	0,6	0,5	0,1	0,1	0,4
Middle class and prof. groups	0,6	0,3	0,5	0,4	0,2
Constitution -	0,6	0,2	0,2	0,1	0,2
Military -	0,3	0,1	0,2	0,1	0,2
Europe +	0,5	0,7	0,9	0,6	0,2
Constitution +	1,3	0,3	1,0	0,3	0,1
Anti-imperalism	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,1
Peace	0,0	0,3	0,2	0,1	0,0
Foreign special +	0,1	0,2	0,2	0,3	0,0
Marxist analysis +	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
Foreign special -	0,1	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0

Note: The table reports the scores of anti-immigration parties on all the items available in the Comparative Manifesto Project database. Values correspond to the share of "quasi-sentences" dedicated to emphasizing each category of issues in parties' manifestos. Vote-share-weighted average over all parties with available data in the corresponding decade. Figure are ranked in decreasing order of their magnitude in the 2010s.

Table B5 - Manifesto scores of green parties

	1980s	1990s	2000s	2010s
Sociocultural dimension				
<u>Conservative emphases</u>				
Law and order +	1,1	1,1	2,0	1,4
Political authority	18,6	4,1	2,7	1,4
Civic mindedness +	1,0	1,4	1,4	1,2
National way of life +	0,1	0,7	0,6	0,8
Traditional morality +	0,3	0,4	0,3	0,3
Multiculturalism -	0,1	0,1	0,2	0,2
<u>Progressive emphases</u>				
Environmentalism +	12,2	16,7	13,3	13,4
Anti-growth economy +	2,9	2,7	3,9	6,9
Freedom & human rights	2,3	2,1	2,5	3,7
Democracy	6,7	6,2	4,0	3,2
Culture +	1,8	2,2	2,6	2,5
Multiculturalism +	0,3	0,8	1,2	1,5
Non-economic demographic groups	3,3	4,4	2,7	1,1
National way of life -	0,1	0,3	0,1	1,1
Traditional morality -	0,4	0,7	0,8	0,9
Minority groups	1,7	2,4	2,0	0,7
Economic-distributive dimension				
<u>Pro-free-market emphases</u>				
Incentives	0,7	0,7	2,4	1,2
Economic growth +	1,2	0,9	2,2	0,6
Economic orthodoxy	0,5	1,0	0,5	0,6
Free market economy	0,2	0,2	0,2	0,5
Welfare -	0,0	0,0	0,1	0,2
Protectionism -	0,0	0,1	0,1	0,1
Education -	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
Labour groups -	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
<u>Pro-redistribution emphases</u>				
Welfare +	5,3	8,1	8,1	11,1
Equality +	2,7	7,7	9,7	9,6
Education +	1,5	3,2	4,5	6,1
Labour groups +	4,2	2,6	3,4	4,5
Market regulation	1,2	2,4	2,4	3,4
Controlled economy	0,3	0,6	0,7	0,9
Nationalisation	0,4	0,6	0,8	0,7
Protectionism +	0,2	0,3	0,2	0,3
Corporatism/mixed economy	0,0	0,1	0,2	0,3
Economic planning	0,3	0,4	0,1	0,3
Keynesian demand management	0,1	0,0	0,2	0,2
Other categories				
Technology & infrastructure	2,3	3,7	4,8	6,0
Internationalism +	3,4	3,6	3,2	2,5
Gov-admin efficiency	2,0	2,7	2,3	1,5
Decentralisation	2,2	1,3	1,3	1,3
Agriculture +	1,4	1,7	2,1	1,2

Europe +	0,5	1,2	1,5	1,1
Military -	3,0	1,6	1,5	0,9
Political corruption	1,9	0,5	0,8	0,8
Economic goals	1,8	2,7	1,5	0,5
Europe -	0,7	1,1	0,7	0,4
Peace	1,7	0,6	0,8	0,4
Centralisation	0,0	0,0	0,2	0,3
Constitution -	0,1	0,2	0,0	0,2
Military +	0,4	0,2	0,2	0,2
Constitution +	1,4	0,4	0,2	0,2
Middle class and prof. groups	0,3	0,3	0,5	0,1
Internationalism -	0,1	0,2	0,4	0,1
Foreign special +	0,4	0,1	0,1	0,1
Anti-imperalism	0,7	0,1	0,1	0,1
Marxist analysis +	0,7	0,0	0,2	0,0
Foreign special -	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0

Note: The table reports the scores of green parties on all the items available in the Comparative Manifesto Project database. Values correspond to the share of "quasi-sentences" dedicated to emphasizing each category of issues in parties' manifestos. Vote-share-weighted average over all parties with available data in the corresponding decade. Figure are ranked in decreasing order of their magnitude in the 2010s.

Table B6 - Manifesto scores of Social Democratic / Socialist / Other left-wing parties

	1950s	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s	2000s	2010s
Sociocultural dimension							
Conservative emphases							
Law and order +	0,2	0,6	1,4	1,9	2,7	4,2	3,0
Political authority	3,5	2,3	3,4	2,9	4,3	4,0	2,9
Civic mindedness +	2,3	1,6	1,7	2,1	2,1	1,6	1,3
National way of life +	0,8	0,9	0,4	0,6	0,8	1,5	1,1
Traditional morality +	0,4	0,3	0,3	0,4	1,0	0,7	0,5
Multiculturalism -	0,6	0,3	0,3	0,1	0,1	0,4	0,3
Progressive emphases							
Environmentalism +	0,4	1,1	3,0	4,7	5,9	5,6	5,8
Democracy	2,8	2,2	5,9	3,0	2,9	2,5	3,2
Anti-growth economy +	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,2	0,5	1,0	2,8
Culture +	1,2	2,2	1,8	2,9	2,6	3,0	2,4
Freedom & human rights	2,2	1,5	2,0	2,1	1,6	1,2	1,8
Non-economic demographic groups	4,4	5,1	4,4	5,4	4,4	3,2	1,4
Multiculturalism +	0,4	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,6	0,9	1,1
Minority groups	0,6	0,9	1,0	1,4	1,4	1,7	0,7
Traditional morality -	0,1	0,1	0,2	0,2	0,3	0,3	0,6
National way of life -	0,2	0,2	0,2	0,1	0,1	0,1	0,4
Economic-distributive dimension							
Pro-free-market emphases							
Incentives	1,7	2,3	2,0	2,4	2,9	2,2	2,1
Economic growth +	3,6	4,0	2,3	2,7	2,2	2,2	1,8
Economic orthodoxy	1,2	1,2	1,7	1,8	2,3	1,3	1,2
Protectionism -	0,3	0,4	0,1	0,1	0,3	0,4	0,3
Free market economy	1,0	0,6	0,4	0,6	0,8	0,7	0,3
Welfare -	0,0	0,1	0,1	0,1	0,3	0,1	0,2
Labour groups -	0,0	0,0	0,1	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
Education -	0,0	0,3	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
Pro-redistribution emphases							
Welfare +	8,2	9,6	7,2	8,3	9,3	11,6	12,8
Equality +	4,7	3,9	6,3	5,7	7,1	6,4	8,8
Education +	3,4	4,9	3,9	3,9	5,0	7,2	6,5
Labour groups +	5,0	4,0	4,1	3,8	3,8	3,3	5,8
Market regulation	2,7	2,3	2,6	1,9	2,1	2,5	4,9
Controlled economy	1,9	1,5	1,9	1,1	0,7	0,6	1,0
Nationalisation	1,3	0,8	1,1	0,8	0,5	0,5	0,8
Keynesian demand management	0,4	0,4	0,3	0,5	0,3	0,2	0,6
Economic planning	2,6	2,4	2,9	1,3	0,5	0,7	0,4
Corporatism/mixed economy	0,2	0,4	0,4	0,4	0,5	0,4	0,3
Protectionism +	0,5	0,4	0,6	0,3	0,2	0,1	0,3
Other categories							
Technology & infrastructure	4,2	5,0	4,6	5,5	6,1	6,9	6,9
Gov-admin efficiency	1,3	1,8	2,0	3,1	4,2	3,9	2,8
Internationalism +	2,3	2,7	2,4	2,8	3,2	3,7	2,6
Decentralisation	1,0	1,7	1,7	1,8	1,9	1,8	1,5
Europe +	0,4	1,0	0,7	1,2	2,0	1,7	1,3

Agriculture +	5,9	4,9	2,8	2,8	2,0	1,4	1,2
Military +	1,2	1,9	0,9	0,9	0,6	1,2	1,1
Economic goals	3,7	2,8	4,8	3,3	2,7	1,8	1,1
Political corruption	0,5	0,3	0,4	0,5	0,6	0,4	0,8
Military -	1,6	1,5	0,8	1,4	0,6	0,6	0,5
Peace	2,1	1,7	1,2	2,2	0,5	0,7	0,4
Europe -	0,0	0,2	0,4	0,2	0,3	0,2	0,3
Foreign special +	1,7	1,3	0,9	1,0	0,4	0,6	0,3
Constitution -	0,7	0,6	0,2	0,3	0,0	0,0	0,3
Middle class and prof. groups	1,5	1,1	0,7	0,7	0,2	0,5	0,2
Constitution +	1,0	0,5	0,6	0,7	0,4	0,4	0,2
Internationalism -	0,5	0,4	0,4	0,1	0,1	0,2	0,1
Anti-imperalism	0,4	0,4	0,6	0,3	0,1	0,1	0,1
Marxist analysis +	0,1	0,0	0,2	0,1	0,1	0,1	0,1
Centralisation	0,2	0,5	0,5	0,1	0,1	0,2	0,1
Foreign special -	0,7	0,5	0,4	0,3	0,0	0,1	0,0

Note: The table reports the scores of social democratic, socialist, and other left-wing parties (excluding Greens) on all the items available in the Comparative Manifesto Project database. Values correspond to the share of "quasi-sentences" dedicated to emphasizing each category of issues in parties' manifestos. Vote-share-weighted average over all parties with available data in the corresponding decade. Figure are ranked in decreasing order of their magnitude in the 2010s.

Table B7 - Manifesto scores of Conservative / Christian Democratic / Liberal parties

	1950s	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s	2000s	2010s
Sociocultural dimension							
<u>Conservative emphases</u>							
Law and order +	0,7	0,9	1,9	2,4	4,7	6,4	5,2
Political authority	4,4	3,2	3,4	3,4	5,4	6,0	2,9
National way of life +	2,0	1,0	0,8	0,9	1,4	2,3	2,4
Civic mindedness +	3,1	1,4	1,5	1,5	1,7	1,8	1,7
Traditional morality +	3,1	1,6	1,8	2,3	3,1	2,5	1,4
Multiculturalism -	0,2	0,3	0,2	0,1	0,4	1,0	1,0
<u>Progressive emphases</u>							
Environmentalism +	0,4	1,5	3,8	4,5	5,1	4,2	4,3
Freedom & human rights	3,3	2,0	3,0	3,0	2,3	2,2	2,4
Culture +	1,0	2,2	2,8	2,5	2,0	2,0	2,1
Democracy	2,8	2,4	3,8	2,1	2,3	2,0	2,0
Anti-growth economy +	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,1	0,3	0,5	1,9
Non-economic demographic groups	3,9	4,9	4,9	4,0	3,4	2,9	1,3
Multiculturalism +	1,2	0,8	0,6	0,7	0,5	0,7	0,8
Minority groups	0,5	0,7	1,1	1,1	1,1	1,3	0,5
National way of life -	0,1	0,1	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,5
Traditional morality -	0,1	0,0	0,1	0,1	0,1	0,2	0,3
Economic-distributive dimension							
<u>Pro-free-market emphases</u>							
Incentives	3,0	3,7	3,9	3,9	4,1	3,9	3,7
Economic growth +	3,1	3,9	2,3	3,0	2,2	2,4	3,0
Economic orthodoxy	5,0	3,9	4,3	5,4	4,4	2,5	2,9
Free market economy	5,0	3,8	3,1	4,4	3,5	2,8	2,7
Welfare -	0,4	0,3	0,6	0,8	1,1	0,8	1,5
Protectionism -	0,4	0,5	0,2	0,6	0,3	0,4	0,6
Labour groups -	0,4	0,2	0,5	0,5	0,3	0,1	0,4
Education -	0,0	0,0	0,2	0,0	0,1	0,1	0,2
<u>Pro-redistribution emphases</u>							
Welfare +	4,9	6,0	6,6	5,6	6,1	8,5	9,0
Education +	2,2	4,6	4,0	3,4	4,8	5,7	5,4
Equality +	3,1	3,1	3,9	2,9	3,5	3,1	4,4
Labour groups +	2,4	2,0	1,9	1,7	1,2	2,0	3,0
Market regulation	1,4	1,0	1,5	1,4	2,0	2,0	3,0
Economic planning	0,9	1,5	1,1	0,4	0,3	0,4	0,5
Protectionism +	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,2	0,2	0,2	0,3
Controlled economy	0,3	0,4	0,9	0,4	0,4	0,3	0,3
Corporatism/mixed economy	0,6	0,2	0,3	0,3	0,3	0,1	0,3
Keynesian demand management	0,3	0,3	0,6	0,3	0,1	0,1	0,2
Nationalisation	0,2	0,0	0,1	0,0	0,0	0,1	0,2
Other categories							
Technology & infrastructure	3,2	5,8	4,2	5,5	5,2	6,3	7,6
Gov-admin efficiency	1,6	2,5	2,7	4,8	5,2	5,8	4,7
Internationalism +	1,6	2,6	1,8	2,2	3,0	2,4	2,3
Military +	2,1	2,6	1,7	2,6	1,4	1,7	2,1
Agriculture +	5,3	4,5	3,4	4,2	2,7	1,9	2,0

Decentralisation	2,0	2,2	3,2	2,1	1,9	1,9	1,8
Europe +	0,6	1,4	1,3	1,8	2,7	1,7	1,6
Economic goals	2,4	2,2	3,6	3,2	2,5	2,5	1,2
Europe -	0,1	0,1	0,0	0,1	0,5	0,4	0,6
Political corruption	0,4	0,3	0,4	0,3	0,6	0,6	0,5
Middle class and prof. groups	2,3	1,4	1,1	0,7	0,4	0,6	0,4
Constitution +	1,1	0,9	0,7	0,5	0,4	0,3	0,4
Centralisation	0,3	0,3	0,3	0,2	0,1	0,2	0,3
Foreign special +	2,1	1,8	0,9	1,1	0,6	0,7	0,3
Internationalism -	0,4	0,8	0,4	0,2	0,2	0,2	0,2
Constitution -	0,4	0,3	0,2	0,2	0,1	0,0	0,2
Peace	0,9	1,2	0,7	0,9	0,4	0,3	0,2
Military -	0,3	0,3	0,2	0,5	0,2	0,1	0,1
Foreign special -	0,4	0,3	0,1	0,3	0,0	0,1	0,0
Anti-imperalism	0,4	0,5	0,2	0,2	0,0	0,0	0,0
Marxist analysis +	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0

Note: The table reports the scores of conservative, Christian democratic, and liberal parties on all the items available in the Comparative Manifesto Project database. Values correspond to the share of "quasi-sentences" dedicated to emphasizing each category of issues in parties' manifestos. Vote-share-weighted average over all parties with available data in the corresponding decade. Figure are ranked in decreasing order of their magnitude in the 2010s.

Table B8 - Sociocultural polarization and educational divides: regression results

	Raw coefficient	After controls and country/year fixed effects	After controls and election fixed effects
1948-1979	-0.13*	0.12	0.11
1980-1999	-0.68***	-0.13	-0.21
2000-2020	-1.21***	-0.65***	-0.73***

Source: authors' computations combining the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Datatabase with Manifesto Project data.

Note: the table reports the coefficient associated to a regression of the sociocultural index on the education gradient (the share of top 10% educated voters within a given party's electorate) at the party level, decomposing the dataset into three time periods: 1948-1979, 1980-1999, and 2000-2020. The first column reports the raw coefficient (without controls). The second column reports the coefficient after controlling for country and year fixed effects and for the composition of the electorate of each party in terms of income, age, gender, rural-urban location, and religion. The third column reports the same coefficient after controlling for the same variables and for election fixed effects (that is, interacting country and year fixed effects). * $p<0.10$, ** $p<0.05$, *** $p<0.01$.

Interpretation: in 1948-1979, the link between a party's position on the sociocultural axis and the composition of its electorate in terms of education was small and not statistically significant; in 2000-2020, it has become strongly negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, so that parties strongly emphasizing progressive issues in their manifestos receive much greater support from higher-educated voters.

Table B9 - Sociocultural polarization and educational divides: complete regression results

	Raw coefficient			After controls and country/year fixed effects			After controls and election fixed effects		
	1948-1979	1980-1999	2000-2020	1948-1979	1980-1999	2000-2020	1948-1979	1980-1999	2000-2020
Share of top 10% educated voters in party's electorate	-0.134* (0.079)	-0.681*** (0.103)	-1.208*** (0.118)	0.122 (0.174)	-0.133 (0.200)	-0.651*** (0.205)	0.114 (0.176)	-0.208 (0.193)	-0.733*** (0.207)
R-squared	0.01	0.06	0.14	0.59	0.52	0.43	0.61	0.59	0.47
Observations	444	661	640	159	266	341	159	266	341

Source: authors' computations combining the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Datatabase with Manifesto Project data.

Note: the table reports the results of a regression of the sociocultural index on the education gradient (the share of top 10% educated voters within a given party's electorate) at the party level, decomposing the dataset into three time periods: 1948-1979, 1980-1999, and 2000-2020. The first panel reports the raw coefficient (without controls). The second panel reports the coefficient after controlling for country and year fixed effects and for the composition of the electorate of each party in terms of income, age, gender, rural-urban location, and religion. The third panel reports the same coefficient after controlling for the same variables and for election fixed effects (that is, interacting country and year fixed effects). * $p<0.10$, ** $p<0.05$, *** $p<0.01$.

Interpretation: in 1948-1979, the link between a party's position on the sociocultural axis and the composition of its electorate in terms of education was small and not statistically significant; in 2000-2020, it has become strongly negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, so that parties strongly emphasizing progressive issues in their manifestos receive much greater support from higher-educated voters.

Table B10 - Correlation between income and education gradients and all Manifesto items, 1960s-2010s											
	Relative support among top 10% educated voters						Relative support among top 10% income voters					
	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s	2000s	2010s	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s	2000s	2010s
Sociocultural dimension												
Conservative emphases												
Law and order +	0.11	0.11*	-0.08	-0.09*	-0.07	-0.27***	-0.03	0.12*	0.13**	0.25***	0.14**	-0.07
National way of life +	-0.05	-0.11*	-0.05	-0.24***	-0.20***	-0.28***	-0.07	0.04	0.06	-0.15**	-0.10*	-0.09*
Multiculturalism -	-0.09	-0.03	-0.12**	-0.14***	-0.19***	-0.30***	-0.13	-0.01	-0.07	-0.07	-0.08	-0.09*
Traditional morality +	-0.02	-0.04	-0.04	-0.14**	-0.18***	-0.11**	-0.06	-0.02	-0.07	-0.10	-0.19***	-0.11**
Political authority	-0.05	-0.09	0.02	0.04	-0.04	-0.08	-0.08	-0.01	-0.09	0.06	0.07	0.03
Civic mindedness +	0.02	-0.07	-0.11**	-0.04	0.01	0.02	-0.08	0.05	-0.07	-0.02	-0.07	0.07
Progressive emphases												
Culture +	-0.11	-0.09	-0.11**	0.02	-0.03	0.15***	-0.06	-0.04	-0.09	-0.08	0.04	0.10*
Freedom & human rights	0.09	0.11*	0.11**	0.13**	0.16***	0.23***	0.14	0.17***	0.24***	0.19***	0.12**	0.17***
Anti-growth economy +	-0.08	-0.00	0.13**	0.23***	0.22***	0.23***	-0.07	0.02	0.02	-0.00	0.06	-0.06
Environmentalism +	0.02	0.15**	0.28***	0.23***	0.20***	0.27***	-0.10	0.01	-0.02	-0.12*	-0.05	-0.02
Traditional morality -	0.07	0.06	0.09	0.13**	0.21***	0.27***	0.00	0.16**	0.02	0.02	0.04	0.14**
Multiculturalism +	-0.06	0.01	0.07	0.13**	0.13**	0.11**	-0.09	0.12*	0.01	-0.02	0.01	0.03
National way of life -	-0.10	-0.07	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.11**	-0.13	-0.08	-0.03	-0.07	-0.12**	0.02
Non-economic demographic groups	-0.09	-0.07	0.01	0.04	0.01	-0.06	-0.15*	-0.11	-0.06	-0.06	-0.01	-0.05
Minority groups	0.06	0.01	0.03	0.18***	0.16***	0.02	0.01	-0.11*	-0.02	0.05	0.08	-0.04
Democracy	-0.03	0.10	0.06	0.16***	0.08	0.05	-0.08	0.02	-0.15**	-0.06	-0.10*	-0.08
Economic-distributive dimension												
Pro-free-market emphases												
Incentives	-0.05	0.05	-0.11**	-0.11**	-0.08	-0.18***	-0.10	0.17***	0.24***	0.12*	0.17***	0.08
Economic growth +	0.01	-0.12*	-0.08	-0.04	-0.13**	-0.09*	-0.12	-0.09	0.10	0.09	-0.00	0.16***
Economic orthodoxy	0.38***	-0.01	-0.06	-0.06	0.01	-0.10*	0.42***	0.22***	0.30***	0.19***	0.14**	0.09*
Labour groups -	0.08	0.03	-0.01	-0.07	-0.08	-0.00	0.09	0.10	0.12*	0.05	0.08	0.13**
Education -	0.01	0.08	-0.09	-0.07	-0.00	-0.01	-0.07	0.08	0.05	0.03	0.04	0.11**
Protectionism -	0.15*	0.04	-0.02	0.00	0.00	-0.03	-0.10	0.08	0.05	0.06	0.08	0.20***
Welfare -	0.19**	-0.05	-0.11*	-0.04	-0.02	-0.05	0.39***	0.06	0.08	0.09	0.15***	0.15***
Free market economy	0.30***	0.05	-0.04	0.01	-0.09*	-0.07	0.25***	0.25***	0.32***	0.28***	0.20***	0.30***
Pro-redistribution emphases												
Equality +	-0.02	-0.12*	-0.04	0.07	0.12**	0.21***	-0.05	-0.16**	-0.29***	-0.18***	-0.17***	-0.05
Keynesian demand management	0.02	-0.10	-0.01	-0.04	-0.03	-0.11**	-0.11	-0.04	0.04	-0.01	-0.10*	-0.07
Labour groups +	-0.16*	0.15**	0.01	0.06	0.09	0.13**	-0.11	-0.19***	-0.25***	-0.13**	-0.12**	-0.06

Protectionism +	-0.17*	-0.09	-0.03	-0.18***	-0.10*	-0.10*	-0.17*	-0.14**	-0.07	-0.10*	-0.11*	-0.18***
Education +	-0.01	-0.06	-0.12**	0.01	0.03	0.11*	0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.13**	-0.01	0.03
Welfare +	-0.22**	-0.09	-0.10*	-0.15***	0.00	-0.05	-0.22**	-0.06	-0.20***	-0.24***	-0.11*	-0.16***
Economic planning	-0.15*	-0.17***	-0.13**	-0.01	-0.09	-0.06	-0.19**	-0.05	-0.15**	-0.09	-0.08	0.02
Corporatism/mixed economy	-0.00	0.09	-0.11*	-0.05	-0.11*	-0.08	-0.03	0.06	-0.02	0.01	-0.11*	-0.08
Controlled economy	-0.15*	-0.14**	-0.00	-0.07	0.04	0.00	-0.05	-0.11*	-0.22***	-0.11*	-0.01	-0.18***
Market regulation	-0.11	-0.00	0.01	0.01	0.08	0.01	-0.19**	-0.12*	-0.02	-0.02	0.02	-0.09
Nationalisation	-0.05	0.08	0.06	-0.09	-0.03	0.01	-0.03	-0.21***	-0.26***	-0.16***	-0.23***	-0.22***
Other categories												
Agriculture +	-0.06	-0.14**	-0.15***	-0.11**	-0.20***	-0.17***	-0.02	-0.03	0.01	-0.06	0.01	-0.04
Military +	0.11	0.02	-0.00	-0.10*	-0.10*	-0.18***	0.06	0.21***	0.20***	0.15**	0.12**	0.05
Europe -	0.00	0.05	0.05	0.01	-0.07	-0.27***	0.02	-0.04	-0.11*	-0.15**	-0.18***	-0.16***
Political corruption	0.02	0.04	0.05	-0.05	-0.05	0.18***	-0.01	0.06	-0.03	0.02	-0.02	0.08
Europe +	0.04	-0.01	-0.05	0.04	0.11**	0.19***	0.03	0.06	0.10*	0.17***	0.22***	0.23***
Military -	-0.11	0.13**	0.21***	0.26***	0.25***	0.20***	-0.05	-0.17***	-0.15**	-0.10*	-0.13**	-0.17***
Internationalism -	-0.07	0.00	-0.13**	-0.11**	-0.17***	-0.13**	-0.07	-0.03	-0.02	-0.18***	-0.17***	-0.10*
Internationalism +	0.04	0.10	0.13**	0.09	0.28***	0.12**	-0.12	0.08	-0.04	-0.03	-0.01	0.03
Centralisation	-0.09	-0.07	-0.04	-0.03	0.05	0.10*	-0.14	-0.12*	0.05	-0.01	0.05	0.09
Constitution +	0.08	-0.05	0.05	-0.02	-0.00	-0.00	0.16*	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.05	0.09
Gov-admin efficiency	0.18**	-0.03	-0.02	-0.08	-0.01	-0.04	0.17*	0.10	0.22***	0.16***	0.19***	0.16***
Constitution -	-0.04	0.10	0.02	-0.06	-0.06	-0.04	-0.08	-0.04	0.10*	-0.04	-0.04	0.00
Decentralisation	-0.06	-0.11*	-0.06	-0.04	-0.08	-0.06	-0.17*	-0.06	-0.04	0.03	0.02	-0.00
Middle class and prof. groups	-0.03	0.01	0.10*	-0.08	0.03	-0.06	-0.02	0.03	0.10*	0.07	0.04	0.06
Technology & infrastructure	-0.04	-0.10	-0.12**	-0.12**	-0.14**	-0.08	-0.09	-0.11*	-0.01	-0.04	0.05	0.04
Foreign special +	0.13	-0.03	-0.05	-0.03	0.12**	-0.08	0.08	0.02	-0.03	0.06	0.12**	0.00
Economic goals	0.06	-0.09	-0.06	0.03	-0.09	-0.09	0.05	-0.06	0.01	-0.02	0.09	0.00
Foreign special -	-0.13	-0.08	0.11*	-0.03	0.20***	0.03	0.08	-0.06	-0.06	0.02	0.09	0.05
Anti-imperalism	0.04	-0.03	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.06	-0.03	-0.09	-0.03	-0.17***	-0.08	-0.14**
Marxist analysis +	.	-0.07	0.01	0.13**	-0.03	0.07	.	-0.07	-0.12**	-0.13**	-0.04	-0.12**
Peace	-0.22**	-0.12*	0.14***	0.13**	0.17***	0.07	-0.13	-0.18***	-0.21***	-0.01	0.02	-0.05

Note: The table reports the correlation coefficient between all items available in the Comparative Manifesto Project database and (1) the education gradient (defined as the share of top 10% educated voters within the electorate of the corresponding party) and (2) the income gradient (defined as the share of top 10% income voters within the electorate of the corresponding party). The unit of observation is the political party. Manifesto items correspond to the share of "quasi-sentences" dedicated to emphasizing each category of issues in parties' manifestos. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Figure B1 - Share of votes covered by the survey-manifesto dataset

Source: authors' computations combining the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database and Manifesto Project data.
Note: the figure represents the total share of votes captured by the merged survey-manifesto dataset by country for all elections available between 1945 and 2020.

Figure B2 - Ideological polarization in Western democracies, 1950s

Note: the figure displays the average score of all parties available in the CMP dataset in the 1950s on the economic-distributive index (y-axis) and the sociocultural index (x-axis). Parties are categorized into conservative, Christian democratic, and liberal parties; social democratic, socialist, communist, and other left-wing parties, anti-immigration parties; and green parties.

Figure B3 - Ideological polarization in Western democracies, 1960s

Figure B4 - Ideological polarization in Western democracies, 1970s

Source: authors' computations using the Comparative Manifesto Project database.
Note: the figure displays the average score of all parties available in the CMP dataset in the 1970s on the economic-distributive index (y-axis) and the sociocultural index (x-axis). Parties are categorized into conservative, Christian democratic, and liberal parties; social democratic, socialist, communist, and other left-wing parties, anti-immigration parties; and green parties.

Figure B5 - Ideological polarization in Western democracies, 1980s

Figure B6 - Ideological polarization in Western democracies, 1990s

Figure B7 - Ideological polarization in Western democracies, 2000s

Figure B8 - Ideological polarization in Western democracies, 2010s

Note: the figure displays the average score of all parties available in the CMP dataset in the 2010s on the economic-distributive index (y-axis) and the sociocultural index (x-axis). Parties are categorized into conservative, Christian democratic, and liberal parties; social democratic, socialist, communist, and other left-wing parties, anti-immigration parties; and green parties.

Figure B9 - Multidimensional political conflict and the divergence of income and education (bottom 50%)

Source: authors' computations combining the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database with Manifesto Project data.
Note: the upper lines plots the raw correlation between the education gradient (defined as the share of top 50% educated voters within the electorate of a given party) and the sociocultural index. The bottom line plots the raw correlation between the income gradient (defined as the share of top 50% income voters within the electorate of a given party) and the economic-distributive index (inverted, so that higher values correspond to greater pro-redistribution emphases). Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure B10 - Sociocultural polarization and educational divides, 1970s

Source: authors' computations combining the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database and Manifesto Project data.
Note: parties are categorized into conservative and Christian democratic parties; liberal and social-liberal parties; social democratic, socialist, communist and other left-wing parties, anti-immigration parties; green parties; and other unclassifiable parties.

Figure B11 - Sociocultural polarization and educational divides, 1980s

Source: authors' computations combining the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database and Manifesto Project data.
Note: parties are categorized into conservative and Christian democratic parties; liberal and social-liberal parties; social democratic, socialist, communist and other left-wing parties, anti-immigration parties; green parties; and other unclassifiable parties.

Figure B12 - Sociocultural polarization and educational divides, 1990s

Source: authors' computations combining the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database and Manifesto Project data.
Note: parties are categorized into conservative and Christian democratic parties; liberal and social-liberal parties; social democratic, socialist, communist and other left-wing parties, anti-immigration parties; green parties; and other unclassifiable parties.

Figure B13 - Sociocultural polarization and educational divides, 2000s

Source: authors' computations combining the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database and Manifesto Project data.
Note: parties are categorized into conservative and Christian democratic parties; liberal and social-liberal parties; social democratic, socialist, communist and other left-wing parties, anti-immigration parties; green parties; and other unclassifiable parties.

Figure B14 - Sociocultural polarization and educational divides, 2010s

Figure B15 - Multidimensional political conflict and the divergence of income and education (country-level analysis)

Legend:
- Correlation between education gradient and sociocultural polarization
- Correlation between income gradient and economic-distributive polarization

X-axis: 1970-79, 1980-89, 1990, 2000-09, 2010-20

Source: authors' computations combining the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database and Manifesto Project data.
Note: the upper lines plots the raw correlation between the education gradient (defined as the difference between the share of top 10% educated voters and the share of bottom 90% educated voters voting for left-wing parties) and sociocultural polarization (defined as the standard deviation of the sociocultural index across all parties in a given country). Conversely, the bottom line plots the raw correlation between the income gradient and economic-distributive polarization (inverted, so that higher values correspond to greater pro-redistribution emphases). Both polarization indices are normalized to the average standard deviation to highlight relative evolutions. The unit of observation is the country.

Figure B16 - Average left-right positions of political parties in Western democracies, 2000-2020: survey data vs. manifesto data

Legend:
- ● Social Democrats / Socialists / Communists
- ● Conservatives / Christian Democrats / Liberals
- ● Greens
- ● Anti-immigration

Y-axis: Left-right ideological index in CMP dataset

X-axis: Average left-right position of voters (0-10 scale)

Source: authors' computations combining the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database and the CMP database.
Note: the figure displays the average score of parties on the left-right ideological index in the Comparative Manifesto Project database (y-axis) and the average self-reported left-right placement of voters supporting these parties, as reported in survey data (x-axis). Average over the 2000-2020 period. Excludes parties that received less than 5% of the vote in a given election. Parties are categorized into conservative, Christian democratic, and liberal parties; social democratic, socialist, communist and other left-wing parties, anti-immigration parties; and green parties. The size of bubbles is proportional to the square root of the average vote share of each party.

Figure B17 - Average left-right positions of political parties in Western democracies, 2000-2020: survey data vs. manifesto data (normalized)

Note: the figure displays the average score of parties on the left-right ideological index in the Comparative Manifesto Project database (y-axis) and the average self-reported left-right placement of voters supporting these parties, as reported in survey data (x-axis). Both variables are normalized by taking the difference between the party's value and the vote-share-weighted average value in a given country-year. Average over the 2000-2020 period. Excludes parties that received less than 5% of the vote in a given election. Parties are categorized into conservative, Christian democratic, and liberal parties; social democratic, socialist, communist and other left-wing parties, anti-immigration parties; and green parties. The size of bubbles is proportional to the square root of the average vote share of each party.

Figure B18 - Average self-declared left-right position of voters supporting Conservative / Christian Democratic / Liberal parties

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure represents the difference between the average self-declared left-right position of voters supporting Conservative, Christian Democratic, and Liberal parties and the average self-declared left-right position of all voters over the 2000-2020 period by country.
Interpretation: In all countries, voters supporting Conservative / Christian Democratic / Liberal parties are significantly more likely to declare being more right-wing than other voters.

Figure B19 - Average self-declared left-right position of voters supporting anti-immigration parties

Note: the figure represents the difference between the average self-declared left-right position of voters supporting anti-immigration parties and the average self-declared left-right position of all voters over the 2000-2020 period by country.
Interpretation: In nearly all countries, voters supporting anti-immigration parties are significantly more likely to declare being more right-wing than other voters.

Figure B20 - Average self-declared left-right position of voters supporting Social Democratic / Socialist / Communist / Other left-wing parties (excl. Greens)

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.

Note: the figure represents the difference between the average self-declared left-right position of voters supporting Social Democratic, Socialist, communist and other left-wing parties (excluding Greens) and the average self-declared left-right position of all voters over the 2000-2020 period by country.

Interpretation: In all countries, voters supporting Social Democratic / Socialist / Communist / Other left-wing parties are significantly more likely to declare being more left-wing than other voters.

# Figure B21 - Average self-declared left-right position of voters supporting green parties

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure represents the difference between the average self-declared left-right position of voters supporting green parties and the average self-declared left-right position of all voters over the 2000-2020 period by country.
Interpretation: In all countries, voters supporting green parties are significantly more likely to declare being more left-wing than other voters.

Figure B22 - Average CMP left-right ideological index of Conservative / Christian Democratic / Liberal parties in Manifesto Project Database

Source: authors' computations using the Comparative Manifesto Project Database.
Note: the figure represents the difference between the left-right ideological index of Conservative, Christian Democratic, and Liberal parties and the overall vote-share-weighted average of the same index (by country and election) over the 2000-2020 period by country.
Interpretation: In all countries, Conservative / Christian Democratic / Liberal parties have a left-right ideological index that is higher (that is, more right-wing) than that of other parties.

Figure B23 - Average CMP left-right ideological index of anti-immigration parties

Source: authors' computations using the Comparative Manifesto Project Database.

Note: the figure represents the difference between the left-right ideological index of anti-immigration parties and the vote-share-weighted average of the same index (by country and election) over the 2000-2020 period by country.

Interpretation: In nearly all countries, anti-immigration parties have a left-right ideological index that is higher (that is, more right-wing) than that of other parties.

Figure B24 - Average CMP left-right ideological index of Social Democratic / Socialist / Communist / Other left-wing parties (excl. Greens)

Source: authors' computations using the Comparative Manifesto Project Database.
Note: the figure represents the difference between the left-right ideological index of Social Democratic, Socialist, Communist and other left-wing parties (excluding Greens) and the vote-share-weighted average of the same index (by country and election) over the 2000-2020 period by country.
Interpretation: In all countries, Social Democratic / Socialist / Communist / Other left-wing parties parties have a left-right ideological index that is lower (that is, more left-wing) than that of other parties.

Figure B25 - Average CMP left-right ideological index of green parties

Source: authors' computations using the Comparative Manifesto Project Database.
Note: the figure represents the difference between the left-right ideological index of green parties and the vote-share-weighted average of the same index (by country and election) over the 2000-2020 period by country.
Interpretation: In all countries, green parties have a left-right ideological index that is lower (that is, more left-wing) than that of other parties.

# Figure CA1 - Vote for left-wing parties among young voters in Western democracies

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters younger than 25 and the share of voters aged 25 or above voting for left-wing parties in Western democracies.

Figure CA2 - Vote for left-wing parties among old voters in Western democracies

Figure CA3 - Vote for left-wing parties among young voters in Western democracies, after controls

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters younger than 25 and the share of voters aged 25 or above voting for left-wing parties in Western democracies, after controlling for income, education, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status.

Figure CA4 - Vote for left-wing parties among old voters in Western democracies, after controls

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of the 10% oldest voters and the share of the youngest 90% voters voting for left-wing parties in Western democracies, after controlling for income, education, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status.

Figure CA5 - Generational cleavages and party system fragmentation

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.

Note: the figure represents the share of votes received by selected groups of parties in Western democracies by age in the last election available. Green parties and "New left" parties (Die Linke, Podemos, France Insoumise, Bloco de Esquerda, Norwegian Socialist Left Party) make much higher scores among the youth than among older generations. By contrast, there is no clear age profile in the case of far-right or anti-immigration parties. 20 correponds to voters aged 20 or younger; 70 corresponds to voters 70 or older.

Figure CA6 - Vote for Green parties by age group

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Green parties in Western democracies in the last election available by age group.

Figure CA7 - Vote for anti-immigration parties by age group

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by anti-immigration parties in Western democracies in the last election available by age group.

Figure CB1 - The rural-urban divide

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure displays the difference between the share of rural areas and the share of urban areas voting for social democratic / socialist / communist / green parties. In all countries, rural areas have remained significantly less likely to vote for these parties than cities, with no clear trend over time. Estimates control for income, education, age, gender, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure CB2 - Vote for Green parties by rural-urban location in Western democracies

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Green parties by rural-urban location in Western democracies.

Figure CB3 - Vote for anti-immigration parties by rural-urban location in Western democracies

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by anti-immigration parties by rural-urban location in Western democracies.

Figure CB4 - Vote for left-wing parties by center-periphery location in Western democracies

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by center-periphery location in Western democracies. Centers correspond to the Australian Capital Territory (Australia), Vienna (Austria), Brussels (Belgium), Copenhagen (Denmark), Paris (France), Reykjavík (Iceland), Dublin (Ireland), Auckland and Wellington (New Zealand), Lisbon (Portugal), Madrid (Spain), and London (United Kingdom).

Figure CB5 - Vote for Green parties by center-periphery location in Western democracies

Figure CB6 - Vote for anti-immigration parties by center-periphery location in Western democracies

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by anti-immigration parties by center-periphery location in Western democracies. Centers correspond to the Australian Capital Territory (Australia), Vienna (Austria), Brussels (Belgium), Copenhagen (Denmark), Paris (France), Reykjavík (Iceland), Dublin (Ireland), Auckland and Wellington (New Zealand), Lisbon (Portugal), Madrid (Spain), and London (United Kingdom).

# Figure CB7 - Vote for left-wing parties among capital cities in Western democracies

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters living in the capital city and the share of other voters voting for left-wing parties in Western democracies. Centers correspond to the Australian Capital Territory (Australia), Vienna (Austria), Brussels (Belgium), Copenhagen (Denmark), Paris (France), Reykjavík (Iceland), Dublin (Ireland), Auckland and Wellington (New Zealand), Lisbon (Portugal), Madrid (Spain), and London (United Kingdom).

Figure CB8 - Vote for left-wing parties among capital cities in Western democracies, after controls

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters living in the capital city and the share of other voters voting for left-wing parties in Western democracies, after controlling for income, education, age, gender, employment status, and marital status. Centers correspond to the Australian Capital Territory (Australia), Vienna (Austria), Brussels (Belgium), Copenhagen (Denmark), Paris (France), Reykjavík (Iceland), Dublin (Ireland), Auckland and Wellington (New Zealand), Lisbon (Portugal), Madrid (Spain), and London (United Kingdom).

Figure CC1 - The religious divide

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure displays the difference between the share of Catholics (or Catholics and Protestants in mixed countries) declaring going to church at least once a year and the share of other voters voting for social democratic / socialist / communist / green parties. In all countries, religious voters have remained significantly less likely to vote for these parties than other voters.

Figure CC2 - Vote for left-wing parties by religion in Western democracies, 1970s

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by religion in the 1970s in Western democracies.

Figure CC3 - Vote for left-wing parties by religion in Western democracies, 2010s

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by religion in the 2010s in Western democracies.

Figure CC4 - Vote for left-wing parties among voters with no religion in Western democracies

Figure CC5 - Vote for Green parties by religion, 2010s

Figure CC6 - Vote for anti-immigration parties by religion, 2010s

Legend: Catholic, Other Christian, None, Other

Countries (x-axis): Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by anti-immigration parties by religious affiliation.

# Figure CD1 - The reversal of the gender cleavage in Western democracies (before and after controls)

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure displays the difference between the share of women and the share of men voting for left-wing (social democratic, socialist, communist, and green) parties in Western democracies, before and after controlling for other covariates (for country-years in which these variables are available). Women have gradually shifted from being significantly more right-wing to being significantly more left-wing than men, both before and after controls. Average over all Western democracies.

Figure CD2 - The reversal of the gender cleavage

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure displays the difference between the share of women and the share of men voting for social democratic / socialist / communist / green parties in Western democracies. In the majority of countries, women have gradually shifted from being significantly more conservative than men in the 1950s-1960s to being significantly more left-wing in the 2000s-2010s.

Figure CD3 - Vote for left-wing parties among women in Western democracies (after controlling for religion)

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure displays the difference between the share of women and the share of men voting for left-wing (socialist, social democratic, communist, and green) parties in Western democracies, after controlling for religion and church attendance. In the majority of countries, women have gradually shifted from being significantly more right-wing to being significantly more left-wing than men.

Figure CD4 - Gender cleavages and sectoral specialization in Western democracies

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of women and the share of men voting for left-wing parties in Western democracies in the last election available, before and after controlling for occupation (employment status + private/public sector of employment).

Figure CD5 - Vote for green parties by gender in Western democracies

Legend: ■ Women ■ Men

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Green parties by gender in Western democracies in the last election available.

Figure CD6 - Vote for anti-immigration parties by gender in Western democracies

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by anti-immigration parties by gender in Western democracies in the last election available.

Figure CE1 - The nativist cleavage
The native-immigrant cleavage

Denmark: immigrants more likely to vote for social democratic / socialist / green parties by 39 percentage points

Iceland, Finland, Portugal, Australia: immigrants not voting for different parties than natives

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database and the European Social Survey for Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of voters born in non-Western countries (all countries excluding Europe, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States) and the share of natives (voters born in the country considered) voting for social democratic / socialist / communist / green parties over the 2010-2020 period. In nearly all Western countries, immigrants are much more likely to vote for these parties than natives. US and Iceland figures include voters born in Western countries given lack of data on exact country of origin. Excludes Fianna Fáil in Ireland.

Figure CE2 - The nativist cleavage
The Muslim vote

Muslim voters more likely to vote for social democratic / socialist / green parties by over 40 percentage points

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database and the European Social Survey for Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of Muslim voters and the share of non-Muslims voting for social democratic / socialist / communist / green parties over the 2010-2020 period. In all Western countries, Muslims are substantially more likely to vote for these parties than non-Muslims. This cleavage is stronger in countries with strong far-right parties (e.g. Sweden, Denmark, Austria, Switzerland, France). Excludes Fianna Fáil in Ireland.

Figure CE3 - Vote for left-wing parties by country of birth in Western democracies, 2010s

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by country of birth in Western democracies in the 2010s. Excludes Fianna Fáil in Ireland. Covers 2007 and 2012 elections in France (no data in 2017).

Figure CF1 - The decline of self-perceived class cleavages in Western democracies (before controls)

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters self-identifying as belonging to the "working class" or the "lower class" and the share of voters identifying with the "middle class", the "upper class" or "no class" voting for left-wing (socialist, social democratic, communist, and green) parties.

Figure CF2 - The decline of self-perceived class cleavages in Western democracies (after controls)

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters self-identifying as belonging to the "working class" or the "lower class" and the share of voters identifying with the "middle class", the "upper class" or "no class" voting for social democratic / socialist / communist / green parties. Self-perceived class cleavages have declined significantly over the past decades. Estimates control for income, education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure CF3 - Vote for green parties by self-perceived class

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Green parties in Western democracies in the last election available by self-perceived social class.

Figure CF4 - Vote for anti-immigration parties by self-perceived class

Figure CF5 - Vote for left-wing parties among union members in Western democracies

Figure CF6 - Vote for left-wing parties among union members in Western democracies, after controls

Figure CF7 - Vote for left-wing parties among public sector workers in Western democracies

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of public sector workers and the share of private sector workers voting for social democratic, socialist, communist, and green parties in Western democracies.

Figure CF8 - Vote for left-wing parties among public sector workers in Western democracies, after controls

Figure CF9 - Vote for left-wing parties among homeowners in Western democracies

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of homeowners and the share of renters voting for social democratic, socialist, communist, and green parties in Western democracies.

Figure CF10 - Vote for left-wing parties among homeowners in Western democracies, after controls

	1948-59	1960-69	1970-79	1980-89	1990-99	2000-09	2010-2020
Table D1 - Marginal effect of belonging to top 10% educated voters on support for social democratic and affiliated parties by country and decade, after controls							
Australia		-13.3***	-4.8	-3.2	-3.0*	10.6***	5.9***
		(2.4)	(3.3)	(2.3)	(1.7)	(2.3)	(1.4)
Austria			-15.5***	-10.4***	-2.4	-2.4	12.8***
			(4.3)	(3.3)	(2.6)	(2.7)	(3.3)
Belgium			-10.6***	-8.2***	0.4	1.2	2.1*
			(1.5)	(1.5)	(1.5)	(1.1)	(1.3)
Canada		3.1	-2.0	-0.7	5.8***	6.9***	7.7***
		(3.0)	(2.9)	(1.9)	(2.0)	(1.9)	(1.7)
Denmark		-15.3***	-7.9***	-1.2	-0.8	5.0***	4.1***
		(3.5)	(2.0)	(1.7)	(1.2)	(0.9)	(1.5)
Finland			-19.0***	-14.6***	-8.4***	-5.6***	-2.6*
			(2.2)	(2.1)	(1.8)	(1.6)	(1.4)
France	-18.2***	-2.5	-4.8***	-0.0	8.1***	4.8***	10.2***
	(3.5)	(2.2)	(1.4)	(1.7)	(1.6)	(1.6)	(1.6)
Germany	-15.1***	-12.9***	-18.4***	-6.8*	3.1	4.2*	10.3***
	(2.2)	(2.7)	(3.8)	(3.5)	(2.4)	(2.4)	(2.7)
Iceland			6.7	-0.1	9.7***	5.6***	4.4***
			(5.7)	(3.1)	(2.4)	(1.5)	(1.0)
Ireland			-13.3***	-11.4***	-6.6***	-3.1*	-5.2***
			(2.3)	(1.4)	(2.0)	(1.7)	(1.4)
Italy	-9.9**	-0.9	-4.5	3.2	2.0	4.8**	5.2*
	(4.9)	(2.4)	(2.9)	(2.4)	(1.8)	(2.3)	(2.8)
Luxembourg			-16.0***	-5.1**	-0.6	7.4	5.5
			(3.1)	(2.5)	(1.8)	(4.9)	(5.0)
Netherlands		-1.8	-7.3***	1.9	11.5***	10.8***	10.7***
		(3.4)	(2.1)	(1.6)	(2.0)	(2.1)	(1.4)
New Zealand			0.6	-5.8*	2.3	12.7***	14.1***
			(2.3)	(3.3)	(1.5)	(1.8)	(1.7)
Norway	-30.7***	-33.1***	-16.8***	-12.0***	-3.6**	3.2***	2.7***

(3.3)	(2.6)	(2.2)	(1.5)	(1.5)	(1.0)	(1.0)
Portugal			-8.9	-5.9	-8.1***	-16.4***
			(5.4)	(5.2)	(2.5)	(3.8)
Spain			-9.9***	-12.5***	-6.1***	-1.8**
			(1.4)	(1.9)	(1.3)	(0.7)
Sweden -35.5***	-33.2***	-23.4***	-17.0***	-9.4***	-7.3***	-0.9
(2.5)	(1.6)	(1.6)	(1.4)	(1.2)	(1.1)	(3.2)
Switzerland	-15.0***	-4.5*	-4.5	4.6**	10.1***	14.1***
	(5.3)	(2.7)	(4.4)	(2.3)	(2.0)	(1.2)
United Kingdom -16.6***	-12.2***	-10.5***	-4.7***	-3.2**	-5.4***	2.1
(2.6)	(2.2)	(1.0)	(1.1)	(1.4)	(1.5)	(1.6)
United States -15.1***	-10.4***	-2.5	2.0	-3.1	4.6**	17.6***
(2.0)	(2.3)	(2.1)	(1.8)	(2.1)	(1.9)	(1.1)

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.

Note: the table reports the marginal effect of belonging to top 10% educated voters on the probability to support Social Democratic / Socialist / Green / Communist / Other left-wing parties, after controlling for income, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available). The original survey dataset is duplicated for each education category to approximate education deciles (see methodology). Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level. Coefficient standard errors in parenthesis. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table D2 - Marginal effect of belonging to top 10% income voters on support for social democratic and affiliated parties by country and decade, after controls

	1948-59	1960-69	1970-79	1980-89	1990-99	2000-09	2010-2020
Australia		-24.2***	-20.6***	-12.2***	-13.4***	-10.5***	-10.5***
		(2.7)	(3.8)	(3.7)	(2.0)	(2.2)	(1.8)
Austria			-17.9***	-7.4**	-2.4	-8.4*	-8.5**
			(4.0)	(3.6)	(3.0)	(4.9)	(3.4)
Belgium			-5.7***	-9.8***	-9.3***	-6.2***	-7.8***
			(1.6)	(1.6)	(1.5)	(1.7)	(1.7)
Canada		5.3*	-8.6***	-7.0***	-3.1	-5.4***	-7.0***
		(2.9)	(2.5)	(2.1)	(2.7)	(2.0)	(1.8)
Denmark		-12.6***	-14.9***	-22.2***	-19.8***	-14.5***	-14.6***
		(4.7)	(2.3)	(1.9)	(2.0)	(1.9)	(2.8)
Finland			-12.0***	-15.0***	-7.3***	-4.1*	-6.7***
			(2.4)	(2.1)	(2.1)	(2.2)	(1.9)
France	-0.8	-11.2***	-14.7***	-12.0***	-10.4***	-6.1***	-8.8***
	(5.7)	(2.8)	(1.6)	(1.8)	(1.8)	(1.5)	(2.6)
Germany	-11.4***	-17.7***	-12.1***		-11.8***	-10.1***	-13.8***
	(2.0)	(2.4)	(3.9)		(4.2)	(2.8)	(3.4)
Iceland				-4.0	-0.7	-6.2***	-7.1***
				(3.1)	(1.9)	(1.9)	(1.6)
Ireland			-6.7***	-8.1***	-10.6***	-1.3	-7.0***
			(2.5)	(1.3)	(2.7)	(3.1)	(2.4)
Italy	2.2	-6.6**	-1.4	-1.5		-3.0	4.6***
	(8.7)	(3.3)	(4.4)	(3.8)		(5.6)	(1.5)
Luxembourg			-7.8***	-7.6***	-5.0***	-18.2***	
			(2.9)	(2.4)	(1.6)	(6.1)	
Netherlands		-18.0***	-17.6***	-16.0***	-13.8***	-15.2***	-8.7***
		(3.5)	(2.8)	(2.0)	(2.4)	(2.4)	(1.9)
New Zealand			-19.9***	-6.4**	-11.8***	-11.3***	-12.2***
			(2.8)	(3.2)	(1.8)	(2.5)	(2.4)
Norway	-22.6***	-20.5***	-15.9***	-22.0***	-12.9***	-13.4***	-15.6***

	(4.1)	(2.6)	(2.0)	(2.0)	(2.8)	(2.2)	(2.5)
Portugal				-14.6*	-11.6*	-11.0***	-7.7
				(7.6)	(6.0)	(2.6)	(5.6)
Spain				-15.6***		-8.6***	-5.9***
				(3.2)		(1.5)	(1.4)
Sweden	-16.3***	-8.4***	-17.2***	-8.2***	-12.0***	-15.7***	-17.4***
	(3.7)	(1.6)	(1.9)	(1.3)	(1.9)	(1.8)	(2.3)
Switzerland				-11.9***		-7.2***	-11.7***	-5.6***
				(4.1)		(2.3)	(2.1)	(1.5)
United Kingdom	-23.7***	-31.3***	-15.6***	-15.3***	-10.0***	-6.8***	-7.6***
	(2.9)	(2.1)	(1.2)	(1.2)	(1.6)	(1.8)	(1.9)
United States	-9.6***	-8.2***	-12.8***	-13.1***	-7.7***	-11.1***	-0.0
	(2.2)	(2.4)	(2.2)	(2.1)	(2.7)	(2.8)	(1.9)

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.

Note: the table reports the marginal effect of belonging to top 10% income voters on the probability to support Social Democratic / Socialist / Communist / Green / Other left-wing parties, after controlling for education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available). The original survey dataset is duplicated for each income bracket to approximate income deciles (see methodology). Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level. Coefficient standard errors in parenthesis. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table D3 - Marginal effect of belonging to top 10% educated voters on support for specific families of parties by country, 2010-2020, after controls

	Social Democratic / Socialist / Communist / Other left	Conservative / Christian Democratic / Liberal	Green	Anti-immmigration
Australia	1.1	-7.0***	4.8***	-0.2**
	(1.4)	(1.4)	(1.1)	(0.1)
Austria	3.2	3.8	9.6***	-16.4***
	(3.1)	(3.2)	(2.4)	(2.4)
Belgium	-4.3***	0.1	6.3***	-2.0***
	(1.1)	(1.3)	(0.9)	(0.4)
Canada	6.1***	-8.2***	1.7**	
	(1.7)	(1.6)	(0.7)	
Denmark	3.5**	1.0	0.6	-5.0***
	(1.4)	(1.4)	(0.8)	(0.9)
Finland	-6.3***	9.7***	3.7***	-7.9***
	(1.3)	(1.5)	(0.9)	(1.2)
France	9.0***	-2.0	1.2**	-11.7***
	(1.6)	(1.5)	(0.5)	(1.3)
Germany	-0.6	-7.7***	11.1***	-1.6
	(2.4)	(2.6)	(2.2)	(1.1)
Iceland	2.0**	-5.1***	2.4***	
	(0.8)	(1.0)	(0.7)	
Ireland	-6.0***	4.0***	0.8	
	(1.5)	(1.4)	(0.6)	
Italy	5.2*	-4.9*		
	(2.8)	(2.9)		(2.1)
Luxembourg	-0.7	-4.0	6.1	-1.3
	(5.0)	(5.0)	(4.7)	(1.7)
Netherlands	6.6***	-2.3*	4.1***	-8.0***
	(1.4)	(1.4)	(0.8)	(0.7)
New Zealand	6.0***	-14.7***	8.1***	-1.2

	(1.6)	(1.7)	(1.1)	(0.7)
Norway	1.8*	-0.8	0.9**	-3.6***
	(1.0)	(1.0)	(0.4)	(0.7)
Portugal	-14.1***	16.4***	-2.2	
	(3.6)	(3.8)	(1.7)	
Spain	-2.1***	4.8***	0.3***	-2.6***
	(0.7)	(0.7)	(0.1)	(0.4)
Sweden	-7.5**	5.2	6.6***	-4.3***
	(3.1)	(3.3)	(2.2)	(1.2)
Switzerland	6.2***	-0.6	7.9***	-13.0***
	(1.0)	(1.2)	(1.0)	(1.0)
United Kingdom	2.1	-10.2***		-2.3***
	(1.6)	(1.6)		(0.4)
United States	17.6***	-17.6***		
	(1.1)	(1.1)		

Note: the table reports the marginal effect of belonging to top 10% educated voters on the probability to support specific families of parties in the 2010-2020 period, after controlling for income, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available). The original survey dataset is duplicated for each education category to approximate education deciles (see methodology). Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level. Coefficient standard errors in parenthesis. * $p<0.10$, ** $p<0.05$, *** $p<0.01$.

Table D4 - Marginal effect of belonging to top 10% income voters on support for specific families of parties by country, 2010-2020, after controls

	Social Democratic / Socialist / Communist / Other left	Conservative / Christian Democratic / Liberal	Green	Anti-immmigration
Australia	-7.5***	13.1***	-3.0**	-0.2
	(1.7)	(1.8)	(1.2)	(0.1)
Austria	-7.3**	12.9***	-1.2	-4.4
	(3.2)	(3.4)	(2.7)	(2.8)
Belgium	-5.9***	8.6***	-2.0*	-0.1
	(1.4)	(1.9)	(1.2)	(0.7)
Canada	-5.4***	7.6***	-1.6***	
	(1.8)	(1.7)	(0.6)	
Denmark	-9.3***	20.7***	-5.3***	-6.0***
	(2.8)	(2.9)	(1.1)	(1.6)
Finland	-7.0***	9.0***	0.3	-1.2
	(1.7)	(1.9)	(1.1)	(1.5)
France	-8.2***	13.5***	-0.5	-5.1**
	(2.6)	(2.9)	(0.6)	(2.1)
Germany	-12.0***	15.5***	-0.3	-0.2
	(3.0)	(3.5)	(2.7)	(1.8)
Iceland	-2.4*	10.5***	-4.7***	
	(1.3)	(1.8)	(1.3)	
Ireland	-7.9***	8.1***	0.9	
	(2.4)	(2.4)	(0.9)	
Italy	4.6***	0.9		-2.4*
	(1.5)	(1.6)		(1.3)
Netherlands	-7.1***	12.2***	-1.6*	-1.8*
	(1.8)	(1.9)	(0.9)	(1.0)
New Zealand	-9.9***	16.6***	-2.3*	-1.8*
	(2.3)	(2.5)	(1.2)	(1.1)
Norway	-13.0***	13.8***	-2.6***	1.0

	(2.5)	(2.9)	(0.7)	(2.0)
Portugal	-4.3	7.7	-3.5	
	(5.5)	(5.6)	(2.4)	
Spain	-6.0***	5.3***	0.1	1.5*
	(1.4)	(1.3)	(0.1)	(0.8)
Sweden	-13.4***	19.2***	-4.0***	-1.8
	(2.2)	(2.4)	(1.2)	(1.3)
Switzerland	-8.1***	9.6***	2.5**	-3.2**
	(1.3)	(1.7)	(1.2)	(1.4)
United Kingdom	-7.6***	15.0***		-1.9***
	(1.9)	(2.1)		(0.6)
United States	-0.0	0.0		
	(1.9)	(1.9)		

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.

Note: the table reports the marginal effect of belonging to top 10% income voters on the probability to support specific families of parties in the 2010-2020 period, after controlling for education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available). The original survey dataset is duplicated for each income bracket to approximate income deciles (see methodology). Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level. Coefficient standard errors in parenthesis. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table D5 - Effect of income and education on support for more left-wing parties
(dummy income and education variables, continuous left-right ideological index)

|	(1) 1948-1959	(2) 1960-69	(3) 1970-79	(4) 1980-89	(5) 1990-99	(6) 2000-09	(7) 2010-20
Income: Top 10%	-5.700***	-4.505***	-5.066***	-4.213***	-3.809***	-3.255***	-3.829***
	(0.673)	(0.430)	(0.327)	(0.267)	(0.207)	(0.191)	(0.200)
Education: University graduate	-10.880***	-6.278***	-2.158***	-1.060***	1.055***	2.212***	2.264***
	(1.211)	(0.614)	(0.388)	(0.251)	(0.195)	(0.174)	(0.165)
R-squared	0.35	0.24	0.24	0.23	0.34	0.27	0.17
Observations	35196	82331	158203	210450	170789	212937	208247

Note: The table reports the effect of income and education on support for more left-wing parties by decade across all Western democracies with available data. All estimates include election fixed effects. The dependent variable is the (inverted) left-right ideological index available from the Comparative Manifesto Project database, which theoretically ranges from -100 (most right-wing) to 100 (most left-wing). *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

Interpretation: in 1948-1959, higher income and higher education were both associated with support for more right-wing parties. By 2010-2020, higher income is still associated with support for more right-wing parties, but higher education is now associated with higher support for more left-wing parties.

	(1) 1948-1959	(2) 1960-69	(3) 1970-79	(4) 1980-89	(5) 1990-99	(6) 2000-09	(7) 2010-20
Table D6 - Effect of income and education on support for more left-wing parties, after controls **(dummy income and education variables, continuous left-right ideological index)**							
Income: Top 10%	-6.445***	-5.398***	-5.618***	-4.370***	-3.523***	-3.135***	-3.462***
	(0.673)	(0.420)	(0.331)	(0.255)	(0.208)	(0.189)	(0.197)
Education: University graduate	-11.640***	-7.119***	-2.830***	-1.558***	0.700***	1.734***	1.667***
	(1.230)	(0.614)	(0.391)	(0.250)	(0.195)	(0.174)	(0.169)
R-squared	0.37	0.26	0.26	0.25	0.36	0.32	0.22
Observations	35196	82331	158203	210450	170789	212937	208247

Note: The table reports the effect of income and education on support for more left-wing parties by decade across all Western democracies with available data. The dependent variable is the (inverted) left-right ideological index available from the Comparative Manifesto Project database, theoretically ranging from -100 (most right-wing) to 100 (most left-wing). All estimates include election fixed effects and control for the following variables (in country-years for which they are available): age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

Interpretation: in 1948-1959, higher income and higher education were both associated with support for more right-wing parties. By 2010-2020, higher income is still associated with support for more right-wing parties, but higher education is now associated with higher support for more left-wing parties.

Table D7 - Effect of income and education on support for more left-wing parties
(continuous income and education variables, continuous left-right ideological index)

	(1) 1948-1959	(2) 1960-69	(3) 1970-79	(4) 1980-89	(5) 1990-99	(6) 2000-09	(7) 2010-20
Income rank	0.422	1.957***	-1.569***	-3.589***	-4.882***	-4.909***	-5.688***
	(0.722)	(0.408)	(0.387)	(0.294)	(0.269)	(0.262)	(0.287)
Education rank	-10.214***	-9.269***	-5.295***	-2.413***	1.142***	3.993***	4.649***
	(0.590)	(0.382)	(0.351)	(0.266)	(0.261)	(0.255)	(0.281)
R-squared	0.35	0.24	0.24	0.23	0.34	0.27	0.18
Observations	13025	34028	70328	91076	86594	97681	100116

Note: The table reports the effect of income and education on support for more left-wing parties by decade across all Western democracies with available data. All estimates include election fixed effects. Income and education ranks/quantiles (ranging from 0 to 1) are defined discretely based on all income and education categories available in each survey. The dependent variable is the (inverted) left-right ideological index available from the Comparative Manifesto Project database, which theoretically ranges from -100 (most right-wing) to 100 (most left-wing). *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

Interpretation: in 1948-1969, higher income and higher education were both associated with support for more right-wing parties. By 2010-2020, higher income is still associated with support for more right-wing parties, but higher education is now associated with higher support for more left-wing parties.

Table D8 - Effect of income and education on support for more left-wing parties, after controls
(continuous income and education variables, continuous left-right ideological index)

	(1) 1948-1959	(2) 1960-69	(3) 1970-79	(4) 1980-89	(5) 1990-99	(6) 2000-09	(7) 2010-20
Income rank	-2.719***	-0.766*	-3.918***	-4.838***	-5.025***	-5.312***	-5.139***
	(0.775)	(0.437)	(0.440)	(0.315)	(0.299)	(0.290)	(0.312)
Education rank	-10.066***	-10.112***	-6.448***	-3.841***	0.291	3.099***	3.119***
	(0.607)	(0.389)	(0.360)	(0.272)	(0.271)	(0.264)	(0.293)
R-squared	0.37	0.27	0.27	0.25	0.36	0.32	0.22
Observations	13025	34028	70328	91076	86594	97681	100116

Note: The table reports the effect of income and education on support for more left-wing parties by decade across all Western democracies with available data. Income and education ranks/quantiles (ranging from 0 to 1) are defined discretely based on all income and education categories available in each survey. The dependent variable is the (inverted) left-right ideological index available from the Comparative Manifesto Project database, theoretically ranging from -100 (most right-wing) to 100 (most left-wing). All estimates include election fixed effects and control for the following variables (in country-years for which they are available): age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

Interpretation: in 1948-1959, higher income and higher education were both associated with support for more right-wing parties. By 2010-2020, higher income is still associated with support for more right-wing parties, but higher education is now associated with higher support for more left-wing parties.

	1960-69	1970-79	1980-89	1990-99	2000-09	2010-20	Difference 2010s-1960s
Table D9 - The reversal of educational divides, 1960-2020: before and after controls							
Raw coefficient	-21.6***	-11.8***	-7.3***	-2.7***	3.4***	5.3***	26,9
	(1.0)	(0.7)	(0.7)	(0.6)	(0.6)	(0.6)	
After controlling for income	-18.0***	-9.8***	-4.9***	-0.8	5.1***	6.6***	24,6
	(1.0)	(0.7)	(0.7)	(0.6)	(0.6)	(0.6)	
After controlling for the above and: Gender	-18.3***	-10.1***	-4.9***	-0.8	5.0***	6.5***	24,8
	(1.0)	(0.7)	(0.7)	(0.6)	(0.6)	(0.6)	
After controlling for the above and: Age	-18.9***	-11.0***	-5.9***	-1.5**	4.6***	5.7***	24,6
	(1.0)	(0.7)	(0.7)	(0.6)	(0.6)	(0.5)	
After controlling for the above and: Religion	-19.1***	-11.4***	-6.5***	-2.3***	4.1***	4.9***	24,0
	(1.0)	(0.7)	(0.7)	(0.6)	(0.6)	(0.5)	
After controlling for the above and: Religious practice	-18.5***	-10.9***	-5.9***	-1.8***	4.3***	5.1***	23,6
	(1.0)	(0.7)	(0.7)	(0.6)	(0.6)	(0.5)	
After controlling for the above and: Rural/urban	-19.2***	-11.6***	-6.5***	-2.2***	3.8***	4.6***	23,8
	(1.0)	(0.7)	(0.7)	(0.6)	(0.6)	(0.5)	
After controlling for the above and: Region	-19.9***	-11.9***	-6.6***	-2.2***	3.6***	4.5***	24,4
	(1.0)	(0.7)	(0.7)	(0.6)	(0.6)	(0.5)	
After controlling for the above and: Employment/marital status	-19.4***	-11.7***	-6.5***	-2.3***	3.6***	4.6***	24,0
	(1.0)	(0.7)	(0.7)	(0.6)	(0.6)	(0.5)	
After controlling for the above and: Sector of employment	-19.7***	-12.5***	-7.7***	-3.7***	2.1***	3.6***	23,3
	(1.0)	(0.7)	(0.7)	(0.6)	(0.6)	(0.5)	
After controlling for the above and: Union membership	-19.4***	-12.5***	-7.9***	-3.7***	1.7***	3.3***	22,7
	(1.0)	(0.7)	(0.7)	(0.6)	(0.6)	(0.5)	
After controlling for the above and: Home ownership	-18.8***	-12.1***	-7.7***	-3.7***	1.9***	3.6***	22,4
	(1.0)	(0.7)	(0.7)	(0.6)	(0.6)	(0.5)	

Note: The table reports the marginal effect of belonging to top 10% educated voters on the probability to support Social Democratic / Socialist / Communist / Green / Other left-wing parties, before and after controlling for a set of covariates. The regressions are run on the restricted number of countries for which these covariates are available in most decades: Australia, Denmark, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. All estimates include election (country-year) fixed effects.

	1948-59	1960-69	1970-79	1980-89	1990-99	2000-09	2010-20	2010s - 1950s
Table D10 - The reversal of educational divides by subgroup								
Gender								
Men	-25.1***	-17.0***	-7.8***	-3.8***	3.8***	5.0***	6.9***	32,0
	(1.6)	(1.4)	(1.0)	(0.9)	(0.7)	(0.7)	(0.7)	
Women	-24.9***	-16.7***	-13.2***	-7.4***	-3.3***	0.8	2.0***	26,9
	(1.9)	(1.1)	(0.8)	(0.7)	(0.7)	(0.7)	(0.7)	
Location								
Urban areas	-25.2***	-16.2***	-11.9***	-8.6***	-2.5***	1.7***	3.3***	28,5
	(2.6)	(1.2)	(1.0)	(0.8)	(0.8)	(0.6)	(0.6)	
Rural areas	-18.1***	-13.4***	-2.9*	-3.7***	3.5**	5.9***	9.7***	27,8
	(3.2)	(1.9)	(1.7)	(1.4)	(1.7)	(1.4)	(1.6)	
Religion								
No religion	-24.0***	-24.0***	-6.1***	-0.6	4.6***	5.2***	7.8***	31,8
	(8.9)	(3.0)	(1.5)	(1.4)	(1.2)	(1.1)	(0.9)	
Christian / Other	-18.1***	-13.6***	-11.6***	-8.1***	-3.0***	-0.2	1.3**	19,4
	(2.4)	(1.1)	(0.9)	(0.9)	(0.7)	(0.7)	(0.7)	
Sector of employment								
Private sector	-25.2***	-20.7***	-14.9***	-8.1***	-4.2***	-0.9	1.5**	26,7
	(3.5)	(3.0)	(1.6)	(1.2)	(0.8)	(0.9)	(0.7)	
Public sector	-12.3**	-22.4***	-3.4*	-3.1***	1.1	5.4***	5.8***	18,1
	(6.0)	(4.7)	(1.8)	(1.2)	(0.9)	(0.9)	(0.8)	
Subjective social class								
Working/Lower class	-13.4***	-6.7***	0.8	-3.7*	-1.7	2.6	4.9*	18,3
	(4.3)	(2.6)	(2.0)	(2.0)	(2.2)	(2.4)	(2.8)	
Middle/Upper class	-11.0***	-6.0***	0.2	0.9	3.2***	5.3***	7.3***	18,3
	(2.4)	(1.2)	(1.2)	(1.0)	(0.7)	(0.8)	(1.0)	

Source: authors' computations using the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database.

Note: the table reports the unconditional effect of belonging to top 10% educated voters on the probability to support Social Democratic / Socialist / Green / Other left-wing parties, decomposed by subgroup of voters. Within nearly all groups, most educated voters used to be significantly less likely to vote for these parties in the 1950s and 1960s. By the 2010s, they had become significantly more likely to do so. Figures correspond to regression results on all countries with available data for each decade. All estimates include election fixed effects. The original survey dataset is duplicated for each education category to approximate education deciles (see methodology). Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level. Coefficient standard errors in parenthesis. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table E1 - Determinants of support for Labor / Greens in Australia

	(1) 1960-69	(2) 1970-79	(3) 1980-89	(4) 1990-99	(5) 2000-09	(6) 2010-20
Education: None/Primary	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Education: Secondary	-0.118***	-0.054**	-0.045***	-0.040***	-0.019	-0.010
	(0.018)	(0.024)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.013)
Education: University	-0.238***	-0.047	-0.046*	-0.070***	0.086***	0.061***
	(0.031)	(0.040)	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.017)
Education: Postgraduate			-0.125	-0.021	0.128***	0.077***
			(0.082)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.017)
Income group: Bottom 50%	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Income group: Middle 40%	-0.165***	-0.071***	-0.012	-0.038***	-0.104***	-0.034***
	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.023)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.013)
Income group: Top 10%	-0.333***	-0.275***	-0.110***	-0.149***	-0.179***	-0.126***
	(0.029)	(0.024)	(0.037)	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.020)
Age: 20-39	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Age: 40-59	0.020	0.009	-0.033**	-0.067***	0.028	-0.001
	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.015)
Age: 60+	-0.067**	-0.059***	-0.074***	-0.098***	-0.071***	-0.112***
	(0.028)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.016)
Gender: Woman	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Gender: Man	0.068***	0.087***	0.048***	0.039***	-0.012	-0.073***
	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.011)
Religion: None			(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
			(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Religion: Catholic			0.084**	0.064***	-0.049**	-0.090***
			(0.041)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.018)
Religion: Other Christian			-0.024	-0.059***	-0.146***	-0.165***
			(0.037)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.015)
Religion: Other			0.099	-0.029	0.040	-0.043
			(0.113)	(0.027)	(0.044)	(0.033)
Religion: Muslim				0.274*	0.307***	0.193***
				(0.152)	(0.069)	(0.058)
Religious practice: Never	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Religious practice: Less than monthly	-0.083***	-0.034	-0.094***	-0.068***	-0.026	-0.053***
	(0.025)	(0.034)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.015)
Religious practice: Monthly or more	-0.095***	-0.096***	-0.210***	-0.136***	-0.092***	-0.124***
	(0.026)	(0.035)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.017)
Location: Urban	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Location: Rural	-0.132***	-0.105***	-0.130***	-0.090***	-0.093***	-0.063***
	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.013)
Employment status: Employed	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Employment status: Unemployed/Inactive	-0.017	0.018	0.045***	0.036**	0.026	0.013
	(0.039)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.013)

	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
Marital status: Single	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Marital status: Married/With partner	0.018	-0.014	-0.023	-0.039***	-0.029*	-0.037***
	(0.024)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.012)
Region: Australian Capital Territory			(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
			(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Region: New South Wales			-0.044	0.009	-0.142***	-0.177***
			(0.094)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.032)
Region: Northern Territory			-0.085	0.093	-0.285***	-0.130*
			(0.202)	(0.082)	(0.101)	(0.069)
Region: Queensland			-0.018	-0.050	-0.181***	-0.234***
			(0.097)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.033)
Region: South Australia			-0.091	-0.074	-0.188***	-0.198***
			(0.098)	(0.045)	(0.049)	(0.035)
Region: Tasmania			-0.000	0.067	-0.051	-0.145***
			(0.113)	(0.049)	(0.058)	(0.043)
Region: Victoria			-0.081	0.015	-0.122***	-0.164***
			(0.095)	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.032)
Region: Western Australia			-0.062	-0.032	-0.137***	-0.232***
			(0.100)	(0.046)	(0.047)	(0.034)
Constant	0.728***	0.510***	0.705***	0.623***	0.804***	0.886***
	(0.038)	(0.036)	(0.100)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.035)
R-squared	0.10	0.07	0.05	0.05	0.07	0.09
Observations	9787	10182	7064	12457	8151	14875
Clusters	2039	4066	2934	2997	2001	3932

Note: The table reports the effect of a set of individual characteristics on the probability to vote for Labor / Greens by decade in Australia. The original survey dataset is duplicated for each income bracket to approximate income deciles (see methodology). The number of clusters corresponds to the number of surveyed individuals in each decade. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level.

Table E2 - Determinants of support for SPÖ / KPÖ / Greens / NEOS in Austria

	(1) 1970-79	(2) 1980-89	(3) 1990-99	(4) 2000-09	(5) 2010-20
Education: None/Primary	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Education: Secondary	-0.056**	-0.033	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.028)	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.025)	(0.035)
Education: University	-0.197***	-0.133***	-0.029	-0.028	0.170***
	(0.050)	(0.036)	(0.029)	(0.037)	(0.044)
Income group: Bottom 50%	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Income group: Middle 40%	-0.039	-0.085***	-0.022	-0.021	0.005
	(0.031)	(0.023)	(0.016)	(0.024)	(0.025)
Income group: Top 10%	-0.201***	-0.123***	-0.024	-0.101*	-0.076*
	(0.045)	(0.038)	(0.027)	(0.053)	(0.039)
Age: 20-39	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Age: 40-59	0.010	-0.010	-0.031*	0.067**	-0.053*
	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.016)	(0.027)	(0.030)
Age: 60+	0.058	-0.075**	-0.072***	0.009	-0.125***
	(0.036)	(0.032)	(0.021)	(0.032)	(0.039)
Gender: Woman	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Gender: Man	0.029	-0.007	-0.043***	-0.057***	-0.081***
	(0.028)	(0.022)	(0.014)	(0.021)	(0.023)
Religion: None	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Religion: Catholic	0.002	-0.196***	-0.086*	-0.009	-0.135***
	(0.058)	(0.032)	(0.050)	(0.042)	(0.042)
Religion: Other Christian	-0.119	-0.205***	0.013	0.245***	-0.021
	(0.087)	(0.055)	(0.073)	(0.064)	(0.074)
Religion: Other	0.131	0.032	0.124	0.180	0.150*
	(0.172)	(0.102)	(0.129)	(0.132)	(0.087)
Religion: Muslim			-0.643***	0.275**	0.290***
			(0.055)	(0.128)	(0.108)
Religious practice: Never	(baseline)	(baseline)		(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)		(.)	(.)
Religious practice: Less than monthly	-0.045	-0.148***		-0.212***	-0.056
	(0.037)	(0.030)		(0.038)	(0.037)
Religious practice: Monthly or more	-0.469***	-0.388***		-0.436***	-0.116***
	(0.036)	(0.028)		(0.042)	(0.041)
Location: Urban	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Location: Rural	-0.055*	-0.092***	-0.073***	-0.102**	-0.071**
	(0.029)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.042)	(0.028)
Employment status: Employed	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Employment status: Unemployed/Inactive	0.068**	0.032	0.004	0.032	0.107***
	(0.030)	(0.026)	(0.016)	(0.024)	(0.034)
Marital status: Single	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)

Marital status: Married/With partner	-0.042	0.011	-0.013	-0.010	-0.029
	(0.028)	(0.022)	(0.015)	(0.023)	(0.027)
Region: Burgenland				(baseline)	(baseline)
				(.)	(.)
Region: Carinthia				-0.110	-0.255**
				(0.067)	(0.105)
Region: Lower Austria				-0.228***	-0.245***
				(0.053)	(0.094)
Region: Salzburg				-0.210***	-0.349***
				(0.066)	(0.105)
Region: Styria				-0.213***	-0.193*
				(0.057)	(0.100)
Region: Tyrol				-0.218***	-0.334***
				(0.059)	(0.099)
Region: Upper Austria				-0.193***	-0.211**
				(0.054)	(0.099)
Region: Vienna				-0.153***	-0.168*
				(0.055)	(0.098)
Region: Vorarlberg				-0.221***	-0.065
				(0.065)	(0.117)
Constant	0.861***	1.003***	0.647***	1.008***	0.881***
	(0.069)	(0.042)	(0.053)	(0.268)	(0.105)
R-squared	0.23	0.20	0.02	0.12	0.12
Observations	2137	4158	11336	8514	3559
Clusters	1336	2688	6468	2731	1162

Note: The table reports the effect of a set of individual characteristics on the probability to vote for SPÖ / KPÖ / Greens / NEOS by decade in Austria. The original survey dataset is duplicated for each income bracket to approximate income deciles (see methodology). The number of clusters corresponds to the number of surveyed individuals in each decade. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level.

Table E3 - Determinants of support for Socialists / Greens in Belgium

	(1) 1970-79	(2) 1980-89	(3) 1990-99	(4) 2000-09	(5) 2010-20
Education: None/Primary	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Education: Secondary	-0.114***	-0.090***	-0.057***	-0.049**	-0.053***
	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.023)	(0.020)
Education: University	-0.196***	-0.143***	-0.051***	-0.035	-0.028
	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.026)	(0.022)
Income group: Bottom 50%	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Income group: Middle 40%	-0.032***	-0.063***	-0.004	-0.022	-0.012
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Income group: Top 10%	-0.102***	-0.144***	-0.093***	-0.076***	-0.083***
	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Age: 20-39	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Age: 40-59	0.046***	-0.086***	0.006	0.024	0.012
	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Age: 60+	-0.001	-0.197***	-0.059***	-0.043*	-0.032
	(0.020)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.023)	(0.021)
Gender: Woman	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Gender: Man	0.017	0.025**	-0.037***	-0.035***	-0.044***
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Religion: None	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Religion: Catholic	-0.308***	-0.212***	-0.148***	-0.126***	-0.126***
	(0.028)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.019)
Religion: Other Christian	-0.087	-0.143**	0.046	-0.087	0.014
	(0.083)	(0.064)	(0.058)	(0.069)	(0.054)
Religion: Other	-0.179*	0.088	0.033	(baseline)	-0.005
	(0.092)	(0.063)	(0.043)	(0.080)	(0.073)
Religion: Muslim				0.364***	0.320***
				(0.064)	(0.042)
Religious practice: Never	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Religious practice: Less than monthly	-0.114***	-0.054**	-0.054***	-0.039*	-0.027
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.019)	(0.023)	(0.021)
Religious practice: Monthly or more	-0.342***	-0.258***	-0.198***	-0.150***	-0.061**
	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.028)
Location: Urban	(baseline)	(baseline)			
	(.)	(.)			
Location: Rural	-0.073***	-0.051***			
	(0.016)	(0.010)			
Employment status: Employed	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Employment status: Unemployed/Inactive	-0.021	0.007	0.020	0.044**	0.042**
	(0.017)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.017)
Marital status: Single	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)

Marital status: Married/With partner	0.022	-0.002	0.015	-0.003	-0.034**
	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Race/ethnicity/language: Dutch	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Race/ethnicity/language: French	0.079***	0.055***	0.135***	-0.053*	-0.010
	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.035)	(0.029)	(0.032)
Race/ethnicity/language: Other				-0.023	0.105
				(0.076)	(0.070)
Region: Brussels	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Region: Flanders	0.101***	-0.048***	0.068**	-0.214***	-0.187***
	(0.029)	(0.018)	(0.029)	(0.038)	(0.030)
Region: Wallonia	0.240***	0.161***	0.124***	0.054*	0.090***
	(0.028)	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.033)	(0.030)
Constant	0.622***	0.813***	0.468***	0.588***	0.557***
	(0.044)	(0.032)	(0.036)	(0.049)	(0.042)
R-squared	0.15	0.13	0.12	0.12	0.14
Observations	22962	25787	11737	10767	10034
Clusters	11054	12947	4411	1777	1825

Note: The table reports the effect of a set of individual characteristics on the probability to vote for Socialists / Greens by decade in Belgium. The original survey dataset is duplicated for each income bracket to approximate income deciles (see methodology). The number of clusters corresponds to the number of surveyed individuals in each decade. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table E4 - Determinants of support for Liberal / NDP / Green in Canada						
	1960-69	1970-79	1980-89	1990-99	2000-09	2010-20
Education: None/Primary	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Education: Secondary	0.011	-0.016	-0.057***	-0.001	0.001	0.051**
	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.017)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Education: University	0.044	0.013	-0.055**	0.046*	0.081***	0.117***
	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.024)	(0.027)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Education: Postgraduate				0.080**	0.103***	0.145***
				(0.037)	(0.029)	(0.027)
Income group: Bottom 50%	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Income group: Middle 40%	0.072***	-0.022	-0.034**	0.002	-0.009	-0.022*
	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.012)
Income group: Top 10%	0.097***	-0.096***	-0.088***	-0.031	-0.053**	-0.082***
	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.024)	(0.030)	(0.023)	(0.020)
Age: 20-39	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Age: 40-59	-0.003	-0.039	-0.003	0.041**	0.015	-0.034**
	(0.018)	(0.025)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Age: 60+	-0.032	-0.073**	-0.021	0.073***	0.005	-0.051***
	(0.025)	(0.032)	(0.022)	(0.026)	(0.020)	(0.016)
Gender: Woman	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Gender: Man	-0.011	-0.036	-0.069***	-0.060***	-0.062***	-0.071***
	(0.017)	(0.023)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.011)
Religion: None	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Religion: Catholic	0.142**	0.139**	0.114***	0.046	-0.065***	-0.067***
	(0.061)	(0.058)	(0.036)	(0.033)	(0.025)	(0.017)
Religion: Other Christian	-0.158***	-0.105*	-0.057*	-0.085***	-0.213***	-0.151***
	(0.059)	(0.056)	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.024)	(0.018)
Religion: Other	0.042	0.011	0.087*	0.070	-0.007	-0.030
	(0.066)	(0.063)	(0.046)	(0.048)	(0.035)	(0.027)
Religion: Muslim					0.312***	0.283***
					(0.040)	(0.047)
Religious practice: Never	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Religious practice: Less than monthly	-0.032	-0.061*	-0.056**	0.025	0.015	-0.016
	(0.039)	(0.032)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.019)	(0.016)
Religious practice: Monthly or more	-0.112***	-0.088***	-0.067***	0.033	-0.036*	-0.101***
	(0.039)	(0.034)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.021)	(0.018)
Location: Urban	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)		(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)		(.)	(.)
Location: Rural	-0.105***	-0.091***	-0.045**		-0.042	-0.078***
	(0.020)	(0.027)	(0.021)		(0.028)	(0.017)
Employment status: Employed	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Employment status: Unemployed/Inactive	0.005	-0.021	0.001	-0.000	0.026	0.028**
	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.016)	(0.013)

Marital status: Single	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Marital status: Married/With partner	0.010	0.025	-0.058***	-0.050***	-0.056***	-0.047***
	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.012)
Race/ethnicity/language: English	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Race/ethnicity/language: French	-0.078**	-0.118***	-0.023	-0.164***	-0.241***	-0.100***
	(0.033)	(0.045)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.021)
Race/ethnicity/language: Other	0.026	0.054	0.053*	0.188***	0.041	-0.041*
	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.030)	(0.045)	(0.027)	(0.022)
Region: Eastern	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Region: Ontario	0.054*	0.007	0.012	-0.050*	-0.095***	-0.086***
	(0.029)	(0.034)	(0.023)	(0.029)	(0.025)	(0.020)
Region: Quebec	0.017	0.098**	-0.060*	-0.268***	-0.198***	-0.095***
	(0.037)	(0.044)	(0.032)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.024)
Region: Western	-0.018	-0.107***	-0.076***	-0.200***	-0.235***	-0.214***
	(0.031)	(0.035)	(0.024)	(0.028)	(0.025)	(0.020)
Constant	0.666***	0.741***	0.764***	0.674***	0.860***	0.838***
	(0.059)	(0.062)	(0.040)	(0.043)	(0.039)	(0.031)
R-squared	0.09	0.10	0.05	0.09	0.11	0.08
Observations	11112	7188	13319	7025	11959	20018
Clusters	2642	2381	3368	3646	5872	12260

Note: The table reports the effect of a set of individual characteristics on the probability to vote for Liberal / NDP / Green by decade in Canada. The original survey dataset is duplicated for each income bracket to approximate income deciles (see methodology). The number of clusters corresponds to the number of surveyed individuals in each decade. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level.

Table E5 - Determinants of support for Social Democratic Party / Socialist People's Party / Social Liberal Party / Red-Green Alliance in Denmark

	(1) 1960-69	(2) 1970-79	(3) 1980-89	(4) 1990-99	(5) 2000-09	(6) 2010-20
Education: None/Primary	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Education: Secondary	-0.200***	-0.163***	0.004	-0.063***	-0.002	0.057***
	(0.043)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.022)
Education: University	-0.249***	-0.115***	-0.018	-0.037**	0.070***	0.095***
	(0.072)	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.025)
Income group: Bottom 50%	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Income group: Middle 40%	0.084**	0.005	-0.003	-0.031**	-0.083***	-0.029
	(0.039)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.020)
Income group: Top 10%	-0.041	-0.150***	-0.223***	-0.216***	-0.201***	-0.161***
	(0.058)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.031)
Age: 20-39	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Age: 40-59	-0.007	-0.061***	-0.113***	0.064***	0.099***	0.046**
	(0.033)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.019)
Age: 60+	-0.034	-0.086***	-0.156***	-0.093***	-0.001	-0.014
	(0.043)	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.025)
Gender: Woman	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Gender: Man	0.005	0.006	0.010	-0.034**	-0.068***	-0.087***
	(0.037)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.016)
Religious practice: Never	(baseline)	(baseline)		(baseline)	(baseline)	
	(.)	(.)		(.)	(.)	
Religious practice: Less than monthly	-0.016	-0.031		-0.065***	-0.073***	
	(0.057)	(0.048)		(0.024)	(0.018)	
Religious practice: Monthly or more	-0.154**	-0.143**		-0.151***	-0.175***	
	(0.067)	(0.060)		(0.050)	(0.035)	
Location: Urban		(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
		(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Location: Rural		-0.213***	-0.111***	-0.069***	-0.077***	-0.098***
		(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.017)
Employment status: Employed	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Employment status: Unemployed/Inactive	0.057	-0.049***	-0.005	-0.008	-0.020	0.067***
	(0.040)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.025)
Marital status: Single	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Marital status: Married/With partner	-0.039	-0.078***	-0.002	-0.023	-0.043***	0.013
	(0.038)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.017)
Region: Capital	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Region: Central Jutland	-0.139***	-0.076***	-0.088***	-0.050**	-0.071***	-0.047
	(0.041)	(0.024)	(0.016)	(0.022)	(0.018)	(0.031)
Region: Northern Jutland	-0.130***	-0.103***	-0.080***	-0.036	-0.010	0.005
	(0.049)	(0.031)	(0.022)	(0.030)	(0.024)	(0.045)
Region: Southern Denmark	-0.036	-0.067***	-0.034	-0.106***	-0.068***	-0.059*
	(0.048)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.018)	(0.032)

Region: Zealand	-0.037	-0.019	-0.017	-0.041*	-0.061***	-0.038
	(0.044)	(0.026)	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.038)
Constant	0.752***	1.072***	0.754***	0.742***	0.612***	0.556***
	(0.078)	(0.055)	(0.021)	(0.030)	(0.026)	(0.038)
R-squared	0.10	0.09	0.07	0.05	0.05	0.04
Observations	11059	22837	24186	23048	20258	7069
Clusters	1137	1923	3809	2028	3987	2174

Note: The table reports the effect of a set of individual characteristics on the probability to vote for Social Democratic Party / Socialist People's Party / Social Liberal Party / Red-Green Alliance by decade in Denmark. The original survey dataset is duplicated for each income bracket to approximate income deciles (see methodology). The number of clusters corresponds to the number of surveyed individuals in each decade. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level.

	(1) 1970-79	(2) 1980-89	(3) 1990-99	(4) 2000-09	(5) 2010-20
Table E6 - Determinants of support for Social Democratic Party / Finnish People's Democratic League / Left Alliance / Green League in Finland					
Education: None/Primary	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Education: Secondary	-0.187***	-0.159***	-0.113***	-0.070***	-0.041
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.025)	(0.038)
Education: University	-0.337***	-0.261***	-0.188***	-0.131***	-0.086**
	(0.032)	(0.026)	(0.021)	(0.029)	(0.041)
Income group: Bottom 50%	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Income group: Middle 40%	0.022	-0.067***	-0.006	-0.057**	-0.021
	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.022)	(0.023)
Income group: Top 10%	-0.115***	-0.193***	-0.089***	-0.087***	-0.077***
	(0.028)	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.028)	(0.027)
Age: 20-39	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Age: 40-59	-0.050***	-0.044***	0.052***	0.027	-0.046*
	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.021)	(0.027)
Age: 60+	-0.081***	-0.086***	-0.079***	-0.055**	-0.092***
	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Gender: Woman	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Gender: Man	0.071***	0.016	-0.049***	0.003	-0.042**
	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.018)	(0.021)
Location: Urban			(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
			(.)	(.)	(.)
Location: Rural			-0.141***	-0.121***	-0.086***
			(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.023)
Employment status: Employed		(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
		(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Employment status: Unemployed/Inactive		-0.049***	0.020	-0.004	0.043*
		(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.021)	(0.024)
Marital status: Single	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Marital status: Married/With partner	0.039	0.023	-0.005	-0.017	-0.023
	(0.037)	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.022)	(0.023)
Region: Central Finland	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Region: Northern Finland	-0.036	0.001	0.055***	-0.078**	-0.038
	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.020)	(0.031)	(0.042)
Region: Southern Finland	0.094***	0.078***	0.145***	0.059***	0.062*
	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.032)
Constant	0.501***	0.534***	0.517***	0.553***	0.502***
	(0.046)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.035)	(0.049)
R-squared	0.07	0.05	0.06	0.04	0.03
Observations	7403	9839	11737	7665	5175
Clusters	1358	1196	2480	1562	1442

Note: The table reports the effect of a set of individual characteristics on the probability to vote for left-wing parties by decade in Finland. The original survey dataset is duplicated for each income bracket to approximate income deciles (see methodology). The number of clusters corresponds to the number of surveyed individuals in each decade. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level.

Table E7 - Determinants of support for PS / PCF / Radicaux / Other left in France

	(1) 1950-59	(2) 1960-69	(3) 1970-79	(4) 1980-89	(5) 1990-99	(6) 2000-09	(7) 2010-20
Education: None/Primary	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Education: Secondary	-0.089***	-0.054***	-0.048***	-0.017	-0.009	0.002	0.046*
	(0.026)	(0.018)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.025)
Education: University	-0.238***	-0.078**	-0.094***	-0.031	0.081***	0.062***	0.177***
	(0.055)	(0.037)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.030)
Income group: Bottom 50%	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Income group: Middle 40%	-0.030	-0.022	-0.014	-0.071***	-0.007	-0.011	-0.015
	(0.030)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.019)
Income group: Top 10%	-0.015	-0.133***	-0.153***	-0.160***	-0.090***	-0.065***	-0.098***
	(0.056)	(0.031)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.030)
Age: 20-39	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Age: 40-59	-0.033	-0.029	-0.083***	-0.064***	0.022	0.036***	0.058***
	(0.025)	(0.018)	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.021)
Age: 60+	-0.092***	-0.069***	-0.157***	-0.068***	-0.012	0.002	0.020
	(0.033)	(0.023)	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.028)
Gender: Woman	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Gender: Man	0.168***	0.070***	0.014	-0.040***	-0.019*	-0.013	-0.016
	(0.026)	(0.017)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.017)
Religion: None		(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
		(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Religion: Catholic		-0.227***	-0.299***	-0.305***	-0.243***	-0.207***	-0.189***
		(0.041)	(0.012)	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.020)
Religion: Other Christian		-0.033	-0.323***	-0.357***	-0.320***	-0.308***	-0.214***
		(0.073)	(0.033)	(0.046)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.062)
Religion: Other			-0.273***	-0.143***	-0.121**	-0.096**	-0.026
			(0.044)	(0.055)	(0.051)	(0.046)	(0.059)
Religion: Muslim				-0.135	0.261***	0.207***	0.281***
				(0.111)	(0.052)	(0.043)	(0.037)
Location: Urban	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)		(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)		(.)	(.)	(.)
Location: Rural	0.012	-0.024	-0.052***		-0.024	-0.052***	-0.095***
	(0.025)	(0.017)	(0.011)		(0.025)	(0.012)	(0.019)
Employment status: Employed	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Employment status: Unemployed/Inactive	0.035	-0.009	-0.003	-0.008	-0.013	0.003	0.034
	(0.029)	(0.020)	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.022)
Marital status: Single	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Marital status: Married/With partner	0.102***	-0.001	0.033***	0.002	0.011	-0.028**	-0.038*
	(0.034)	(0.022)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.019)
Region: Auvergne-Rhone-Alpes	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Region: Bourgogne-Franche-Comte	0.054	-0.006	-0.073***	0.031	0.051*	-0.003	-0.028
	(0.066)	(0.037)	(0.027)	(0.031)	(0.028)	(0.049)	(0.078)
Region: Bretagne	-0.058	-0.062*	-0.058**	0.129***	0.046	0.041	0.009
	(0.058)	(0.037)	(0.026)	(0.033)	(0.029)	(0.048)	(0.062)
Region: Centre-Val de Loire	-0.057	-0.007	-0.103***	-0.032	0.017	-0.072	-0.022
	(0.060)	(0.047)	(0.024)	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.052)	(0.076)
Region: Grand Est	-0.162***	-0.133***	-0.035*	-0.010	0.023	0.008	-0.154***
	(0.052)	(0.036)	(0.020)	(0.028)	(0.022)	(0.039)	(0.058)
Region: Hauts-de-France	0.035	0.014	-0.043**	0.060**	0.036*	-0.042	-0.135**
	(0.045)	(0.034)	(0.020)	(0.027)	(0.022)	(0.038)	(0.056)

Region: Ile-de-France	0.051	0.003	0.021	-0.022	-0.016	-0.020	-0.063
	(0.068)	(0.038)	(0.018)	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.037)	(0.052)
Region: Normandie	-0.138**	-0.147***	-0.050**	-0.041	0.044*	-0.033	0.007
	(0.055)	(0.038)	(0.021)	(0.032)	(0.025)	(0.047)	(0.074)
Region: Nouvelle-Aquitaine	0.046	0.058	0.025	0.066**	0.018	-0.039	-0.037
	(0.047)	(0.036)	(0.020)	(0.028)	(0.023)	(0.040)	(0.059)
Region: Occitanie	0.155***	0.149***	0.112***	0.034	0.015	-0.011	0.036
	(0.052)	(0.039)	(0.021)	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.040)	(0.056)
Region: PACA	0.148**	0.064	0.014	-0.060**	-0.094***	-0.081*	-0.170***
	(0.064)	(0.045)	(0.023)	(0.029)	(0.025)	(0.042)	(0.063)
Region: Paris	0.071	0.060	-0.007	-0.028	-0.084**	0.100	-0.066
	(0.051)	(0.040)	(0.024)	(0.037)	(0.034)	(0.062)	(0.093)
Region: Pays de la Loire	-0.152***	-0.181***	-0.045*	0.001	0.003	0.076*	-0.039
	(0.056)	(0.039)	(0.024)	(0.029)	(0.025)	(0.044)	(0.064)
Constant	0.550***	0.732***	0.948***	0.874***	0.793***	0.645***	0.646***
	(0.072)	(0.053)	(0.022)	(0.031)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.051)
R-squared	0.09	0.12	0.18	0.11	0.09	0.11	0.12
Observations	3650	9522	20668	15563	17578	18054	7122
Clusters	1339	1936	4474	3819	3964	3953	2457

Note: The table reports the effect of a set of individual characteristics on the probability to vote for left-wing parties (PS, PCF, Radicaux, etc.) by decade in France. The original survey dataset is duplicated for each income bracket to approximate income deciles (see methodology). The number of clusters corresponds to the number of surveyed individuals in each decade. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level.

Table E8 - Determinants of support for SPD / Die Grünen / Die Linke in Germany

	(1) 1950-59	(2) 1960-69	(3) 1970-79	(4) 1980-89	(5) 1990-99	(6) 2000-09	(7) 2010-20
Education: None/Primary	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Education: Secondary	-0.155***	-0.139***	-0.166***	-0.066**	-0.043*	-0.090***	-0.008
	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.028)
Education: University	-0.172***	-0.189***	-0.263***	-0.090**	0.032	-0.005	0.072**
	(0.031)	(0.038)	(0.042)	(0.039)	(0.028)	(0.024)	(0.033)
Education: Postgraduate						-0.056	0.115***
						(0.042)	(0.034)
Income group: Bottom 50%	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)		(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)		(.)	(.)	(.)
Income group: Middle 40%	-0.009	-0.013	-0.026		-0.061**	-0.032*	-0.045*
	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.023)		(0.025)	(0.018)	(0.023)
Income group: Top 10%	-0.119***	-0.187***	-0.136***		-0.143***	-0.118***	-0.167***
	(0.022)	(0.027)	(0.042)		(0.044)	(0.030)	(0.037)
Age: 20-39	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Age: 40-59	-0.013	-0.030	-0.059**	-0.066***	-0.044*	0.031	0.041
	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.029)
Age: 60+	-0.071***	-0.096***	-0.088***	-0.097***	-0.132***	-0.064***	0.015
	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.030)
Gender: Woman	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Gender: Man	0.122***	0.077***	0.003	-0.041*	-0.053***	-0.013	-0.029
	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.021)
Religion: None	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Religion: Catholic	-0.298***	-0.116	-0.191***	-0.170***	-0.131***	-0.207***	-0.091***
	(0.044)	(0.139)	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.035)	(0.030)	(0.034)
Religion: Other Christian	-0.196***	0.063	-0.016	-0.077	-0.053*	-0.047*	-0.022
	(0.043)	(0.139)	(0.052)	(0.050)	(0.031)	(0.026)	(0.030)
Religion: Other	-0.157*	-0.443***	-0.166	0.024	0.103	0.106*	0.129
	(0.083)	(0.139)	(0.107)	(0.128)	(0.100)	(0.062)	(0.080)
Religious practice: Never	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Religious practice: Less than monthly	-0.138***	-0.155***	-0.201***	-0.092***	-0.130***	-0.087***	-0.052*
	(0.022)	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.022)	(0.029)
Religious practice: Monthly or more	-0.301***	-0.270***	-0.381***	-0.288***	-0.301***	-0.201***	-0.190***
	(0.021)	(0.037)	(0.042)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.037)
Region: East					(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
					(.)	(.)	(.)
Region: West					0.093***	-0.008	0.045*
					(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.024)
Constant	0.738***	0.605***	0.851***	0.788***	0.777***	0.728***	0.514***
	(0.045)	(0.143)	(0.054)	(0.051)	(0.032)	(0.029)	(0.039)
R-squared	0.13	0.11	0.16	0.08	0.10	0.08	0.04
Observations	15983	5837	4993	3034	5849	9169	6293
Clusters	4705	2958	2155	3034	3937	4726	3131

Note: The table reports the effect of a set of individual characteristics on the probability to vote for SPD / Die Grünen / Die Linke by decade in Germany. The original survey dataset is duplicated for each income bracket to approximate income deciles (see methodology). The number of clusters corresponds to the number of surveyed individuals in each decade. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level.

Table E9 - Determinants of support for Social Democratic Alliance / Left-Green movement in Iceland

	(1) 1970-79	(2) 1980-89	(3) 1990-99	(4) 2000-09	(5) 2010-20
Education: None/Primary	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Education: Secondary	0.084*	0.028	0.022	-0.022	0.029
	(0.048)	(0.024)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.019)
Education: University	0.125*	0.014	0.111***	0.075***	0.084***
	(0.073)	(0.043)	(0.027)	(0.024)	(0.020)
Income group: Bottom 50%		(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
		(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Income group: Middle 40%		-0.045*	-0.040**	-0.091***	-0.042**
		(0.027)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.016)
Income group: Top 10%		-0.087**	-0.035	-0.122***	-0.097***
		(0.039)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.022)
Age: 20-39	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Age: 40-59	-0.107**	-0.075***	-0.021	0.013	0.010
	(0.043)	(0.024)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.017)
Age: 60+	-0.105**	-0.142***	0.011	-0.002	0.074***
	(0.053)	(0.029)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.019)
Gender: Woman	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Gender: Man	-0.041	-0.067***	-0.110***	-0.112***	-0.083***
	(0.044)	(0.022)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.016)
Location: Urban	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Location: Rural	0.007	-0.014	0.003	-0.140***	-0.059**
	(0.065)	(0.036)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.027)
Employment status: Employed	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Employment status: Unemployed/Inactive	-0.020	-0.109***	-0.090***	-0.082***	-0.125***
	(0.047)	(0.026)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.019)
Marital status: Single	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Marital status: Married/With partner	0.085*	-0.024	-0.041**	0.008	-0.053***
	(0.048)	(0.026)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.018)
Region: Capital area	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Region: East	-0.148	-0.081	-0.018	-0.043	0.012
	(0.105)	(0.056)	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.047)
Region: Northeast	-0.030	-0.053	-0.007	0.108***	0.079**
	(0.082)	(0.046)	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.034)
Region: Northwest	-0.236**	-0.232***	-0.142***	-0.021	-0.017
	(0.108)	(0.057)	(0.045)	(0.050)	(0.049)
Region: South	-0.207**	-0.171***	-0.059	0.026	0.005
	(0.085)	(0.044)	(0.036)	(0.039)	(0.033)
Region: Sudurnes	-0.007	-0.145***	0.036	0.043	-0.027
	(0.098)	(0.053)	(0.042)	(0.046)	(0.038)
Region: West	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)

Constant	0.505***	0.688***	0.568***	0.683***	0.474***
	(0.066)	(0.038)	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.026)
R-squared	0.06	0.06	0.05	0.06	0.05
Observations	716	4498	9618	9245	9516
Clusters	716	1598	1688	1550	1981

Note: The table reports the effect of a set of individual characteristics on the probability to vote for Social Democratic Alliance / Left-Green movement by decade in Iceland. The original survey dataset is duplicated for each income bracket to approximate income deciles (see methodology). The number of clusters corresponds to the number of surveyed individuals in each decade. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level.

Table E10 - Determinants of support for Fianna Fáil / Sinn Féin / Other left-wing parties in Ireland

	(1) 1970-79	(2) 1980-89	(3) 1990-99	(4) 2000-09	(5) 2010-20
Education: None/Primary	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Education: Secondary	-0.099***	-0.073***	-0.050***	-0.064***	-0.095***
	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.026)
Education: University	-0.188***	-0.205***	-0.120***	-0.128***	-0.151***
	(0.035)	(0.020)	(0.026)	(0.022)	(0.028)
Income group: Bottom 50%	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Income group: Middle 40%	-0.004	-0.061***	-0.044***	-0.029	-0.048***
	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Income group: Top 10%	-0.069***	-0.118***	-0.125***	-0.041	-0.095***
	(0.025)	(0.015)	(0.026)	(0.032)	(0.026)
Age: 20-39	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Age: 40-59	-0.085***	-0.056***	-0.042***	-0.043***	-0.034*
	(0.016)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.018)
Age: 60+	-0.092***	-0.071***	-0.074***	-0.090***	-0.056***
	(0.019)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.021)
Gender: Woman	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Gender: Man	0.027*	0.056***	0.027**	0.036***	0.004
	(0.015)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Religion: None	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Religion: Catholic	-0.102	0.063	0.061	0.010	-0.046*
	(0.099)	(0.048)	(0.046)	(0.042)	(0.027)
Religion: Other Christian	-0.416***	-0.269***	-0.301***	-0.185***	-0.203***
	(0.105)	(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.055)	(0.045)
Religion: Other	-0.346***	-0.147*	0.066	0.217**	0.008
	(0.133)	(0.083)	(0.086)	(0.101)	(0.057)
Religion: Muslim				0.131	0.048
				(0.124)	(0.168)
Religious practice: Never	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Religious practice: Less than monthly	-0.011	-0.064	-0.065*	-0.047	-0.045
	(0.089)	(0.043)	(0.037)	(0.040)	(0.028)
Religious practice: Monthly or more	-0.013	-0.046	-0.112***	-0.061	-0.073***
	(0.085)	(0.039)	(0.034)	(0.040)	(0.028)
Location: Urban	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)		
	(.)	(.)	(.)		
Location: Rural	-0.103***	-0.058***	-0.043***		
	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.013)		
Employment status: Employed	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Employment status: Unemployed/Inactive	0.010	0.048***	0.061***	0.025	0.036**
	(0.017)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.016)
Marital status: Single	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)

Marital status: Married/With partner	-0.006	0.008	-0.007	-0.013	-0.033**
	(0.014)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.016)
Region: Border				(baseline)	(baseline)
				(.)	(.)
Region: Dublin				0.062**	-0.038
				(0.029)	(0.026)
Region: Mid-East				-0.023	-0.046
				(0.036)	(0.030)
Region: Mid-West				-0.049	-0.069**
				(0.035)	(0.032)
Region: Midlands				-0.020	-0.081**
				(0.040)	(0.036)
Region: South-East				-0.001	-0.049
				(0.035)	(0.030)
Region: South-West				0.002	-0.026
				(0.031)	(0.028)
Region: West				-0.129***	-0.151***
				(0.034)	(0.030)
Constant	0.959***	0.730***	0.783***	0.776***	0.849***
	(0.058)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.039)	(0.040)
R-squared	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.06
Observations	17708	31395	18108	12435	16099
Clusters	8254	18359	12790	2384	2678

Note: The table reports the effect of a set of individual characteristics on the probability to vote for Fianna Fáil / Sinn Féin / Labour / Other left by decade in Ireland. The original survey dataset is duplicated for each income bracket to approximate income deciles (see methodology). The number of clusters corresponds to the number of surveyed individuals in each decade. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level.

Table E11 - Determinants of support for Social Democrats / Socialists / Communists / Greens in Italy

	(1) 1950-59	(2) 1960-69	(3) 1970-79	(4) 1980-89	(5) 1990-99	(6) 2000-09	(7) 2010-20
Education: None/Primary	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Education: Secondary	-0.123**	-0.050**	-0.034	-0.026	-0.014	-0.011	0.070**
	(0.048)	(0.024)	(0.034)	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.023)	(0.032)
Education: University	-0.243**	-0.030	-0.135**	0.012	0.043	0.041	0.137***
	(0.098)	(0.050)	(0.064)	(0.042)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.036)
Income group: Bottom 50%	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)		(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)		(.)	(.)
Income group: Middle 40%	0.075*	-0.040**	0.016	0.013		-0.059	0.089***
	(0.044)	(0.017)	(0.028)	(0.024)		(0.057)	(0.018)
Income group: Top 10%	0.063	-0.096***	-0.008	0.012		-0.076	0.097***
	(0.091)	(0.035)	(0.049)	(0.042)		(0.070)	(0.020)
Age: 20-39	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Age: 40-59	-0.124**	-0.036*	-0.011	-0.026	0.020	0.018	0.047**
	(0.050)	(0.022)	(0.032)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Age: 60+	-0.080	-0.112***	-0.079**	-0.055	-0.023	0.017	0.150***
	(0.065)	(0.027)	(0.038)	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.025)	(0.026)
Gender: Woman	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Gender: Man	0.293***	0.104***	0.023	0.014	0.014	0.010	-0.025
	(0.052)	(0.023)	(0.032)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.018)
Religion: None	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Religion: Catholic	0.047	-0.161***	-0.159***	-0.106*	-0.165***	-0.178***	-0.222***
	(0.179)	(0.045)	(0.055)	(0.065)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.065)
Religion: Other	-0.186			0.071	-0.061	-0.081	-0.419***
	(0.197)			(0.060)	(0.045)	(0.073)	(0.106)
Religious practice: Never	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Religious practice: Less than monthly	-0.027	-0.067	-0.073	-0.130***	-0.137***	-0.140***	-0.053**
	(0.082)	(0.042)	(0.049)	(0.040)	(0.035)	(0.026)	(0.022)
Religious practice: Monthly or more	-0.425***	-0.377***	-0.424***	-0.433***	-0.208***	-0.183***	-0.107***
	(0.074)	(0.042)	(0.048)	(0.039)	(0.033)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Location: Urban	(baseline)	(baseline)			(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)			(.)	(.)	(.)
Location: Rural	-0.141***	-0.029			0.006	-0.007	-0.024
	(0.046)	(0.023)			(0.040)	(0.021)	(0.042)
Employment status: Employed	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Employment status: Unemployed/Inactive	0.109**	-0.062***	-0.069**	0.014	-0.021	0.004	-0.013
	(0.050)	(0.024)	(0.033)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.020)
Marital status: Single	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Marital status: Married/With partner	-0.016	0.053**	0.007	0.016	0.010	0.020	-0.001
	(0.050)	(0.022)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.027)	(0.018)	(0.021)
Region: Center	(baseline)	(baseline)		(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)		(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Region: Islands	-0.270***	-0.139***		-0.315***	-0.066	-0.091**	0.005
	(0.082)	(0.035)		(0.073)	(0.043)	(0.040)	(0.034)
Region: North	0.021	-0.031		-0.044	-0.114***	-0.049*	0.021
	(0.059)	(0.026)		(0.046)	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.025)
Region: South	-0.219***	-0.136***		-0.180***	-0.072**	-0.031	0.004
	(0.065)	(0.029)		(0.054)	(0.035)	(0.033)	(0.029)
Constant	0.696***	0.985***	0.948***	0.954***	0.838***	0.799***	0.478***
	(0.179)	(0.042)	(0.052)	(0.068)	(0.058)	(0.074)	(0.074)

R-squared	0.34	0.21	0.21	0.18	0.07	0.04	0.08
Observations	2197	7780	3333	5608	4243	5268	12033
Clusters	523	2422	1238	1602	2406	2867	2045

Note: The table reports the effect of a set of individual characteristics on the probability to vote for Social Democrats / Socialists / Communists / Greens by decade in Italy. The original survey dataset is duplicated for each income bracket to approximate income deciles (see methodology). The number of clusters corresponds to the number of surveyed individuals in each decade. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level.

Table E12 - Determinants of support for LSAP / Greens / Other left in Luxembourg

	(1) 1970-79	(2) 1980-89	(3) 1990-99	(4) 2000-09	(5) 2010-20
Education: None/Primary	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Education: Secondary	-0.103***	-0.135***	-0.077***	0.099	-0.007
	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.064)	(0.071)
Education: University	-0.228***	-0.190***	-0.061**	0.082	0.050
	(0.040)	(0.033)	(0.031)	(0.062)	(0.070)
Income group: Bottom 50%	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	
Income group: Middle 40%	-0.051**	-0.076***	-0.060***	-0.028	
	(0.022)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.047)	
Income group: Top 10%	-0.122***	-0.103***	-0.079***	-0.185***	
	(0.033)	(0.026)	(0.021)	(0.067)	
Age: 20-39	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Age: 40-59	-0.031	-0.117***	-0.095***	0.104*	0.010
	(0.024)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.055)	(0.058)
Age: 60+	-0.110***	-0.228***	-0.202***	-0.019	-0.067
	(0.035)	(0.025)	(0.020)	(0.073)	(0.066)
Gender: Woman	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Gender: Man	0.089***	0.044***	-0.014	0.003	0.049
	(0.023)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.042)	(0.043)
Religion: None	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Religion: Catholic	-0.077	-0.181***	-0.204***	-0.032	-0.124
	(0.055)	(0.044)	(0.041)	(0.074)	(0.078)
Religion: Other Christian	0.102	0.019	0.038	0.091	0.113
	(0.137)	(0.147)	(0.107)	(0.085)	(0.130)
Religion: Other	-0.015	0.087	-0.121	0.377***	-0.072
	(0.204)	(0.109)	(0.101)	(0.086)	(0.134)
Religious practice: Never	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Religious practice: Less than monthly	-0.168***	-0.112***	-0.115***	-0.239***	-0.133*
	(0.040)	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.067)	(0.071)
Religious practice: Monthly or more	-0.379***	-0.353***	-0.286***	-0.333***	-0.200**
	(0.040)	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.078)	(0.080)
Location: Urban	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)		(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)		(.)
Location: Rural	-0.114***	-0.081***	-0.034*		-0.066
	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.018)		(0.047)
Employment status: Employed	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Employment status: Unemployed/Inactive	0.044*	0.027	0.014	0.019	-0.028
	(0.026)	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.059)	(0.068)
Marital status: Single	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Marital status: Married/With partner	0.006	0.011	0.038**	0.052	0.065
	(0.023)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.046)	(0.074)

Region: Centre					(baseline)
					(.)
Region: East					0.134*
					(0.075)
Region: North					0.104
					(0.073)
Region: South					0.091*
					(0.051)
Constant	0.821***	0.996***	0.847***	0.411***	0.518***
	(0.059)	(0.049)	(0.047)	(0.086)	(0.095)
R-squared	0.10	0.10	0.07	0.12	0.10
Observations	7744	8821	10633	1705	692
Clusters	3561	4761	6229	761	466

Note: The table reports the effect of a set of individual characteristics on the probability to vote for LSAP / Greens / Other left in Luxembourg. The original survey dataset is duplicated for each income bracket to approximate income deciles (see methodology). The number of clusters corresponds to the number of surveyed individuals in each decade. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level.

Table E13 - Determinants of support for PvdA / D66 / Greens / Other left in the Netherlands

	(1) 1960-69	(2) 1970-79	(3) 1980-89	(4) 1990-99	(5) 2000-09	(6) 2010-20
Education: None/Primary	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Education: Secondary	-0.088***	-0.093***	-0.136***	-0.136***	0.058***	-0.004
	(0.022)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.026)	(0.018)	(0.020)
Education: University	-0.077*	-0.127***	-0.099***	-0.008	0.154***	0.100***
	(0.042)	(0.026)	(0.021)	(0.031)	(0.024)	(0.022)
Education: Postgraduate					0.194***	0.165***
					(0.042)	(0.037)
Income group: Bottom 50%	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Income group: Middle 40%	-0.014	-0.068***	-0.110***	-0.071***	-0.028*	-0.028*
	(0.024)	(0.018)	(0.014)	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.014)
Income group: Top 10%	-0.204***	-0.226***	-0.234***	-0.184***	-0.168***	-0.103***
	(0.037)	(0.029)	(0.023)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.020)
Age: 20-39	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Age: 40-59	-0.055**	-0.023	-0.047***	0.020	0.102***	0.065***
	(0.023)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.017)
Age: 60+	-0.064**	-0.077***	-0.101***	-0.131***	0.028	0.014
	(0.030)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.021)
Gender: Woman	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Gender: Man	0.021	-0.032*	0.007	-0.087***	-0.061***	-0.068***
	(0.026)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.013)
Religion: None	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Religion: Catholic	-0.229***	-0.131***	-0.133***	-0.131***	-0.154***	-0.108***
	(0.046)	(0.031)	(0.023)	(0.032)	(0.026)	(0.021)
Religion: Other Christian	-0.128***	-0.129***	-0.138***	-0.195***	-0.194***	-0.182***
	(0.042)	(0.027)	(0.022)	(0.030)	(0.025)	(0.023)
Religion: Other	0.008	-0.076	0.002	0.026	-0.050	-0.031
	(0.073)	(0.055)	(0.034)	(0.049)	(0.042)	(0.035)
Religion: Muslim					0.537***	0.364***
					(0.056)	(0.062)
Religious practice: Never	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Religious practice: Less than monthly	-0.087*	-0.168***	-0.158***	-0.071**	-0.076**	0.011
	(0.052)	(0.034)	(0.025)	(0.035)	(0.030)	(0.029)
Religious practice: Monthly or more	-0.388***	-0.440***	-0.345***	-0.242***	-0.206***	-0.150***
	(0.039)	(0.026)	(0.019)	(0.028)	(0.023)	(0.022)
Location: Urban	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Location: Rural	-0.023	-0.053***	-0.041***	-0.034*	-0.022	-0.060***
	(0.021)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.015)
Employment status: Employed	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Employment status: Unemployed/Inactive	-0.002	-0.022	0.010	0.027	0.011	0.044**
	(0.028)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.017)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Marital status: Single	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Marital status: Married/With partner	0.009	-0.004	0.023	-0.024	-0.073***	-0.059***
	(0.028)	(0.023)	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.014)
Region: East	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Region: North	-0.044	0.017	0.033	0.073*	0.078***	0.077***
	(0.034)	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.040)	(0.027)	(0.024)
Region: South	0.018	0.048**	0.024	0.043	0.012	0.012
	(0.029)	(0.023)	(0.019)	(0.035)	(0.023)	(0.020)
Region: West	-0.027	-0.019	-0.024	-0.038	-0.033*	-0.007
	(0.028)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.031)	(0.019)	(0.017)
Constant	0.818***	0.947***	0.846***	0.858***	0.526***	0.529***
	(0.053)	(0.033)	(0.025)	(0.040)	(0.029)	(0.028)
R-squared	0.31	0.29	0.21	0.17	0.16	0.09
Observations	3025	7479	10041	5401	6139	9884
Clusters	1753	2186	2110	1956	2590	3215

Note: The table reports the effect of a set of individual characteristics on the probability to vote for PvdA / D66 / Greens / Other left by decade in the Netherlands. The original survey dataset is duplicated for each income bracket to approximate income deciles (see methodology). The number of clusters corresponds to the number of surveyed individuals in each decade. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level.

Table E14 - Determinants of support for Labour / Greens / Other left in New Zealand

	(1) 1970-79	(2) 1980-89	(3) 1990-99	(4) 2000-09	(5) 2010-20
Education: None/Primary	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Education: Secondary	-0.096***	-0.080***	-0.029***	-0.020	-0.032*
	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.018)
Education: University	-0.073**	-0.119***	-0.019	0.031	0.072***
	(0.030)	(0.039)	(0.017)	(0.022)	(0.023)
Education: Postgraduate				0.151***	0.159***
				(0.028)	(0.029)
Income group: Bottom 50%	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Income group: Middle 40%	-0.015	-0.012	-0.043***	-0.124***	-0.098***
	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.017)
Income group: Top 10%	-0.208***	-0.072**	-0.132***	-0.169***	-0.183***
	(0.032)	(0.035)	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Age: 20-39	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Age: 40-59	0.002	-0.067***	0.038***	0.013	-0.008
	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.021)
Age: 60+	-0.016	-0.101***	0.029*	-0.010	-0.105***
	(0.027)	(0.032)	(0.015)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Gender: Woman	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Gender: Man	0.056***	0.001	-0.051***	-0.086***	-0.043***
	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Religion: None	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Religion: Catholic	0.051	-0.024	-0.010	-0.038	-0.062**
	(0.038)	(0.060)	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.029)
Religion: Other Christian	-0.090***	-0.082*	-0.105***	-0.111***	-0.101***
	(0.031)	(0.049)	(0.014)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Religion: Other	-0.055	0.173*	-0.014	0.007	0.034
	(0.049)	(0.091)	(0.029)	(0.035)	(0.036)
Religion: Muslim				0.154	0.305***
				(0.199)	(0.082)
Religious practice: Never	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Religious practice: Less than monthly	-0.059*	-0.025	-0.042***	-0.002	0.008
	(0.032)	(0.048)	(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.021)
Religious practice: Monthly or more	-0.079**	-0.048	-0.123***	-0.128***	-0.016
	(0.032)	(0.049)	(0.014)	(0.020)	(0.022)
Location: Urban			(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
			(.)	(.)	(.)
Location: Rural			-0.089***	-0.098***	-0.077***
			(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.022)
Employment status: Employed	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Employment status: Unemployed/Inactive	-0.007	0.007	0.064***	0.030*	0.060***
	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.017)

Marital status: Single	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Marital status: Married/With partner	0.020	0.029	-0.073***	-0.037**	-0.037**
	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.011)	(0.017)	(0.019)
Race/ethnicity/language: European	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Race/ethnicity/language: Maori	0.293***	0.277***	0.173***	0.364***	0.339***
	(0.057)	(0.052)	(0.019)	(0.023)	(0.021)
Race/ethnicity/language: Other	0.214***	0.116	0.177***	0.212***	0.046
	(0.079)	(0.088)	(0.025)	(0.038)	(0.034)
Region: Auckland		(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
		(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Region: Other		0.042	0.118***	0.093***	0.032*
		(0.033)	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.017)
Region: Wellington		0.068	0.077**	0.117***	0.104***
		(0.048)	(0.032)	(0.028)	(0.024)
Constant	0.670***	0.688***	0.659***	0.550***	0.516***
	(0.035)	(0.132)	(0.025)	(0.029)	(0.031)
R-squared	0.05	0.04	0.06	0.11	0.10
Observations	6539	8027	26066	17102	17512
Clusters	1581	1482	5815	3680	3419

Note: The table reports the effect of a set of individual characteristics on the probability to vote for Labour / Greens / Other left by decade in New Zealand. The original survey dataset is duplicated for each income bracket to approximate income deciles (see methodology). The number of clusters corresponds to the number of surveyed individuals in each decade. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level.

Table E15 - Determinants of support for Labour Party / Socialist Left Party / Other left in Norway

	(1) 1950-59	(2) 1960-69	(3) 1970-79	(4) 1980-89	(5) 1990-99	(6) 2000-09	(7) 2010-20
Education: None/Primary	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Education: Secondary	-0.373***	-0.344***	-0.261***	-0.216***	-0.110***	-0.018	-0.014
	(0.035)	(0.025)	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.023)	(0.018)	(0.033)
Education: University	-0.457***	-0.409***	-0.310***	-0.218***	-0.146***	0.029	0.051
	(0.053)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.019)	(0.035)
Income group: Bottom 50%	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Income group: Middle 40%	0.005	-0.001	-0.013	-0.045***	0.030	-0.035**	0.009
	(0.031)	(0.021)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.023)
Income group: Top 10%	-0.239***	-0.194***	-0.168***	-0.239***	-0.100***	-0.146***	-0.151***
	(0.045)	(0.029)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.031)	(0.024)	(0.030)
Age: 20-39	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Age: 40-59	-0.091***	-0.048**	-0.030	0.046***	-0.022	0.014	-0.034
	(0.030)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.022)
Age: 60+	-0.226***	-0.122***	-0.129***	-0.018	-0.099***	-0.058***	-0.051**
	(0.043)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.017)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.025)
Gender: Woman	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Gender: Man	0.013	0.059***	0.035*	-0.022*	-0.037**	-0.105***	-0.080***
	(0.039)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.017)
Location: Urban	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Location: Rural	-0.113***	-0.128***	-0.095***	-0.142***	-0.129***	-0.063***	-0.113***
	(0.029)	(0.021)	(0.027)	(0.016)	(0.028)	(0.015)	(0.020)
Employment status: Employed	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)			(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)			(.)	(.)
Employment status: Unemployed/Inactive	-0.034	0.059	0.016			0.015	-0.002
	(0.043)	(0.039)	(0.024)			(0.018)	(0.023)
Marital status: Single	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Marital status: Married/With partner	0.119***	0.104***	0.041*	0.093***	-0.016	-0.010	-0.031
	(0.037)	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.022)	(0.017)	(0.021)
Region: East				(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
				(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Region: North				-0.053*	-0.048	-0.004	-0.003
				(0.027)	(0.033)	(0.027)	(0.036)
Region: South and Oslo				-0.136***	-0.079***	-0.065***	-0.082***
				(0.020)	(0.025)	(0.020)	(0.028)
Region: Trondelag				-0.026	-0.003	-0.011	-0.014
				(0.027)	(0.034)	(0.027)	(0.038)
Region: West				-0.212***	-0.160***	-0.148***	-0.146***
				(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.020)	(0.029)
Constant	0.705***	0.533***	0.630***	0.678***	0.738***	0.594***	0.585***
	(0.047)	(0.039)	(0.028)	(0.024)	(0.035)	(0.028)	(0.047)
R-squared	0.18	0.15	0.09	0.11	0.04	0.04	0.05
Observations	2404	5125	8931	12608	5085	7359	4433
Clusters	1170	1598	2393	2184	2119	2082	1887

Note: The table reports the effect of a set of individual characteristics on the probability to vote for Labour Party / Socialist Left Party / Other left by decade in Norway. The original survey dataset is duplicated for each income bracket to approximate income deciles (see methodology). The number of clusters corresponds to the number of surveyed individuals in each decade. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level.

Table E16 - Determinants of support for Socialists / Communists / Greens / Left bloc in Portugal

	(1) 1980-89	(2) 1990-99	(3) 2000-09	(4) 2010-20
Education: None/Primary	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Education: Secondary	-0.108**	-0.038	-0.028	-0.023
	(0.048)	(0.046)	(0.022)	(0.037)
Education: University	-0.172***	-0.090	-0.120***	-0.175***
	(0.065)	(0.068)	(0.030)	(0.055)
Income group: Bottom 50%	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Income group: Middle 40%	0.002	-0.069*	-0.023	-0.042
	(0.037)	(0.040)	(0.018)	(0.035)
Income group: Top 10%	-0.140*	-0.150**	-0.130***	-0.124**
	(0.079)	(0.066)	(0.029)	(0.059)
Age: 20-39	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Age: 40-59	-0.006	-0.001	0.011	-0.007
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.023)	(0.042)
Age: 60+	-0.103**	-0.020	-0.103***	-0.024
	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.028)	(0.050)
Gender: Woman	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Gender: Man	0.055	0.018	-0.019	-0.015
	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.019)	(0.029)
Religion: None	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Religion: Catholic	-0.147	-0.093	-0.117	-0.116**
	(0.107)	(0.098)	(0.081)	(0.058)
Religion: Other	0.003	-0.029	-0.143	-0.030
	(0.161)	(0.159)	(0.098)	(0.099)
Religious practice: Never	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Religious practice: Less than monthly	-0.043	-0.156**	0.001	-0.062
	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.030)	(0.047)
Religious practice: Monthly or more	-0.168***	-0.221***	-0.108***	-0.192***
	(0.065)	(0.068)	(0.030)	(0.049)
Location: Urban	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Location: Rural	-0.105***	0.021	-0.054***	-0.043
	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.018)	(0.034)
Employment status: Employed	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Employment status: Unemployed/Inactive	-0.063	-0.101**	0.021	0.060*
	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.020)	(0.035)
Marital status: Single	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Marital status: Married/With partner	0.031	0.095***	-0.008	-0.004
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.021)	(0.033)
Region: Alentejo	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)

Region: Algarve	-0.511***	-0.566***	-0.188***	-0.200**
	(0.061)	(0.063)	(0.054)	(0.096)
Region: Center	-0.242***	-0.283***	-0.234***	-0.367***
	(0.062)	(0.065)	(0.038)	(0.069)
Region: Lisbon	-0.206***	-0.227***	-0.094**	-0.156**
	(0.053)	(0.056)	(0.037)	(0.071)
Region: North	-0.334***	-0.404***	-0.167***	-0.229***
	(0.054)	(0.052)	(0.035)	(0.067)
Constant	1.109***	0.980***	0.978***	1.074***
	(0.111)	(0.106)	(0.091)	(0.099)
R-squared	0.14	0.11	0.07	0.11
Observations	7986	3442	12259	3759
Clusters	1223	1407	2459	1105

Note: The table reports the effect of a set of individual characteristics on the probability to vote for Socialists / Communists / Greens / Left bloc by decade. The original survey dataset is duplicated for each income bracket to approximate income deciles (see methodology). The number of clusters corresponds to the number of surveyed individuals in each decade. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level.

Table E17 - Determinants of support for PSOE / Podemos / IU / Other left in Spain

	(1) 1980-89	(2) 1990-99	(3) 2000-09	(4) 2010-20
Education: None/Primary	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Education: Secondary	-0.101***	-0.081***	-0.045***	-0.065***
	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Education: University	-0.172***	-0.178***	-0.074***	-0.073***
	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Education: Postgraduate	-0.375***	-0.297**	-0.124***	-0.080**
	(0.144)	(0.134)	(0.042)	(0.035)
Income group: Bottom 50%	(baseline)		(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)		(.)	(.)
Income group: Middle 40%	-0.029		-0.055***	-0.034***
	(0.018)		(0.010)	(0.009)
Income group: Top 10%	-0.144***		-0.123***	-0.080***
	(0.032)		(0.016)	(0.015)
Age: 20-39	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Age: 40-59	-0.148***	-0.093***	0.022**	0.034***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Age: 60+	-0.169***	-0.121***	-0.038***	0.027**
	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Gender: Woman	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Gender: Man	0.045***	0.024*	-0.067***	-0.048***
	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.007)
Religion: None	(baseline)		(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)		(.)	(.)
Religion: Catholic	-0.303***		-0.220***	-0.280***
	(0.025)		(0.012)	(0.011)
Religion: Other	0.021		-0.047	-0.009
	(0.084)		(0.047)	(0.029)
Religious practice: Never	(baseline)		(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)		(.)	(.)
Religious practice: Less than monthly	-0.139***		-0.132***	-0.136***
	(0.024)		(0.012)	(0.011)
Religious practice: Monthly or more	-0.398***		-0.259***	-0.267***
	(0.021)		(0.011)	(0.010)
Location: Urban	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Location: Rural	-0.093***	-0.096***	-0.036**	-0.008
	(0.018)	(0.028)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Employment status: Employed	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Employment status: Unemployed/Inactive	0.010	0.013	0.001	0.023**
	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Marital status: Single	(baseline)		(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)		(.)	(.)
Marital status: Married/With partner	0.019		-0.008	-0.007
	(0.018)		(0.010)	(0.008)

Region: Andalucia	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Region: Aragon	-0.101***	-0.185***	-0.014	-0.011
	(0.032)	(0.036)	(0.024)	(0.022)
Region: Asturias	-0.083**	-0.092**	(baseline)	0.009
	(0.034)	(0.038)	(0.026)	(0.021)
Region: Baleares	-0.230***	-0.239***	-0.187***	-0.043*
	(0.041)	(0.045)	(0.028)	(0.024)
Region: Basque Country	-0.107***	-0.173***	-0.185***	0.041*
	(0.028)	(0.033)	(0.022)	(0.021)
Region: Canarias	-0.203***	-0.269***	-0.251***	-0.042**
	(0.032)	(0.035)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Region: Cantabria	-0.189***	-0.076	-0.060*	0.140***
	(0.047)	(0.059)	(0.033)	(0.030)
Region: Castilla La Mancha	-0.233***	-0.230***	-0.079***	-0.067***
	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.020)	(0.019)
Region: Castilla y Leon	-0.239***	-0.211***	-0.107***	-0.090***
	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.017)	(0.018)
Region: Catalonia	-0.209***	-0.147***	-0.063***	0.017
	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Region: Extremadura	-0.141***	(baseline)	0.014	-0.010
	(0.035)	(0.038)	(0.024)	(0.020)
Region: Galicia	-0.249***	-0.177***	-0.035**	(baseline)
	(0.020)	(0.028)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Region: Madrid	-0.110***	-0.154***	-0.120***	-0.081***
	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.016)	(0.014)
Region: Murcia	-0.103***	-0.237***	-0.224***	-0.091***
	(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.023)	(0.019)
Region: Navarra	0.016	-0.025	0.023	0.108***
	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.036)	(0.030)
Region: Rioja	-0.171**	-0.289***	-0.138**	-0.044
	(0.070)	(0.062)	(0.057)	(0.034)
Region: Valencia	-0.109***	-0.203***	-0.185***	-0.022
	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Region: Ceuta				-0.278***
				(0.040)
Region: Melilla				-0.227***
				(0.063)
Constant	1.447***	0.749***	0.982***	0.836***
	(0.093)	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.019)
R-squared	0.13	0.05	0.13	0.14
Observations	20532	11048	45305	74833
Clusters	4358	4925	6005	6216

Note: The table reports the effect of a set of individual characteristics on the probability to vote for PSOE / Podemos / IU / Other left by decade in Spain. The original survey dataset is duplicated for each income bracket to approximate income deciles (see methodology). The number of clusters corresponds to the number of surveyed individuals in each decade. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level.

Table E18 - Determinants of support for Social Democratic Party / Left Party / Green Party in Sweden

	(1) 1950-59	(2) 1960-69	(3) 1970-79	(4) 1980-89	(5) 1990-99	(6) 2000-09	(7) 2010-20
Education: None/Primary	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Education: Secondary	-0.312***	-0.244***	-0.218***	-0.199***	-0.163***	-0.108***	-0.036
	(0.025)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.023)	(0.033)
Education: University	-0.513***	-0.472***	-0.302***	-0.323***	-0.255***	-0.212***	-0.029
	(0.034)	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.024)	(0.037)
Income group: Bottom 50%	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Income group: Middle 40%	0.121***	0.051***	0.026**	0.050***	0.010	-0.024**	-0.085***
	(0.027)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.022)
Income group: Top 10%	-0.048	-0.052***	-0.136***	-0.053***	-0.121***	-0.189***	-0.225***
	(0.039)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.029)
Age: 20-39	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Age: 40-59	-0.071***	-0.061***	-0.024**	-0.062***	0.017	0.050***	-0.016
	(0.024)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.029)
Age: 60+	-0.135***	-0.079***	-0.061***	-0.086***	-0.061***	-0.096***	-0.012
	(0.030)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.032)
Gender: Woman	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Gender: Man	0.027	0.018	0.021**	-0.040***	-0.036***	-0.031**	-0.030
	(0.021)	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.023)
Religious practice: Never	(baseline)	(baseline)		(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)		(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Religious practice: Less than monthly	-0.190***	-0.270***		-0.229***	-0.193***	-0.169***	-0.113**
	(0.039)	(0.017)		(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.028)	(0.047)
Religious practice: Monthly or more	0.119***	0.128***		0.137***	0.106***	0.093***	0.046*
	(0.037)	(0.019)		(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.027)
Location: Urban	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Location: Rural	-0.097***	-0.122***	-0.214***	-0.167***	-0.133***	-0.090***	-0.072**
	(0.022)	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.030)
Employment status: Employed				(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
				(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Employment status: Unemployed/Inactive				0.024	0.030*	0.032	0.019
				(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.028)
Marital status: Single	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Marital status: Married/With partner	0.028	0.046***	-0.004	0.017	0.019	-0.019	-0.001
	(0.024)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.029)
Region: Gotland					(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
					(.)	(.)	(.)
Region: Norrland					0.139***	0.110***	0.186***
					(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.037)
Region: Svealand					-0.002	-0.011	0.032
					(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.024)
Constant	0.855***	0.688***	0.634***	0.718***	0.690***	0.663***	0.536***
	(0.147)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.023)	(0.031)	(0.046)
R-squared	0.16	0.15	0.06	0.09	0.09	0.07	0.05
Observations	4441	18082	24545	22345	15299	14440	9405
Clusters	1414	3234	4536	3745	3450	3370	2684

Note: The table reports the effect of a set of individual characteristics on the probability to vote for Social Democratic Party / Left Party / Green Party by decade in Sweden. The original survey dataset is duplicated for each income bracket to approximate income deciles (see methodology). The number of clusters corresponds to the number of surveyed individuals in each decade. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level.

Table E19 - Determinants of support for Social Democrats / Greens / Other left in Switzerland

	(1) 1960-69	(2) 1970-79	(3) 1980-89	(4) 1990-99	(5) 2000-09	(6) 2010-20
Education: None/Primary	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Education: Secondary	-0.053	-0.059**	0.045	(baseline)	0.032	0.036*
	(0.068)	(0.024)	(0.043)	(0.026)	(0.021)	(0.020)
Education: University	-0.217***	-0.069	-0.033	0.062*	0.147***	0.193***
	(0.065)	(0.043)	(0.070)	(0.037)	(0.029)	(0.023)
Income group: Bottom 50%		(baseline)		(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
		(.)		(.)	(.)	(.)
Income group: Middle 40%		-0.022		0.018	0.003	0.012
		(0.031)		(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.011)
Income group: Top 10%		-0.114***		-0.050*	-0.111***	-0.049***
		(0.044)		(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.017)
Age: 20-39	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Age: 40-59	0.020	0.024	-0.105**	-0.051**	0.007	-0.006
	(0.055)	(0.023)	(0.046)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.015)
Age: 60+	-0.042	-0.024	-0.122**	-0.117***	-0.082***	-0.056***
	(0.070)	(0.028)	(0.054)	(0.026)	(0.021)	(0.016)
Gender: Woman		(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
		(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Gender: Man		0.017	-0.007	-0.054***	-0.066***	-0.082***
		(0.025)	(0.040)	(0.018)	(0.014)	(0.011)
Religion: None	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Religion: Catholic	-0.383***	-0.203***	-0.376***	-0.136***	-0.136***	-0.090***
	(0.139)	(0.077)	(0.079)	(0.048)	(0.034)	(0.028)
Religion: Other Christian	-0.255*	-0.123	-0.245***	-0.047	-0.060*	-0.050*
	(0.132)	(0.075)	(0.080)	(0.047)	(0.034)	(0.028)
Religion: Other	-0.149	-0.044	-0.114	-0.019	-0.084**	-0.107***
	(0.328)	(0.136)	(0.148)	(0.068)	(0.042)	(0.036)
Religious practice: Never	(baseline)	(baseline)		(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)		(.)	(.)	(.)
Religious practice: Less than monthly	-0.137*	-0.081**		-0.100***	-0.073**	-0.093***
	(0.078)	(0.036)		(0.035)	(0.029)	(0.026)
Religious practice: Monthly or more	-0.312***	-0.270***		-0.221***	-0.183***	-0.218***
	(0.087)	(0.039)		(0.038)	(0.032)	(0.028)
Location: Urban	(baseline)	(baseline)		(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)		(.)	(.)	(.)
Location: Rural	-0.162***	-0.120***		-0.080***	-0.118***	-0.118***
	(0.050)	(0.025)		(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.011)
Employment status: Employed	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Employment status: Unemployed/Inactive	0.028	-0.015	0.094**	-0.000	-0.042**	0.001
	(0.081)	(0.027)	(0.048)	(0.023)	(0.018)	(0.014)
Marital status: Single	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Marital status: Married/With partner	-0.053	-0.016	-0.045	-0.049***	-0.018	-0.061***
	(0.056)	(0.025)	(0.043)	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.012)

Region: French	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Region: German	-0.017	-0.016	-0.148***	-0.041*	-0.049***	-0.054***
	(0.060)	(0.029)	(0.055)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.014)
Region: Italian	-0.087	-0.019	-0.299***	-0.123***	-0.039*	-0.111***
	(0.105)	(0.063)	(0.070)	(0.030)	(0.023)	(0.017)
Constant	1.038***	0.831***	0.779***	0.675***	0.641***	0.644***
	(0.123)	(0.084)	(0.099)	(0.046)	(0.033)	(0.028)
R-squared	0.17	0.10	0.11	0.07	0.10	0.11
Observations	456	3294	900	11775	11681	18865
Clusters	456	2182	582	6599	6567	11127

Note: The table reports the effect of a set of individual characteristics on the probability to vote for Social Democrats / Greens / Other left by decade in Switzerland. The original survey dataset is duplicated for each income bracket to approximate income deciles (see methodology). The number of clusters corresponds to the number of surveyed individuals in each decade. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level.

	(1) 1950-59	(2) 1960-69	(3) 1970-79	(4) 1980-89	(5) 1990-99	(6) 2000-09	(7) 2010-20
Table E20 - Determinants of support for the Labour Party in the United Kingdom							
Education: None/Primary	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Education: Secondary	-0.214***	-0.190***	-0.177***	-0.130***	-0.129***	-0.072***	-0.022*
	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Education: University	-0.213***	-0.212***	-0.207***	-0.114***	-0.090***	-0.131***	-0.034**
	(0.065)	(0.053)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.017)
Education: Postgraduate					0.033	-0.057**	0.010
					(0.050)	(0.026)	(0.021)
Income group: Bottom 50%	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Income group: Middle 40%	-0.165***	-0.084***	-0.039***	-0.167***	-0.142***	-0.078***	-0.047***
	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Income group: Top 10%	-0.346***	-0.371***	-0.180***	-0.259***	-0.222***	-0.131***	-0.106***
	(0.030)	(0.023)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.021)
Age: 20-39	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Age: 40-59	-0.039*	-0.048***	-0.012	-0.046***	-0.034***	-0.062***	-0.052***
	(0.023)	(0.018)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.016)
Age: 60+	-0.165***	-0.089***	-0.067***	-0.075***	-0.060***	-0.100***	-0.132***
	(0.028)	(0.022)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.019)
Gender: Woman	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Gender: Man	0.102***	0.053***	0.026***	0.033***	0.021**	0.004	-0.020*
	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Religion: None	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Religion: Catholic	-0.131*	0.068	0.074***	0.096***	0.095***	0.110***	0.084***
	(0.070)	(0.055)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Religion: Other Christian	-0.241***	-0.131***	-0.093***	-0.093***	-0.091***	-0.056***	-0.068***
	(0.060)	(0.048)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Religion: Other	-0.290**	-0.134	0.096***	-0.090**	-0.069*	-0.093***	-0.026
	(0.116)	(0.084)	(0.036)	(0.041)	(0.036)	(0.026)	(0.044)
Religion: Muslim				0.043	-0.028	-0.058	0.220***
				(0.062)	(0.076)	(0.074)	(0.050)
Employment status: Employed	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Employment status: Unemployed/Inactive	0.007	0.037*	0.024**	0.002	-0.019	-0.012	0.023
	(0.026)	(0.022)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.015)
Marital status: Single	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Marital status: Married/With partner	0.072***	0.059***	0.029***	-0.004	0.013	0.004	-0.046***
	(0.025)	(0.020)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Race/ethnicity: African / Caribbean			(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
			(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Race/ethnicity: Indian / Pak. / Bang.			0.101	0.141***	-0.077	-0.028	-0.146**
			(0.134)	(0.054)	(0.064)	(0.082)	(0.061)
Race/ethnicity: Other			-0.310	-0.408***	-0.176**	-0.260***	-0.295***
			(0.231)	(0.069)	(0.076)	(0.074)	(0.060)
Race/ethnicity: White			-0.326***	-0.242***	-0.329***	-0.337***	-0.371***
			(0.081)	(0.039)	(0.036)	(0.055)	(0.043)
Constant	0.782***	0.647***	0.888***	0.751***	0.893***	0.886***	0.840***
	(0.067)	(0.053)	(0.082)	(0.040)	(0.038)	(0.057)	(0.046)
R-squared	0.12	0.10	0.06	0.09	0.08	0.05	0.09
Observations	5122	6732	26522	18740	17793	14053	15439
Clusters	2025	2377	8082	7409	6770	5957	5760

Note: The table reports the effect of a set of individual characteristics on the probability to vote for the Labour Party by decade in Britain. The original survey dataset is duplicated for each income bracket to approximate income deciles (see methodology). The number of clusters corresponds to the number of surveyed individuals in each decade. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level.

Table E21 - Determinants of support for the Democratic Party in the United States

	(1) 1948-59	(2) 1960-69	(3) 1970-79	(4) 1980-89	(5) 1990-99	(6) 2000-09	(7) 2010-20
Education: None/Primary	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Education: Secondary	-0.115***	-0.106***	-0.026	-0.126***	-0.098***	-0.100***	-0.031
	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.026)
Education: University	-0.149***	-0.164***	-0.057*	-0.137***	-0.166***	-0.071*	0.077***
	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.028)
Education: Postgraduate		-0.178***	0.041	0.020	-0.105**	0.005	0.217***
		(0.051)	(0.045)	(0.037)	(0.046)	(0.047)	(0.028)
Income group: Bottom 50%	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Income group: Middle 40%	-0.037*	0.004	-0.072***	-0.051**	-0.080***	-0.047**	-0.006
	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.013)
Income group: Top 10%	-0.124***	-0.078**	-0.177***	-0.173***	-0.134***	-0.140***	-0.002
	(0.028)	(0.031)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.022)
Age: 20-39	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Age: 40-59	-0.049**	-0.026	-0.031	0.029	0.084***	-0.011	-0.040***
	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.014)
Age: 60+	-0.118***	-0.107***	-0.051*	0.009	0.045	-0.011	-0.033**
	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.015)
Gender: Woman	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Gender: Man	0.035*	-0.013	-0.046**	-0.070***	-0.100***	-0.081***	-0.062***
	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.011)
Religion: Catholic	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Religion: Other Christian	-0.191***	-0.403***	-0.136***	-0.122***	-0.141***	-0.102***	-0.102***
	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.015)
Religion: Other	-0.112*	-0.229***	0.068	0.018	-0.035	-0.012	0.034*
	(0.064)	(0.074)	(0.047)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.032)	(0.019)
Religious practice: Never	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Religious practice: Less than monthly	-0.038	-0.021	-0.043	-0.009	-0.079**	0.018	-0.030
	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.020)
Religious practice: Monthly or more	-0.082*	-0.113**	-0.092***	-0.042	-0.212***	-0.125***	-0.136***
	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.016)
Location: Urban	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	
Location: Rural	-0.012	0.050**	-0.018	-0.017	-0.003	-0.030	
	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.047)	
Employment status: Employed			(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
			(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Employment status: Unemployed/Inactive			-0.026	-0.012	-0.060**	0.017	0.020
			(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.013)
Marital status: Single	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Marital status: Married/With partner	0.003	0.032	-0.021	-0.009	-0.036	-0.064***	-0.080***
	(0.034)	(0.026)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.013)
Race/ethnicity/language: Black	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Race/ethnicity/language: White	-0.248***	-0.458***	-0.521***	-0.543***	-0.507***	-0.575***	-0.497***
	(0.049)	(0.036)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.019)
Race/ethnicity/language: Other		-0.792***	-0.318***	-0.376***	-0.348***	-0.411***	-0.289***
		(0.210)	(0.065)	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.032)	(0.024)
Region: North Central	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)

Region: Northeast	-0.111***	-0.073***	-0.016	-0.043*	0.040	-0.022	-0.015
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.023)
Region: South	0.129***	0.036	-0.046**	-0.021	-0.009	-0.094***	-0.079***
	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.018)
Region: West	0.001	0.009	-0.040	0.017	0.001	0.031	0.003
	(0.033)	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.021)
Constant	0.997***	1.415***	1.244***	1.211***	1.407***	1.375***	1.131***
	(0.077)	(0.064)	(0.046)	(0.044)	(0.053)	(0.055)	(0.038)
R-squared	0.12	0.19	0.15	0.18	0.21	0.21	0.20
Observations	6532	5513	4498	4892	3491	5301	19023
Clusters	1718	1486	2138	1986	1821	2043	7765

Note: The table reports the effect of a set of individual characteristics on the probability to vote for the Democratic Party by decade in the United States. The original survey dataset is duplicated for each income bracket to approximate income deciles (see methodology). The number of clusters corresponds to the number of surveyed individuals in each decade. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level.

Figure EA1 - Vote for Labor / Greens by education level in Australia

Source: authors' computations using Australian political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Labor / Greens by education level.

Figure EA2 - Vote for SPÖ / KPÖ / Greens / NEOS by education level in Austria

Source: authors' computations using Austrian political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by SPÖ / KPÖ / Greens / NEOS by education level.

Figure EA3 - Vote for Socialists / Greens by education level in Belgium

Source: authors' computations using Belgian political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by socialist and green parties by education level.

Figure EA4 - Vote for Liberal / NDP / Green by education level in Canada

Source: authors' computations using Canadian election studies.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Liberal / NDP / Green parties by education level.

Figure EA5 - Vote for Social Democratic Party / Socialist People's Party / Social Liberal Party / Red-Green Alliance by education level in Denmark

Source: authors' computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Social Democratic Party / Socialist People's Party / Social Liberal Party / Red-Green Alliance by education level.

Figure EA6 - Vote for Social Democratic Party / Finnish People's Democratic League / Left Alliance / Green League by education level in Finland

Source: authors' computations using Finnish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Social Democratic Party / Finnish People's Democratic League / Left Alliance / Green League by education level.

Figure EA7 - Vote for PS / PCF / Radicaux / Other left by education level in France

Source: authors' computations using French electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties (PS, PCF, Radicaux, etc.) by education level.

Figure EA8 - Vote for SPD / Die Grünen / Die Linke by education level in Germany

Source: authors' computations using German election studies.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by SPD / Die Grünen / Die Linke by education level.

Figure EA9 - Vote for Social Democratic Alliance / Left-Green movement by education level in Iceland

Source: authors' computations using Icelandic post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Social Democratic Alliance / Left-Green movement by education level.

Figure EA10 - Vote for Fianna Fáil / Sinn Féin / Labour / Other left by education level in Ireland

Source: authors' computations using Irish political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Fianna Fáil and left-wing parties by education level.

Figure EA11 - Vote for Social Democrats / Socialists / Communists / Greens by education level in Italy

Figure EA12 - Vote for LSAP / Greens / Other left by education level in Luxembourg

Source: authors' computations using Luxembourg political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by LSAP / Greens / Other left by education level.

Figure EA13 - Vote for PvdA / D66 / Greens / Other left by education level in the Netherlands

Figure EA14 - Vote for Labour / Greens / Other left by education level in New Zealand

Source: authors' computations using New Zealand political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by education level.

Figure EA15 - Vote for Labour Party / Socialist Left Party / Other left by education level in Norway

Source: authors' computations using Norwegian post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Labour Party / Socialist Left Party / Other left by education level.

Figure EA16 - Vote for Socialists / Communists / Greens / Left bloc by education level in Portugal

Source: authors' computations using Portuguese political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by education level.

Figure EA17 - Vote for PSOE / Podemos / IU / Other left by education level in Spain

Source: authors' computations using Spanish political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by education level.

Figure EA18 - Vote for Social Democratic Party / Left Party / Green Party by education level in Sweden

Source: authors' computations using Swedish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by education level.

Figure EA19 - Vote for Social Democrats / Greens / Other left by education level in Switzerland

Source: authors' computations using Swiss political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by center-left / left-wing parties by education level.

Figure EA20 - Vote for the Labour Party by education level in the United Kingdom

Source: authors' computations using British electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Labour Party by education level.

Figure EA21 - Vote for the Democratic Party by education level in the United States

Figure EB1 - Vote for Labor / Greens by income group in Australia

Source: authors' computations using Australian political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received Labor / Greens by income group.

Figure EB2 - Vote SPÖ / KPÖ / Greens / NEOS by income group in Austria

Legend: Bottom 50% ■ (blue), Middle 40% ■ (red), Top 10% ■ (green)

Source: authors' computations using Austrian political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by SPÖ / KPÖ / Greens / NEOS by income group.

Figure EB3 - Vote for Socialists / Greens by income group in Belgium

Source: authors' computations using Belgian political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by socialist and green parties by income group.

Figure EB4 - Vote for Liberal / NDP / Green by income group in Canada

Figure EB5 - Vote for Social Democratic Party / Socialist People's Party / Social Liberal Party / Red-Green Alliance by income group in Denmark

Source: authors' computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Social Democratic Party / Socialist People's Party / Social Liberal Party / Red-Green Alliance by income group.

Figure EB6 - Vote for Social Democratic Party / Finnish People's Democratic League / Left Alliance / Green League by income group in Finland

Figure EB7 - Vote for PS / PCF / Radicaux / Other left by income group in France

Legend: ■ Bottom 50% ■ Middle 40% ■ Top 10%

X-axis: 1948-59, 1960-69, 1970-79, 1980-89, 1990-99, 2000-09, 2010-20

Y-axis: 0% to 60%

Source: authors' computations using French post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the PS / PCF / Radicaux / Other left by income group.

Figure EB8 - Vote for SPD / Die Grünen / Die Linke by income group in Germany

Legend:
- Bottom 50%
- Middle 40%
- Top 10%

Source: authors' computations using German post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the SPD / Die Grünen / Die Linke by income group.

Figure EB9 - Vote for Social Democratic Alliance / Left-Green movement by income group in Iceland

Source: authors' computations using Icelandic post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by income group.

Figure EB10 - Vote for Fianna Fáil / Sinn Féin / Labour / Other left by income group in Ireland

Source: authors' computations using Irish political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Fianna Fáil and left-wing parties by income group.

Figure EB11 - Vote for Social Democrats / Socialists / Communists / Greens by income group in Italy

Figure EB12 - Vote for LSAP / Greens / Other left by income group in Luxembourg

Source: authors' computations using Luxembourg political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by LSAP / Greens / Other left by income group.

Figure EB13 - Vote for PvdA / D66 / Greens / Other left by income group in the Netherlands

Source: authors' computations using Dutch political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by PvdA / D66 / Greens / Other left by income group.

Figure EB14 - Vote for Labour / Greens / Other left by income group in New Zealand

Figure EB15 - Vote for Labour Party / Socialist Left Party / Other left by income group in Norway

Source: authors' computations using Norwegian post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Labour Party / Socialist Left Party / Other left by income group.

Figure EB16 - Vote for Socialists / Communists / Greens / Left bloc by income group in Portugal

Figure EB17 - Vote for PSOE / Podemos / IU / Other left by income group in Spain

Source: authors' computations using Spanish political attitudes surveys.
**Note**: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by income group. In the 1993-2000 decade, income is only available in 2000.

Figure EB18 - Vote for Social Democratic Party / Left Party / Green Party by income group in Sweden

Source: authors' computations using Swedish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by income group.

Figure EB19 - Vote for Social Democrats / Greens / Other left by income group in Switzerland

Source: authors' computations using Swiss political attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by center-left / left-wing parties by income group.

Figure EB20 - Vote for the Labour Party by income group in the United Kingdom

Source: authors' computations using British post-electoral surveys.
**Note**: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Labour Party by income group.

Figure EB21 - Vote for the Democratic Party by income group in the United States

Legend: Bottom 50% (blue), Middle 40% (red), Top 10% (green)

Source: authors' computations using US electoral surveys.
**Note**: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Democratic Party by income group.

Figure EC1 - Vote for PS / PCF / Radicaux / Other left by income decile in France

Legend: 1958, 1962, 1967, 1978, 1986, 1988, 1995, 2007, 2012

Source: authors' computations using French post-electoral surveys 1958-2012.
Note: in 1978, left-wing parties (PS, PCF, Radicaux, etc.) obtained 46% of the vote among voters with bottom 10% income, 23% of the vote among top 10% income voters, and 17% among the top 1%. Generally speaking, the profile of left-wing vote by income percentile is relatively flat within the bottom 90%, and strongly declining for the top 10%, especially at the beginning of the period.

Figure EC2 - Vote for PS / PCF / Radicaux / Other left by wealth decile in France

Source: authors' computations using French post-electoral surveys 1974-2012.
Note: in 1978, left-wing parties (PS, PCF, Radicaux, etc.) obtained 69% of the vote among voters with bottom 10% wealth, 23% of the vote among voters with top 10% wealth, and 13% among top 1% wealth holders. Generally speaking, the profile of left-wing vote by wealth percentile is strongly declining, all along the distribution, especially at the begining of the period.